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ABSTRACT 
Everyone is an environmental manager, whether they alter or maintain their personal 
socio-ecological space, or command the operations of a major production company or 
infrastructure developments. Historically the social impacts of organisation have been 
more insidious than the ecological impacts, but now there is much less of a definition 
between social and ecological impact - they are most often bound together. 
At the end of the 20th century, technological and 'scientific' developments, personal 
goals and aspirations, and a psychological separation from nature and its 'laws' means 
that impacts of individual or collective decisions on socio-ecological integrity have 
burgeoned. Gravitation towards managing and exploiting our socio-ecological 
environment has not been matched by a growth in our ability to predict the impacts of 
our actions. 
The greater the impact potential, the greater is the need for ethical consideration in 
environmental management. Yet deliberate and default benignity in actions has been 
eroded as fast as impact potential has grown. The fundamental belief in personal gain, 
and the arrogant psychological and expressed independence from our biological 
dependence on nature, have severed any accord between many sections of human 
society and the rest of nature. 
This dualistic outlook can be explained, especially as social and infrastructural 
developments reinforce destructive and divisive lifestyles, however a watershed of 
socio-environmental and ethical issue awareness brings with it the possibility of 
reinstating an accord with our surroundings. 
Reformist responses to calls for socio-environmental responsibility have brought 
about improvements, and ethical consideration is either explicit or implicit in this. But 
even the most prestigious responses such as environmental economics offer, at best, 
short term partial protection from further socio-ecological degradation, and are of 
questionable utility for procedural and principle based reasons. At worst they offer 
piecemeal, delayed, and inadequate reactions geared towards staying, questioning or 
denying responses and issues, or to resolving symptoms of problems and consciences. 
However there are several linked frameworks offering potential for the ecologisation 
of society, for rectifying indifference to social and environmental decay. Deep, social 
and transpersonal ecologies, and education from non-industrial societies, provide 
outlook frameworks which can assist in the reorientation of development patterns 
towards community organicisation and the redressing socio-ecological discord. 
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The aim of this thesis is to consider the level, nature and potential of ethical 
consideration in environmental management. Analysis on this theme is by no means 
new, but it is timely since the scope and scale of the impact of environmental 
management on each other and Nature-not-Man have for some time, and continue, to 
escalate very quickly. The great frequency and scale of adverse impacts on socio-
ecological integrity are increasingly acknowledged. Simultaneously, vested interests 
and ignorance continue to fuel future breaches of this integrity. 
For almost every ethical issue in environmental management, there is a current or 
historical explanation, often accompanied by a barrage of excuses. Humbled in 
private conversation, few are able to defend the consequences of many socio-
environmentally-impacting projects which regularly reach the media. Others, though 
resigned to the status-quo, regret that it is as it is. That troubled conscience about our 
adverse impacts has precipitated many types of responses might be encouraging. But 
too often the easiest paths to a clear conscience, rather than a fundamental resolution 
of the problems, is taken. So the dislocative process continues, in parallel the 
degradation of socio-ecological integrity. 
Talk of Malthusian collapse scenarios may or may not carry substance, but decay in 
the environment of humans and the rest of nature is abundantly clear. Little of the 
adverse impact is necessary for a global human species to exist with high life quality, 
and indeed the current trends or stasis in integrity corrosion is working directly 
against human interests, and also against the interests of the rest of Nature: of Nature-
not-Man. 
Further, this type of dualistic perception of the world is being questioned. We totally 
depend on the rest of nature, but it could do without us. We are a part of it, not a 
separate or distinctly special species - there is nothing inherently important about our 
intellectual capacities, especially if the products of this are gross destruction and 
divisiveness. However a distinction based on 'transformative impact', primary nature 
(Nature-not-Man) and secondary nature (human affected), is useful in discourse. 
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There is a growing belief that wider human society has much to re-learn from cultures 
which have not followed western industrial development paths. This is not to say that 
the products of these routes are all 'bad', but it is clear that there is much which can 
only serve damaging and disruptive ends. Much of what has become normalised, as 
characteristic of 'civilised' living, is the cause of widespread environmental and social 
disruption and inequity. Trading systems in a spuriously named 'global village' 
currently accommodate many of the following : mass levels of deliberate and/or 
inadvertent adverse impacts on the lives of poorer sections of national and global 
populations - as well as direct racist discrimination; excessive/inapropriate agro-
chemical and biocide applications; vast distances between places of production and 
consumption; huge ratios of input to output; immoral excess of wasted production; 
vast areas of land and ecosystem razing and scouring; huge levels of explosives 
application for industrial, political and experimental purposes; and increasingly large 
scales of administration of people. 
The scale of all these activities has 'denuded' the individual, both human and animal. 
One recurring theme is that people often unwittingly, or through apathy, ignorance, 
incomprehension, and cultural stasis, directly cause or demand actions that breach 
sound ethicality. As Passmore (1980) states: 
To understand why human beings behave as they do, we shall do better in many 
cases to appeal by way of explanation to their ignorance, fear, vanity, greed, bigotry, 
their lust for power - and sometimes, fortunately, to their generosity, affection, 
courage, and creativity - than to the moral principles to which they officially 
subscribe. 
As mentioned above, responses to awareness of the problematic effects of a collective 
human society (very much weighted towards western society) have tended towards 
the least possible effort to arrive at a clear conscience (and in public life, least 
tarnished image) rather than seriously addressing and solving the problems. However, 
of the attempts maie, 'environmental economies' has been one of the most 
'prestigious' efforts. But it is fraught with questions of procedure and legitimacy, 
especially since it works with the value systems and evaluative processes which have 
brought about the need for change, rather than questioning them. Other attempts to 
reforming human activities may be welcomed in the reformative context, but they are 
often contradictory, evasive of real change, or just spoken and written, when action 
(or its cessation) is the only true source of value in the context of reducing adverse 
impacts. 
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It is contradictory and insidious to consider 'green-consumerism', 'environmentalism', 
and 'green-business' as 'growth industries' - this sort of 'greenness' simply extends the 
life-expectancy of 'high mass consumption', hiding the degradation processes behind 
a facade of resolution, and it tends to confuse (mislead) those seeking to live in a 
more benign way. 
The object of this thesis then is to analyse these themes, to consider the strength of 
ethical regard (and indeed inherent ethicality in some cases) in our lifestyles of 
consumption and activities. Further, an analysis of approaches to the future is made. 
In this context, and with the premise that the status-quo is not a viable or favourable 
option for the future, reformist and less contradictory radical approaches are 
considered. 
The other side of the fence. 
Passmore (1980) observes that "it is not fashionable nowadays...to try to understand 
why your opponents think and feel as they do". Throughout this thesis, every effort 
has been made to avoid this kind of tunnel vision. 
At this introductory stage, a picture of the North American counter so/cio-
environmental consideration movement can provide a useful backdrop to the rest of 
the thesis. Similar sentiments are shared by 'growth'-gravitational/ interest groups in 
most other countries, though their form may differ slightly. The North American 
'done-a-backflip' Ron Arnold is author of what is described by his colleague Allan 
Gottlieb, as "the bible of the growing Wise Use Movement" ('Ecology Wars : 
Environmentalism As I f People Mattered', 1993). Arnold once worked for the Sierra 
Club, but now works in the front lines promoting industrial liberalism. 
There is a fervency in Gottliebs' introduction to 'the bible' as he describes how: 
...things have gotten worse for jobs and the economy because of eco-catastrophist 
interference. 
...the clear goal of environmentalists is to 'unmake industrial civilisation'. 
...the environmentalist has only a Stop button, never a Go button. 
He refers to "the dark recesses of environmentalism", and believes that: 
We [the Wise Use people] create productive harmony between man and nature - jobs 
and environment. We live by a Civilization Ethic. So we are the real 
environmentalists. 
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They assert the distinction between 'ecology' and 'environmentalism': the former is a 
science the latter a social movement. They see the personification of the latter as 
"anyone who claims to be one", and the former as "qualified professionals". Arnold 
states that "the gulf of economic/ecologic misunderstanding is enormous and 
unbridgable". He writes that "everybody is an environmentalist of one kind or 
another" - an explanation of the final point in chapter 6, that 79% of Americans 
consider themselves to be environmentalists. 
Arnold observes that from the 1960's, "sensitivity to nature became first a public 
virtue, then a requirement, then a fetish", and that this otherwise "amusing and 
tedious" sentiment came "packaged in a strongly anti-industry, anti-people wrapper". 
The more enlightened captains of industry felt that there had to be a way to protect 
nature without damaging free enterprise, that there were market oriented solutions 
to pollution, and that people could live in harmony with nature even in the midst of 
high growth industrial civilization. 
(Arnold 1993) 
Arnold does not hesitate to criticise industrial responses to the growth of 
environmentalism, observing that attempts to 'green-wash' public images through 
small grants to environmental groups "only sold rope to hangmen". He laments that 
national parks and wilderness preserves block an estimated 50% of US known energy 
reserves from extraction, and that these pressures meant that in 1982, the country 
imported 28% of its oil, costing $62 billion, and contributing to the United States' first 
trade deficit of the century (Arnold 1993). He is also troubled by facts such as his 
estimate of $125 billion costs in 1982 to the American economy of regulations, 
...83% {of which] was spent on compliance with 'social engineering' objectives, on 
bureaucrats playing doctor with natural resources and human lives". 
In the same year, Ronald Reagan was president, and as Zakin (1993) notes, after the 
Carter years, he reasserted the military-industrial complex and unleashed an anti-
environmental backlash. But the bible of the Wise Use movement considers that even 
though Reagan developed a legacy of deregulation, in his time as president he was not 
quick enough at breaking up environmental protection. 
Zakin states that the Wise Use movement had over 3 million supporters by the early 
1990's (US population ~ 260 million), while business interests spend roughly $1 
billion per year on anti-environmental professionals (see chapter 6) whose job is to 
'green-wash' corporate imagery (Stauber & Rampton 1995). The movement is 
comprised of over 400 individual anti-environmental organisations, many of which 
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work under strategically deceptive names such as 'The Abundant Wildlife Society' 
(cattle farmers), The Sahara Club' (an off road vehicle sports club) and The Sea Lion 
Defence Fund' (the Alaskan fisheries legal arm) (Jite 1995). Jite lists the three basic 
tenets of the Wise Use Movement: 
s Removing present environmental protections; 
o Preventing future environmental legislation; and 
° To benefit the economic interests of its members. 
Tokar (1995) provides a detailed insight into the nature and aims of the Wise Use 
movement, describing its goals as being... 
...to discredit environmental organisations, roll back environmental regulations and 
assert unlimited rights for property owners. 
The basic aim of the Wise Use Movement is to spread misinformation to the effect 
that environmental 'issues' are seldom issues at all; that where they might be, free 
market forces are the best way to deal with them; to spread rumours about the nature 
of environmentalists and their intentions. Burke (1995) notes how a Wise Use 
associate group (the Cato Institute) proposed the idea that Greenpeace was a 
communist 'pawn' group with connections to the KGB. 
Arnold (1993) talks of problematic 'regulationism', 'wildemism' (eco-religiousness, 
'Arch Druid' David Brower - founder of Friends of the Earth), 'post-materialist blues' 
(which affect those born after the second world war, and who have never known real 
hardship or physical insecurity) - "the result of resource managers has been headaches 
that grow into migraines and skull fractures". 
It is not surprising then to hear from Zakin (1993) that Arnold and Gottlieb, the two 
front men of the 'Wise Use' movement for industrial freedom, run one of the 'slickest' 
branches of the Wise Use conglomerate, "supported by industry, right wing groups, 
and fundamentalist Christians", the Centre for the Defence of Free Enterprise, "a 
direct-mail and right-wing publishing organization". She quotes Arnold as wanting to 
"destroy the environmental movement once and for all". 
At the close of play... 
Recently the Bovine Spogiform Encephalopathy/Creutzfeldt Jacob Disease 
(BSE/CJD) links have surfaced as an enormous issue in the UK. The £500 million pa 
industry of beef production is in turmoil as domestic and export markets have 
collapsed. Schools, fast food outlets and the French market (50% of exports) have 
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ceased to accept British beef due to concerns over the threat to human health. The 
Guardian (26/3/96) reports that there is a virtual global ban on British beef. Scientists 
cannot confirm categorically whether there is a link between the bovine and human 
diseases thought to derive from the sheep version (scrappie). A day earlier the 
Guardian (25/3/96) reported on a "Cabinet Plot to Stop Beef Alert", stating that 
"ministers wanted [the] BSE link to humans kept quiet". There is talk of slaughtering 
and burning up to 100% of the 11 million cattle in the country. More likely is a 
selective cull of about 4.5 million cattle over five years (costs about £3.2 billion, and 
another £10 billion i f lost earnings are compensated), whilst "the doomsday option" 
of killing and destroying the entire national herd might be £7 billion in compensation 
and £20 billion i f restitution is paid as herds are rebuilt (Guardian 26/3/%). 
This 'crisis' comes just months after the meat industry was in the headlines, defending 
the export of live animals to the rest of Europe. Did successes in this fight lead to the 
successful transference of BSE to French veal farms in the calves? It seems that all 
British sourced calves and cattle in continental Europe might be destroyed too. Might 
some of the condemned animals find their way to more distant (less industrialised) 
countries? How wil l the industry recover from job losses and business collapse? Will 
an estimated 50,000+ British people be affected by dormant contamination with CJD? 
Should there be mass slaughter and burning of human communities thought to be 
affected? Nowhere in any media outlets has anyone considered the interests of the 
cattle. The only concerns raised are about re-establishing public confidence and 
restoring the market for 'safe' British beef. 
We should not forget the pressures on the British fishing industry told to pay millions 
in compensation to other European countries for excluding their fishermen from 
British waters. 
A spokesman for a quango of Charity Commissioners, C. McCall QC, states that 
"charity must serve the overriding object of the public benefit. That is to be measured 
in terms of benefit to mankind" (Guardian 27/3/%). This definition agrees with the 
dictionary definition, but i f the interests of Nature-not-Man are to be recognised, it is 
inadequate. 
Some more recent events from the media: 
• The Newbury by-pass. There is a broad based mass-opposition to it; criticism that it 
is not dealing with the problem of traffic, rather it is accommodating it. Some say it 
should have been tunnelled long ago. Some of those participating in active citizenship 
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in defence of the woodland have been violently harassed, arrested, and charged; 
expert rock climbers have defended both the ancient woodlands and the assertion of 
state authority over citizens. A small snail is losing one of its few habitats; protected 
sites of special scientific interest wil l be built over. The combustion engine and its 
concrete paths win over environmental consideration again. The road wil l be made 
narrower than initially planned 'so as to reduce environmental impact'. Protest wi l l 
have added several million pounds to the cost of the road - not surprising since for 
example "two 'cherry pickers', 100 police and 1,200 security guards were used to 
bring five protesters and two photographers down from the tallest tree on the route [of 
the by-pass], a 160ft Corsican pine" (Guardian 27/3/96). Such an army is not even 
used against armed terrorists. 
• Weapons exports have also been in the 1995-6 headlines: ambiguously purposeful 
products/parts ended up in Iraq, and became part of the arsenal directed at the Allied 
Forces in the Gulf War - nobody was found responsible; the killing of 100,000 Iraqis 
was a price worth paying to secure the flows of oil. By 1996, "sanctions [following 
the Gulf War] have set back health care in Iraq 50 years" (Guardian 26/3/96, reporting 
WHO statement). British companies vie to export 'crowd control' and torture devices 
to known violators of 'human rights' - 40,000 volt electric shock batons exported for 
example, but producing companies deny this (Panorama investigative documentary/ 
Amnesty International). More than 1 million unregistered guns are though to be on 
the streets of Britain; 16 school children and a teacher shot by a suicide killer; an 
adolescent on the run with four stolen guns; "thirty one percent of boys aged 15 admit 
carrying offensive weapons" (Guardian 15/5/96); lunch break shooting practice in the 
City. Britain is thought to be about 10 years behind the trends in the US. Chinese 
threats to Taiwan precipitated a $4.5 billion sale for the US arms industry. 
• "Boots, one of Britain's most trusted companies, commissioned research - and then 
suppressed it after the results showed that its most lucrative drug could be replaced by 
products three times as cheap and just as effective" (Observer 28/4/1996). The 
Observer also reports the Wall Street Journal as revealing that "Boots aggressively 
strove to discredit the research and hired a team of private investigators to help it to 
do so" (ibid.). 
• "There is hardly a family on or off America's 300 [Native American Indian] 
reservations which has not had a child disappear into the white adoption market" 
(Nicoll 1996); tribal elder Phillip Underbaggage "still recalls the days of the boarding 
schools when children were removed from their families and faced with a regime 
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where they had their braids cut, were given cold showers, and were beaten for talking 
in their own language" (ibid.). 
• The director-general of the UNFAO opened their 20th Regional Conference for 
Europe stating that 800 million people are chronically undernourished and roughly 
200 million children under the age of five are affected by "acute or chronic protein 
and calorie deficiency" - "there [is] enough food in the world, distribution [is] 
skewed" (Guardian 30/4/96). 
• There are plans to flood 30 billion gallons of water a day for two weeks down the 
Grand Canyon "to repair ecological damage caused by dams built 33 years ago": 
One of the hardest worked rivers on earth, the Colorado intermittently dries up by 
the lime it reaches the coast in Mexico. It powers some of the countries most 
powerful dams, and keeps the neon lights burning in Las Vegas. 
(Guardian 26/3/%) 
• Convictions for racist and sexist discrimination in the work place and violence in 
public places, and the military asserts discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Nationalism is thought to be on the rise around Europe; American flags are burnt in 
the East and the West, whilst US economic and political colonialism is only 
comparable in scale to its export of cultural pollution. The 'external threat' of 
communism has been replaced by that of the world of Islam, so the CIA and FBI still 
have a big role to play in the US. Meanwhile "police chiefs want [Scotland Yard's] 
anti-terror squad to spy on green activists" (Guardian 27/3/96). 
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C H A P T E R 2 
H U M A N A S P E C T S O F E N V I R O N M E N T A L M A N A G E M E N T 
There are a number of crucial psychological states which define the perceived context 
and role of people, and these in turn guide or dictate their approach to the 
environment. Indeed they are the filters through which perceptions, faiths, and beliefs 
are channelled to values and actions. These perceptions define understanding and its 
development, outlook and expectations, and evaluation of context, role and moral 
beliefs. They are the guidelines for living, but as with all tools or guides, are not 
always used. 
Human survival depends on food, water and protection from environmental and social 
threats. Competition and consumption are part of the living process, as is mutual aid 
and giving and we also have a need for intelectual stimuli and excitement. The routes 
which are chosen to achieve these ends need to be questioned on ethical or moral 
grounds. The primary concerns of any ecologically considerate individual are 
lifestyle, consumption patterns, attitudes and actions. 
From where do socio-ecological tensions and damages derive? How could this 
damage be reversed in order to develop mutual regard amongst people and between 
them and the rest of nature? Our dependence on nature is clearly recognised: 
Our viability as a species depends upon our future relationship with the natural 
world. 
(Bookchin 1990) 
What might parameters for a socially and ecologically favourable future be i f we 
concede that there is a need to reinstate greater accord with the rest of nature? 
To make clear from the start that 'Environmentalism' (to use a general term) does not 
denote anti-human sentiment, environmental racism will be considered first. It is a 
considerable problemand it links the anti-racist and environmental movements. As is 
mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, many (such as Bookchin in Bookchin & Foreman 
1991) believe that human and environmental 'liberation' are now more than ever 
bound together. 
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Humanism is normally defined as a philosophy where human kind can achieve 
happiness and fulfilment without 'religion'. In this thesis it is used to mean 
homocentrism - implying extreme faith in human capacities. 
Managerialism ought to be defined as good environmental 'housekeeping' - though it 
more often manifests itself as a gravitation towards intervention. This ties in with the 
humanistic belief in our ability to improve the collective of life (in the 'man as a 
measure of all value' context), based on an incomplete comprehension of Earth 
systems. 
Speciesism is a term of recent coinage used to refer to discrimination against other 
species, or more typically discrimination in favour of the human species. It is a 
condition of mind that works in parallel with homocentric attitudes, and fortifies 
managerialist tendencies. Humanism, anthropocentrism, speciesism and 
managerialism have considerable impact on our relationship to 'Nature-not-Man'. 
The final section on 'dilemmas' considers the most common instance: the most 
comminly antagonistic relationship between environment and development interests. 
2.1 Environmental Racism. 
Environmental racism is race based discrimination in the design and application of 
environmental policy and management. It is overwhelmingly discrimination by white 
against non-white people. The Rev. B.F. Chavis Jr (introducing Bullard 1993a) 
defines it as discrimination in environmental policy making and in the enforcement of 
regulations and laws, and thus: 
•...the deliberate targeting of communities of colour for toxic waste disposal and the 
siting of polluting industries 
•..the official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons and pollutants 
in communities of colour 
•...[and in] the history of excluding people of colour from the mainstream 
environmental groups, decision making boards, commissions, and regulatory bodies. 
He speaks with particular reference to the USA, but this can be extrapolated into a 
global context. 
While the problem of the 'long range transport of air pollutants' was increasingly 
being considered by EC law makers in the 1970's, more industrialised countries were 
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becoming more entrenched in the morally and ecologically dubious process of the 
internationalisation of waste disposal, and in the locating of 'dirty industries'. "[The 
practice of] dumping toxic wastes from Europe and the US in Third World countries 
perpetuates old patterns of imperialism, colonialism, and racism" (Saeger 1993). 
Countless examples of European and North American companies and governments 
disposing of waste and conducting environmentally obnoxious operations overseas 
are to be found in the archives of the Greenpeace and 'Multinational Monitor' World 
Wide Web (WWW) sites. 
In the context of discriminatory management of the environment it might seem to 
some unreasonable to assert that racism by whites against non-whites is most 
significant, but white dominance in culpability is the reality. Western imperialistic 
attitudes are intrinsically racist and affect all levels of environmental management. 
They can be described as environmentally racist. 
An internal memorandum by World Bank chief economist Lawrence Summers 
(leaked in December 1991) summarises the racist nature of global environmental 
management as sanctioned by influential circles. The suggestion in the leaked note 
quoted by Bullard (1993a) was that dirty industries should be encouraged to migrate 
to 'Less Developed Countries' for three main reasons. Since: 
...the measurement of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the 
foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality [,] 
...economic logic would suggest placement of dirty industries in 
...countries with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages 
[countries in the South and East]. 
...under-polluted areas in Africa are vastly under-polluted...[! Indeed] their air 
quality is probably vastly inefficiently [clean!] when compared to Los Angeles or 
Mexico City. 
and 
...the demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to 
have very high income elasticity. 
This means concern over an enhanced risk of cancer is likely to be higher in a country 
where people survive long enough to get cancer than in a country where under five 
mortality is twenty percent (Bullard 1993a). In essence, since richer - dominantly 
white areas - can locate dirty industries in poorer (dominantly non-white) areas, 
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which might be less effectively vocal in opposition to these, and which still have 
relatively clean air, they ought to. This rationale functions at inter-continental, 
international, and national levels. 
In the US: 
...more than 1,900 maquiladoras ['dirty' industries providing low pay jobs and 
exacerbating pollution and strain on local sewerage and other infrastructure], 
assembly plants operated by American, Japanese, and other foreign countries, are 
located along the 2,000 mile US-Mexican border [on the Mexican side ]. 
(Bullard 1993a) 
Indeed a journey along the Mexican side border road from Matamoros to Reynosa 
(the eastern length of the US/Mexican border) is to experience a foul industrial haze 
even on a breezy 'cloudless' day (pers. obs.). 
Alpert & Elliott (1995) note how the maquiladora phenomenon has another defining 
characteristic: "a young female labour force" is preferred since these women are seen 
as the most exploitable workers available. They state that although the "exploitation is 
fierce and conditions degrading", the factories offer employment opportunities which 
would not otherwise be available. Further, the women workers tolerate the jobs which 
in Guatemala offer almost twice what women could earn as domestics. Still, the 
morality of rich and high profit American and Japanese companies operating such 
conditions simply because they can is questionable. 
In the report 'Playing with Fire' (Greenpeace 1990) it was found that the minority 
representation in communities with existing hazardous waste incinerators in the US 
was 89% higher than the national average, and: 
...all of the [651} nuclear bomb testing sites in continental US are located on Native 
American lands. 
Bullard (1993b) states that: 
...three of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills are located in 
predominantly African American or Latino American communities. 
Lee (1993) draws on the findings of the 1987 report by the UCCCRJ, Toxic Wastes 
and Race in the United States': three out of every five African Americans and 
Hispanic Americans lived in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites 
(Bullard 1993b states 60%), and more than 15 million African American and eight 
12 
million Hispanic Americans lived in communities with one or more such sites. Lee 
also states that: 
...half of all Asians, Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans live in communities with 
uncontrolled toxic waste sites. 
Moreover, removing officially sanctioned racism wi l l hardly effect moral re-
alignment quickly in a country such as the US. Bullard (1993a) succinctly describes 
the background of white racism in the US as: 
...founded on the principles of 'free land' (stolen from Native Americans and 
Mexicans), 'free labour' (cruelly extracted from African slaves), and 'free men' (white 
men with property). 
Systems of segregation and manipulation that existed from the birth of the nation 
were entrenched in the psyche of large sections of the white population, and strongly 
influenced policy and decisions related to the management of the environment. 
Indeed it is suggested that racist discrimination and disregard for environmental 
integrity go hand in hand. For example: 
The wilderness was feared and hated by most white settlers [of North America]. 
Wilderness, like the Indians, stood in the way of the maximum exploitation of the new 
world. They both had to be destroyed. 
(Haughton 1991). 
Novack (1995) also describes how in the US, "the system and government...has held 
[North American Indians] in misery, destitution, and humiliation". 
The pioneers looked upon the Indians as little more than obnoxious obstacles in the 
path of their advancement who had to be cleared away by any means and at all 
costs....They placed Indian 'varmints' and 'serpents' on the same level as wild beasts. 
In Early New England bounties were paid for Indian scalps as today they are 
awarded for the tails of predatory animals. 
(Novack 1995) 
Isbister (1991) states that the culture of white Americans and their living standards 
are founded on... 
...the most genocidal imperialism the world has known,....[they are] beneficiaries of an 
unparalleled destruction that almost eliminated an entire race. 
Further, "it is a fact that most Americans would like to forget" (ibid.). 
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Muhammed Bey (1995) reminds us of the colossal obscenity of the slave trade (up to 
90% of the 100 million abducted and enslaved Africans died during transport across 
the Atlantic), and of how this part of history, including the African heritage, has been 
systematically excluded from, or its importance diminished in taught world history. 
European nations also grew industrially through appropriated labour and resources. 
Colonial exploits were nearly always at the direct expense of the colonised regions. 
The interests of native populations were at best placed second to those of wealthy 
Europeans. Weissman (1993) asserts that: 
...global plundering has always had devastating environmental, as well as social, 
effects. 
He then reminds us that after World War Two, the US continued the pattern initiated 
by European colonisers (particularly through the agency of multi-national 
corporations). Since the late 1970's 'development-induced debt has acted to mould 
poorer countries of the South and East into serving the interests of industrialised 
countries (ibid.). 
The 'control' of countries or their 'change experiences' via debtor/creditor 
relationships is explained in Table 2.1. The sequences in Table 2.1 are of course not 
universal, they represent bad/worst case scenarios. As a self-fuelling cycle, a 'loan for 
development' was chosen as a diagramatical focal point. There is clearly a wide range 
of adverse socio-ecological and economic impacts that can, and have, resulted from 
this development paradigm. Woodward (1995) considers there to be a considerable 
problem in the dynamics that over-emphasise cash crops as the best route to food 
security - though he observes that: 
...in the majority of cases the effect [of large scale cash crop developments] is likely 
to be ambiguous [- the 'dilemma equation]. 
Though more often than not with good intent, development agencies opened the doors 
to economic colonialism as agribusinesses were assimilated and developed by multi-
nationals, dependent to a great extent on imported seed, agrochemicals and 
machinery, so engineering a vicious circle of entrapment in un-manageable debt 
crises. 
Recent debt-for-nature swap proposals are widely received as Western 'playground' 
colonialism, particularly as conservation geared towards the game hunting interests of 
colonising nations was the immediate recollection. So: 
14 
...the association of wildlife with the dictates of colonial administration was largely 
responsible for the later beliefs of emerging independent African [and Indian] 
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Table 2.1 
Dynamics of the Debt/Socio-Ecological Crisis. 
Drives towards (externally funded and influenced) development have not infrequently 
led to considerable adverse socio-ecological impacts. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 (in 
conjunction with Table 2.1) further illustrate this process. O'Riordan (1995) suggest, 
that it may lead to "an economic as well as environmental [and social] haemorrhage". 
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Table 2.2 
Effects of Agribusiness Growth. 
Even more insidious than the hunting related demarcations was the division of 
continents based upon European border creation in colonised areas, with scant regard 
for tribal zoning, trading systems, and kinship ties (split by new borders), which 
remains as testament to the arrogant nature of imperialism. Peet (1991) suggests that 
when European powers worked out their claims to parts of the African continent, the 
prime consideration was the balance of European power rather than natural or 
ethnographic lines. Many Europeans thought the introduction of systems of 
governance were good for the indigenous people. But the cultural and philosophical 
disruption, especially mercenaric Christian missionary endeavours, brought 'cultural 
pollution' and the dissolution of age-old customs. This set the foundation for future 
capitalist endeavours, which would further dilute the cultural richness through the 
spread of American style consumer culture (Big Mac, Coke, Marlboro etc.), and 
precipitate gradual dislocation from (relative) ecological harmony. 
During the era of the new world 'discovery', the introduction of alien diseases wiped 
out whole populations. Bruchan (1993) states that diseases introduced inadvertently to 
North America killed more than 90% of the natives of the continent in the 16th and 
17th centuries. The unintentional genocidal effects of 'New World Discovery' were 
not 'nullified' by the effects of 'new world diseases' on Europeans. In South America 
the appropriation of land and the establishment of slave-worked Latifundia for the 
plantation production of crops destined for Europe, took a heavy toll on the 
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environment of the area as well as the native population of the continent and of West 
Africa, from where the slaves were taken. 
PRESSURE ON LAND 
• > reduction in shifting types of agriculture - continuous use causes nutrient & soil-
structural decline. 
• > use of poorer, less stable, less productive lands 
> increased incentive for chemical use 
> increased chance of pollution related problems 
• > forest clearance for new farm land 
> greater exposure to wind, rains and sun 
> greater access for unscrupulous loggers etc. 
THIS CAN LEAD TO 
• enhanced localised soil disturbance 
• greater exposure of soils generally, and in areas previously vegetated 
• with mechanised techniques, soil structure broken up by deep ploughing and other machinery 
compaction/disturbance effects 
THEREFOR EXPOSURE IS ENHANCED 
EXPOSURE * WIND attack by: particulate lift; wind-carried objects/materials knocking more 
particles loose; and reduced vegetation cover exposes remaining taller vegetation to winds - 'throw' by 
winds may cause root movements to loosen soil. Loosened soils more available for water and wind 
transport (erosion). 
EXPOSURE * WATER erosion enhanced: direct rain splash causes creep & break up, and less surface 
vegetation allows greater overland flow (OLF)(causing sheet, rill and channel erosion). Greater OLF 
means less deep/percolation. [Less deep/percolation can lower the water table. Lessened ease of water 
access may lead to plans for a dam. See 6.1 for potential socic-ecological effects of dams, and Table 
2.1 for possible economic effects of a loan based dam project]. 
EXPOSURE * SUN. Thermal baking: opens cracks in soil; makes soil harder to work; causes onion 
style erosion of rock materials by diumal thermal expansion & contraction; rapidly dried surface draws 
water from deeper in soil down a hydro-gradient - this can lead to salinization (mineral surface deposit 
accumulation) so reducing hospitality to crops; and hard baking and mineralic deposition in the dry 
season can lead to reduced percolation rates and flooding in the wet season, so compromising 
agricultural potential. 
OVERALL EFFECTS OF PRESSURE ON LAND: 
> Soil loss by wind, water, and creep. 
> Loss of soil nutrients and organic matter basis. 
> The above two can lead to the laterization of ferallitic soils. 
> Loss of soil structure (for 'smooth' hydro-cycle and workability) 
> Gully erosion by water disproportionately reduces cultivable land by fragmentation. 
T O T A L E F F E C T C A N B E R E G I O N A L A R I D I S A T I O N AND A D E C L I N E IN T H E 
AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL OF SOILS. THIS MAY L E A D TO FURTHER ENCROACHMENT 
OF V E G E T A T E D / F O R E S T E D A R E A S , STARTING T H E C Y C L E AGAIN WITH MORE 
PRESSURE ON T H E LAND. LOAN BASED C A P I T A L INVESTMENT T O COUNTER THE 
A B O V E PROCESSES : S E E TABLES 2.1 & 2.2. 
Table 2.3 
(Pressure on Land and) Soil Degradation Processes. 
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Environmental racism remains a problem today. Historical forms of colonialism may 
be much reduced, but as mentioned earlier economic colonialism has replaced it, and 
is the cause of considerable social disruption, ecological degradation, political 
manipulation and continued exploitation. 
Racism does not need to be openly institutionalised, as it was formerly in South 
Africa, in order to be endemic, and to violently discriminate. To make an attitude 
illegal does not eradicate it. In the US, even after some progress in law since the 
1960's, there is still ingrained discrimination: 
...communities of colour in urban ghettos, in rural 'poverty pockets', or on 
economically impoverished American Indian reservations face some of the worst 
environmental devastation in the country. 
(Bullard 1993a) 
Lee (1993) notes the important fact that: 
Today most African Americans and other people of colour are beset by rising 
unemployment, increasing poverty, worsening housing, and declining educational 
and health status. It would be very difficult to properly address issues of 
environmental quality outside the broader context of these equity concerns. In short, 
communities of colour cannot afford the luxury of only being concerned about the 
quality of their environment when confronted by a plethora of other problems related 
to their day-to-day survival. This does not mean, however, that people of colour do 
not care about the quality of their environment and it's effect on their lives. 
Again, though Lee speaks of the US experience, similar principles apply in Europe 
and the less industrialised countries. 
The absence of effective opposition to damaging industrial developments does not 
mean that none exists. Moral consideration ought to deter instigators of these 
developments from certain activities. However it seems that ecologically and socially 
damaging activities are often staunchly defended with economic (and even 
militaristic) might in order to secure profit. 
Meanwhile liberation movements for just about every exploited and/or abused party 
are suppressed. Churchill and Wall (1990) present an abundance of evidence, 
including FBI internal memos and other circulars, exposing the extreme lengths to 
which the FBI has gone to "disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise 
neutralise...[by]...infiltration, psychological warfare, legal harassment, and violence 
[including murder]" movements including the Civil Rights, American Indian, the 
Black Panther Party, Central America sympathisers, anti-war, green, and student 
movements (1990; see also B. Glick paper (at Patriot Archives WWW site)). This 
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was carried out officially under the counter-intelligence program named 
COINTELPRO between 1956 and 1971, but as Churchill and Wall conclude, 
"COINTELPRO lives on". This is because vested interests all too frequently depend 
on gain at the expense of others. Potential gain by industrial concerns often eliminates 
the possibility of beneficial negotiation between developers and inhabitants. 
It is acknowledged even in official circles that the deciding factor on whether to 
attack Iraq in what became the Gulf War was that the West had vested oil trade 
interests in the welfare of Kuwait - real budget/economic prohibitiveness barriers 
exist for many other potential war zone intervention sites, whereas oil drives the 
global industrial machine. 
The operations of the oil company Shell in Ogoniland (south-east Nigeria) have for 
years been causing environmental havoc to the Ogoni People (the following comes 
from various sources including the Ogoni Community Association UK, a Channel 4 
(1995) 'Delta Force' documentary, and Rowell 1995). In 1993 the Movement to Save 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) demanded compensation and a drastic reduction or the 
termination of operations. By the end of the year, hundreds had been killed, thousands 
made homeless, scores of villages burnt to the ground, and many arrested. Some have 
now been executed for the 'crime' of protest. There is evidence that Shell assisted with 
the provision of weapons and/or finance used to effect this suppression (see for 
example Rowell 1995). 
Shell has an economic interest in continuing operations here, as does the Nigerian 
Government who receive 80-90% of revenues from oil earnings (ibid.). Shell 
managers have clearly made a moral decision, to the effect that profits come before 
social and ecological justice. Though the above 'enforcement' has been applied not by 
Shell but by the Nigerian government, the continuance of operations and the evidence 
that Shell have assisted with resources is effectively a sanction of this 'justice' (sic). 
Discrimination in state investment of tax revenue, access to jobs, health care, housing, 
basic amenities, law enforcement (no-go zones, longer sentences), ease of movement 
within and between countries, police and public harassment and until very recently 
institutionalised discrimination and segregation have marginalised opportunities for, 
and the life quality of, non-whites in Europe, North America and Australia/New 
Zealand. The Guardian (17/4/1996) for example warns that: 
Non-European visitors to the Sydney Olympic Games in the year 2000 should be 
warned they could be beaten up by police who mistake them for Aborigines. 
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Lower financial security resulting from discrimination amplifies the problem. The 
apparent disinterest of political authorities in resolving it has meant the degeneration 
of considerable areas of (particularly) urban environment into physically dangerous, 
socially depressed and economically marginalised zones. 
Table 2.4 shows some statistics of racist discrimination in Britain, drawn from Youth 
Against Racism in Europe (YRE) publications. It is fair to say that compared to the 
living conditions of the average white citizen, non-whites are marginalised by 
historical and contemporary discrimination. 'Affirmative action' (positive 
discrimination to redress obnoxious imbalances) is a much debated issue in the US. 
There have been calls from a multi-racial spectrum for the cancellation of all 
overseas debt (for less-industrialised countries), and with the facts of contemporary 
and historical racism in mind, it can be seen as a justified proposal. 
In the US, segregation used to be endorsed in law. However segregation by choice 
and restrictive/coercive methods continues. Minority groups of national populations 
in America, the UK, France, Germany, and other European countries tend to be 
residentially concentrated in less favourable areas in terms of environmental quality 
for example: urban locations downwind of prevailing wind directions; city centre 
concrete commuter zones; industrial parts of towns; marginalised and service-
deprived estates (in the US, 'projects') and tower blocks; inadequately maintained 
accommodation in city centres; and sites near busy main roads where air quality and 
safety are compromised. Homeless individuals and poorer families are 
disproportionately represented in these locations (Bullard 1993a, YRE publications, 







20% of British housing agencies 
discriminate against non-whites 
London Research Centre 1990 London non-white popu.: 20% 
Inner London Homeless : 51% non-
white 
British Census 1991 Unemployment: whites - 8% 
non-whites -16.5% 
Y R E 1994 Prison sentences for non-white men 
over 21 in Britain for the same 
offence 30 % longer than for whites. 
Table 2.4 
Statistics of Racism in Britain (from YRE publications). 
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Freund and Martin (1993) note how transport systems, and infrastructures have 
developed in part deliberately and in part by 'default' in a way that discriminates 
against non-whites. General discrimination has meant that non-whites are 
disproportionately represented in lower income groups. The emergence of an 
automobile-based transport system therefor exacerbates disadvantages. Increasingly 
decentralised work opportunities, shopping facilities, health care centres and 
entertainment facilities mean that non-car owners are disproportionately marginalised. 
Financial constraints mean greater dependence on public transport, yet 
...the best developed public transport is that which connects more affluent residential 
suburbs with the core of the central city business district—often bypassing poor 
areas...[,] 
(Freund & Martin 1993) 
The research Freund and Martin did in Europe and America showed that: 
...in the past few decades, the auto, more than rail and other transport modes, has 
facilitated the movement of largely white and middle-class people from inner cities to 
encapsulate the suburbs. 
Freund and Martin cite an example of racist transport planning: planner Robert Moses 
specifically built bridges in New York too low for buses, thus restricting the beaches 
and parkways beyond to car owners - the more affluent (i.e. white) sector of society. 
Alston and Brown (1993) highlight five key areas of global (environmental) threats to 
people of colour: ecological impacts of war, underground nuclear testing, the 
international waste trade, debt-for-nature swaps, and biodiversity. They also consider 
the problem of NGOs whose focus sometimes inadequately addresses the human 
aspects of cultural dynamics in seeking a balance of socio-economic and ecological 
concerns. 
Ecological impacts of war include the worst after effects of mass bombing and 
chemical and nuclear weapon use, such as oil pollution in the Persian gulf; 
ecologically degraded Vietnam and El Salvador (biocide defoliants used by forces to 
clear vegetated areas in order to reduce 'dissident' or 'rebel' group inconspicuity); 
USDEA operations in Latin America (Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Brazil 
and Panama), have left residues from unexploded bombs, shrapnel, and toxics (and 
associated health affects) from chemical weapons. 
A by-product of war is the displacement of millions of refugees and the psychological 
effects they experience. In December 1995, the UNHCR estimated that there were 
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about 50 million people globally uprooted or who had fled war or persecution (1.7 
million from Rwanda, more than 0.5 million from Bosnia Herzegovnia, 2.4 million 
from Afghanistan, etc.)(UNHCR 1995). The intervention and participation of Western 
countries and corporations (especially the US) in the politics and development of less 
industrialised countries amplify the scale and quantity of warfare. Thus: 
...trade, economic assistance, and military policies that reinforce inequities and 
promote underdevelopment in the name of multinational corporate interests must...be 
dismantled and replaced by more fair and just policies and practices. 
(Alston & Brown 1993) 
The 'globalist perspective' adopted by the US during the cold war saw... 
...almost all of the Third World societies as pawns in an enormously complex chess 
game being fought by two master players - the Soviet Union and the US - the stakes 
being the freedom of the people in the western alliance [Europe and AmericaJ. 
(Isbister 1991) 
Underground nuclear testing and the associated uranium mining operations have, 
since the dawn of 'the new drive' in nuclear developments in 1940, overwhelmingly 
impacted and endangered the lives and livelihoods of indigenous populations: 
From the Aborigines of Australia, to the Western Shoshone Indians in Nevada [US], 
from the inhabitants of the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan to the natives of 
the French Pacific, indigenous peoples throughout the world have witnessed the 
destruction of their lands by nuclear testing. 
(Isbister 1991) 
The barren lunar landscapes caused by mineral speculation in Western Algeria, as 
well as the traditional religious areas of aboriginal land in Australia are permanent 
testament to recent environmental racism. France began its nuclear test exploits in 
Algeria, but soon moved them to their Pacific Island colonies. Their insistence on 
continued nuclear tests in the Pacific islands around Tahiti (1995-1996) is a harsh 
demonstration of the disregard for local populations - that France is willing to 
'sacrifice' an area safely away from French national boundaries in opposition to a 
considerable proportion of French people, let alone Pacific Islanders. 
The nature of the international waste trade as was described earlier has also been 
described by Alston and Brown (1993): 
With the increasing restrictions on toxic waste disposal in the US and Western 
Europe, as well as [effective] public opposition to it, waste management companies 
and illegal waste traders are seeking alternative dump sites overseas. 
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Politically and economically weak countries which have benefited least from 
industrialisation are those typically targeted for dump sites. Often persuaded by 
money, jobs and other economic developments, this form of waste transfer can be 
considered an extension of the domestic patterns of targeting communities of colour. 
Since 1988, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has strongly and effectively 
opposed these practices, but the problem has only 'moved' laterally to Central and 
South America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Middle East. Although many countries 
have already suffered contamination from 'traded' wastes (for example Colombia, 
Cyprus, Lebanon, Turkey, China, the Philippines etc. (ibid.)), it is increasingly 
appreciated that the continuance of such trade sanctions unacceptable and racist 
environmental and social disregard. 
Pucket (1994) informs us that between 1980 and 1989, the cost of landfilling one 
tonne of toxic waste in the US rose from $15 to $250. This, in parallel with increased 
opposition (the NIMBY lobby) was what led to overseas waste 'dumping'. Pucket 
describes how, as soon as barriers such as the OAU developed, a strategy of altering 
the description of waste was adopted: 'contaminated scrap metals' became 'resources' 
for heavy metal recovery and recycling; and large quantities of plastic waste exported 
to India, supposedly for recycling, has ended up dumped in the countryside. Indeed 
Pucket (1994) states that it has even been proposed that: 
...solid wastes be used to raise the level of pacific islands to counter the effects of 
global warming and rising sea levels. 
Since almost any waste can be.claimed to be of 'use', virtually all waste trade can be 
labelled as suitable for recycling when it might be, for example, hazardous waste 
which could be burnt as fuel, or could be used for construction or as fertiliser (ibid.). 
There emerged a loophole, which led to the 1989 'Basel Conference on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes'. By 1994 there were 55 signatories 
to the convention, which required a 'weak' control of 'Prior Informed Consent' from 
the relevant receiving authority before the waste could be shipped. 
In the context of apparently well-meaning development programs, debt-for-nature 
swaps have often affected land management practices in such a way as to compromise 
the interests of populations of the less industrialised countries. Alston and Brown 
(1993) suggest that: 
...despite the potential benefits from protecting critical parts of the biosphere, the 
debt-for-nature strategy has undermined the efforts of indigenous peoples to achieve 
self-determination and ownership of the lands where they have lived for centuries. 
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Recently the Co-ordinating Body for Indigenous People's Organisations of the 
Amazon Basin have proposed a new version of debt swapping - debt-for-Indian-
stewardship swaps whereby "foreign debt would be traded for demarcation and 
protection of traditional territory" (Alston & Brown 1993). They qoute the Brazilian 
Institute for Economic and Social Analysis who describe classical debt-for-nature 
swaps as having been: 
...part of a more general strategy for converting debt, reaffirming the creditors' 
political and economic domination over the debtors within a development model 
which commercialises life in all it's aspects. 
The biodiversity issue came to the fore at the 1992 Rio Conference, and is seen by 
many as socially problematic whilst ecologically, and possibly socially important. 
The term 'biodiversity' has grown from meaning just planetary biological life to mean: 
...the vast global collection of genes, species, habitats, and ecosystems, as well as the 
cultural diversity that is its human expression. 
(Alston & Brown 1993)) 
A major concern is that: 
Northern pharmaceutical and agricultural companies, as well as many conservation 
NGOs, have promoted—schemes to preserve biological diversity at the expense of 
cultural diversity. 
(ibid.) 
In addition to the much published rain forest debate, threats to the biodiversity of 
countries such as Madagascar (where many unique species are found) and regions 
such as African mountain rain forests (where primates are a focus) are being exposed 
with increasing frequency. 
The operations of unscrupulous Western based industrial groups are without doubt 
imperialistic and antisocial in nature, disregarding homo-social and ecosystem 
integrity. Berrigan (1995) for example describes the experiences of the Baka people 
(Pygmies) in Cameroon, where until recently, innaccessibility of the forests meant 
there was only gradual encroachment from the coast. 
...now the activities of (mostly) European [especially French and Dutch] logging 
companies are making a major impact on [the forest]. 
These giant firms, employing the latest technology and intensive methods, are 
clearing out the most precious of the woods - the hardwoods...These are used 
extensively in Europe for railway sleepers, for furniture and joinery, such as in the 
construction of conservatories, garden furniture and lavatory seats. 
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The chaotic swathes of unofficial roads disturb wildlife and cause the breakdown of 
the integrity of the forest ecosystem...The way of life of the indigenous populations 
has been shattered by the destruction of the forest and by the decimation of the 
wildlife on which they depend for food. 
(Berrigan 1995) 
One French logging company in particular (SEBC) was distinct in the level of its 
violations of signed agreements, and villagers in the area protested by letter and road 
block. 
The protest at Atsjek made history in Africa - and so did the reaction of the 
authorities, which was swift and brutal. Police descended of the village, crushed the 
protest, broke down the road block and threw 24 people into prison. 
(ibid.) 
Indigenous peoples are exploited in other ways as well. Wilkie (1995) revealed 
another development in this process: the "ambitious and controversial scientific 
enterprise" was to collect blood samples from several hundred isolated indigenous 
peoples around the world. Scientists f rom Yale University and the So^ss 
pharmaceutical company Hoffman-La-Roche accompanied Colombian genetic 
researchers. In exchange for some medical treatments, blood samples were acquired. 
Saleable products (and resulting profits, at the expense or loss of indigenous peoples) 
were the aim. Once the genes are acquired, the welfare of the source peoples is no 
longer a concern. Patent applications have already been made for some of these gene 
extracts (ibid.). 
Similar tales to this are revealed not infrequently, as was raised in the UNCED 
meeting in 1992. The use of herbal medicines/remedies from for example rain forest 
areas are an example. Cox and Balick (1995) consider the ethnobotanical approach to 
drug discovery in detail, and state that they are well aware that the healers with whom 
they carry out research provide significant intellectual guidance, and that "they are 
entitled to the same intelectual property rights enjoyed by other investgators". Hence 
"a significant part of a ny royalties earned from [a drug they are working on from the 
Samoan Healers tuition] wil l be returned to the Samoan people" (ibid.). Indeed Cox 
and Balickstate that "virtually all ethnobotanists active in drug research are involved 
in making similar arrangements" (ibid.), and some are working on formal guidelines. 
Cox and Balick (1995) also note that: 
To many cultures, protecting the forest around them is more important than 
receiving money. Hence, many researchers are devoting effort to protecting the rain 
forests in the regions where they work. 
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It is reasonable to assume that as well as any proffessed concern for the cultures 
themselves, the motivation for this derives also from the potential instrumental value 
to be derived from the forests and the financial rewards of forest products/extracts or 
their synthetic (copy) versions. It is paradoxical then that cultural dissolution through 
contact with 'the outside world' means that: 
...plant knowledge seems to be dissappearing even faster than the forests themselves. 
(Cox & Balick 1995) 
Recent years have seen a strategic change in many environmental movements, in that 
NIMBY (not in my back yard) reactions to offensive environmental management 
plans have changed more towards NIABY (not in anyones back yard). Taylor (1993) 
notes such a change with the increased participation of people of colour in the 
environmental movement in the US. She states that: 
...many of the white-dominated, well-to-do, community environmental organisations 
...have sought to protect their own neighbourhoods from hazardous wastes. 
Taylor reminds us that national conferences of the environmental justice movement 
differ from those of mainstream environmental organisations such as the Sierra Club 
and Friends of the Earth, which lack the multi-cultural outlook that would lead to 
more equitable goals and a more effectively strategic movement. These observations, 
based on the US experience, contain principles and trends which have extended to 
other countries. 
In Britain, the aim of the Black Environment Network is to increase the participation 
of ethnic minorities in, and expand the focus of, the mainstream environment 
movement. Mainstream NGO environment organisations have in place equal 
opportunity charters, the aim of which is to alter the historical 'middle class white' 
domination of the environmental movement. In national campaigns there is 
significant cross-over between activists in the anti-racist movement and the 
environment movement. These notions wil l be considered further in chapter 7, where 
ecologically and socially favourable parameters for the future are discussed: deep, 
social and transpersonal ecological values do not accommodate discrimination; 
mutual aid replacing divisive forms of competetivism would displace discrimination; 
and community resurgence is about the reclamation of autonomy over community 
development. A l l of these demand expansion of ethical consideration in 
environmental management as well as other disciplines. 
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2.2 Humanism, technology and scientism. 
It must be stated that discussion of humanism, and its critique, is not to be considered 
as 'anti-human'. Of course humans have existence legitimacy equal to any other 
organism or object. The un-doubtable calibre of the human species means that there is 
a weighty potential and inherent propensity in the survival and betterment instinct to 
exploit these capacities to the fu l l . It is in doing so that ethical and moral problems 
arise, problems because of our ability to reason and reflect on our actions. I f we did 
not posses this capacity, then our actions would simply be instinctive bio-
physiological pursuit backed by specialised mental capacity. Since we can evaluate, 
decide and scheme, there is an obligation to incorporate moral considerations into 
environmental management. When the effects of our actions are visible or tangible, 
confidence in our ability grows. The transformation of landscape into tamed and 
productive spaces is testament to the significant consequences of our actions. 
Human pride in this ability seems to have developed a particular arrogance, what 
Erhenfield (1980) describes as "arrogant humanism". He states that the core of 
humanism is: 
...a supreme faith in human reason - its ability to confront and solve the many 
problems that humans face, its ability to rearrange both the world of nature and the 
affairs of men and women so that human life will prosper. 
By the 18th century, humanist confidence and homo-centric attitudes were deeply 
entrenched in the dominant Western culture (Erhenfield 1980, Midgley 1992). The 
extent and 'contagious' nature of humanism was manifest in the rejection of religious 
homage in favour of scientism. Midgley (1992) describes how Christianity displaced 
earlier Jewish ideas of community with nature and so set the momentum of a social 
wave - which, by the 17th and 18th century, had merged with new theories of reason. 
By this time, she asserts, the anthropocentric and humanistic tendencies had begun to 
exclude women from the inner circle, and Western men took the front-line of 
overwhelming selfishness and arrogance. 
Erhenfield (1980) produces numerous examples of how people 'stumble' on, 
psychologically 'secure' in a faith in human abilities to mould and cope with their 
environment (accommodating a 'technological f ix ' ) . There is clearly justification for 
this confidence, but it is potentially flawed. He mentions ecological blunders -
disregard for ecological constraints, unquestioned confidence in the products of our 
endeavours (hybrids and genetic engineering, modified ecosystems etc.). As an 
example, the original recommended doses of agro-chemical application to land often 
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end up being reduced, or products recalled, or banned. Project evaluation (from the 
micro to the macro level) fails to fully assess the costs (for example socio-ecological 
damage, and declining male sperm counts (though ecologically this may be 
favourable i f it reduces the number of people). In his paper considering the ecosystem 
management paradigm which "has gained wide acceptance among land resource 
managers", Stanley (1995) concludes that: 
...the belief in our ability to meet the assumptions of [humanistic] ecosystem 
management is unwarranted and ...ecosystem management is yet another example of 
the arrogance of humanism. 
It is in the humanistic framework that those seeking to protect environments or 
organisms aim to 'discover' new instrumental-type values of the subject in order to 
effect conservation. 
What might have in the past seemed a relatively clear sequence of events in terms of 
analysis becomes obscured, and we now have cause, quasi-solution, effects of the 
quasi-solution, and some or all of the original problem remaining. This is how 
Erhenfield sees the modem scientific approach. Indeed it is widely acknowledged that 
approximately 75% of prescribed drugs are served to deal with side-effects of the first 
25%. 
[Quasi-solutions and residue problems] - the dialectical process whereby the 
solution to one problem generates sets of new problems that eventually preclude 
solutions. 
(Schwartz 1971) 
On a macro scale, it is reasonable to suggest that people are not in control of the 
collective momentum of technological 'progress'. This, i f nothing else is of huge 
importance in terms of the moral consequences of technology. Whatever use people 
can put technology to, they wil l try it; i f a negatively-impacting use can be made 
profitable, this is sufficient incentive. Erhenfield (1980) links this application of 
technology to the globalisation of culture and trade: 
...there will always be some people that will be destructive or insane while occupying 
power [or who have access to destructive resources]. The more interlinked and 
organised the world becomes, the more vulnerable it will be to such disturbed [or 
profit seeking] people. 
I f only in the context of human interests, reliance on technology can be very 
dangerous: the illicit trade in radioactive materials from the former USSR are clear 
example, as are the considerable stockpiles of arms in the hands of 'official' and 
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'unofficial' groups. The availability of lethal weapons to anyone will ing and 
(financially) able to purchase them, is ecologically, as well as socially, disastrous -
while financially beneficial to the producers. 
Seymour (1989) notes how in ancient Greece, when abstract sciences in the Islamic 
world were making great progress: 
...people actually drew back, consciously, from the practical developments this 
science would have made possible...the working steam engine...There is evidence 
that they purposefully abstained—kept their science abstract. It would have seemed 
to the good Muslim blasphemous to have interfered too much with what seemed to 
them the work and intentions of God. 
This is one approach to technology which seems more cautious and thoughtful than 
the humanistic approach. 
The impacts of technological culture are most often dualistically 'good' and 'bad', and 
profit seeking is not 'bad' in itself. But the means to the ends so often have adverse 
socio-ecological consequences. What is more, it is unfortunate that the 'bad' side is 
not easily controlled, that 'the lowest social denominators' tend to surface; that there 
will always be people ready to use any means to establish or maintain the satisfaction 
of their desires. The systems and products are not inherently 'bad', but the uses to 
which they are put can be damaging. A simple example is the chainsaw: it can be 
used to fell a tree likely to fall onto a busy route but it can also be used for capitalistic 
quick-return forest clearance, with associated socio-ecological side effects. 
The US Forest Service, in conjunction with private timber companies, actually props 
up an uneconomic and unsustainable timber harvest system. Foreman (1991) states 
that in the 'urgency' to do deals, the Forest Service incur more costs in preparing sales 
for extraction rights than they gain from the timber companies. He states that in 1985 
the cost to the tax payer of below-cost sales was $600 million. He describes the early 
approach to timber extraction in the US as follows, suggesting that attitudes are little 
different today: 
In the view of the timbermen, the forests were endless, and they felt perfectly justified 
in ransacking an area [and burning extensive other areas], leaving it raw and 
bleeding, and moving farther west. 
(Foreman 1991) 
Lee (1995) describes how in the eyes of the US Forest Service, "the technical 
rationality of the modern state meets the undisciplined American Wilderness", and 
that: 
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For most of the twentieth century, [its goal was to emphasize] the need for regional 
economic development. From such a perspective, the role of foresters is the 
management of timber, not the conservation of forests. 
(ibid.) 
This counters the Forest Services' common defence of conservation-know-how/ 
stewardship of forest areas. It is a technical process of timber removal, rather than 
knowledge of ecosystems. 
Many sections of (particularly Western) human society are hardly in control of their 
socio-ecological impact. Yet individually we would like to believe that some degree 
of moderation is in operation, is shown regarding environmental management by 
environmental managers. 
The information super-highway is a more recent addition to technology's resource 
pool, and the mounting infrastructure of potential volatility. It can serve to spread 
valuable information and good wil l , but it also distributes discriminatory, exploitative 
and dangerous literature, images and know-how - government military information, 
child pornography, web sites for militia groups, white power web sites and the 
'alt.guns' discussion group are a few examples. 
The sheer complexity and extent of technology serves to enhance the impressions that 
humans are in control and that problems are surmountable. There must be a solution 
to every problem' - this is the psychology of humanism as supported by technology 
and the scientific world view . The reduction of complex bio-chemi-physical activity 
to simplified, comprehensible levels of analysis, 'lies, damn lies and statistics', and the 
common practice of exposing 'desirable' rather than accurate outcomes in research 
and knowledge exchange are all part of the problem. It is linked to the competitive 
climate of commerce and capitalistic economy, and to party politics. 'Green 
technologies' do exist, as does the know-how for 'greener living' within consumer 
culture. But vested interests, for example in oil (see 2.1) also decrease the likelihood 
of rapid 'greening' in business. Some observers/participants in the world of commerce 
(such as Hawken 1994, Forrester 1990, Ralston & Church 1991), see the emergence 
of 'green commerce' as imminent, with leaders already setting relatively high 
ecological standards (see 6.2. 
Through the search for profit and the desire to develop tradable knowledge (such as 
the trend in universities towards corporate-sponsored research), green technology 
research has been stifled rather than being disseminated - it has been literally 'cuffed 
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in the vaults'. Benton (1994) agrees that profit-making is a driving force behind 
research - usually directed by those with power: 
Political, economic and military interests shape, by way of organising and funding of 
research, the research priorities and the formulation of problems for investigation on 
the part of the scientific community. 
Two characteristics of the humanist outlook which are of particular importance in our 
approach to the management of the environment can usefully be noted. 
Firstly, the humanist orientation favours extensive organisation and managerialism 
(see 2.3). With conservative economic policies this creates a hierarchical social 
climate, and this is a structure that precipitates or aggravates socio-ecological 
disharmony (see 'social ecology', section 7.2). It plays into the hands of Darwinian 
'competetivism', a deficient condition removed from the dynamic equilibrate forces 
that act in primary nature. Although we are indeed, as a species, as i f separate from 
primary nature to a considerable extent, we are intricately bound into the same 
biological dependency web. 
The second characteristic (linked to the first) is the desire for power. 'Blind faith' in 
our perceptive and analytical abilities, coupled with discrimination (in the form of 
racism, sexism and speciecism etc.), leads to a managerialist orientation which 
exploits the environment for rapid return. In the work place, humanistic (egotistical, 
hierarchical) behaviour often overrides experience-based information regarding the 
function and efficiency characteristics of business, and this wreaks havoc amongst 
potential sites of 'improvement' both for human and non-human interest groups. 
Two other points can be usefully mentioned here. Firstly, in the context of 
contemporary communications, transport and travel, individuals can not help but to 
'go with the flow' to a great extent, and so their ability to lessen their adverse impacts 
on people and neighbouring species, whilst participating in society, is hampered. 
Human behaviour is largely dictated by perceptions and experience. As such, an 
individuals' destructive or disruptive characteristics are more a manifestation of 
collective conditioning and habit than genetic make-up. This type of reasoning is 
often used to explain social malaise. In terms of the end uses of technology: 
...when evil results from human discovery it is usually because of unforeseen 
circumstances rather than wicked intent. 
(Ehrenfield 1980) 
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Acknowledgement of this idea also denotes acceptance of the notion that we are not 
fully in control of our technological products, which once produced are open to 
application by 'disturbed' or profit seeking people, to echo Erhenfield (1980). 
Secondly it is a human 'trap' rather than a political ideology characteristic which 
produces the humanist problem. The industrial characteristics of both capitalism and 
communism are "out-growths of the humanist premise" (Ehrenfield 1980). Their 
hyper-societal organisational structures (the nation state and the centrally planned 
economy) are psychologically accommodated by a supreme faith in the ability of 
people to organise their affairs, and to do so with positive results. People are 
primarily concerned with their personal or community interests over all others -
secondary (other interest group) concerns are mainly instrumental. Merchant (1992) 
provides a useful Table summarising the various groundings for environmental ethics. 
Table 2.5 is an illustration of Merchant's data. 
What exactly is problematic about humanistic tendencies and why should it concern 
us that this outlook is so prevalent? Myth and propaganda have widely led to a 
collective state of mind in which human abilities to cope with, and adjust to, 
environmental surroundings are taken for granted. This has led to a stage of 
consciousness detached from nature (see Table 2.6). 
The conditions outlined in Table 2.6 merit concern - they reveal alienation from the 
natural state and they reinforce and enhance the propensity for humanistic faith and 
other ecologically detached states of mind. They are a dislocation from our ecological 
roots - what Devall and Sessions (1985) would describe as 'regressive evolution'. 
2.3 Environmental managerialism, or the interventionist approach. 
'Environmental managerialism' has recently become a catch-phrase synonymous with 
good environmental management practice. 'Managerialism' is the tendency to manage 
our surroundings, based on the premise that 'we know best'. It can be argued that the 
authoritarian and instrumentalist basis of managerialism is incompatible with benign 
actions in relation to the environment. The phraseology seeks, i f not to justify, then to 
pacify opposition to what is now widely recognised as unethical abuse of our 
surroundings. Management per se is not so much in question as the gravitation 
towards intervention and manipulation generally. 
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SELF: EGOCENTRIC SOCIETY: HOMOCENTRIC 
Self-Interest 
•Madmlsadon of Indivi-
dual self biterest: what 
Is good lor each Indivi-
dual wffl benefit society 
as a whole. 
•Mutual coercion mutu-
ally aggreed upon 
Religious Utilitarian Religious 
•Authority of -Greatest good lor the "Stewardship 
. God greatest number of by humans 
Genesis 1 people as God's 
•Protestant ethic 'Social Justice care-takers 
•Individual -Duty to other humans «GoldenRule. 
salvation Genesis 2 
COSMOS: EGOCENTRIC 
Eco-Sclentlfic Eco-Rellgtous 
•Rational, sdenrllc belief 
system based on taws of 
ecology 
•Urifty, stability, diversity 
harmony of ecosystem 
•Balance of nature or 
chaotic systems approach 
•Faith that afllvlng 
andnon-Svjng 
things have value 
•Duty to whole 
environment 
•Human and cosmic 
survival 
MECHANISM 
1. Matter Is composed ol atomic panicles 
2. The whole Is equal to the sum of the parts 
3. Knowledge Is context-Independent 
4. Change occurs by the rearrangement of parts 
5. Dualism of mind and body, matter and spirit 
BOTH MECHANISTIC AND HOLISTIC ORGANICtSM (HOLISM) 
1. Everything Is connected to eveiythlng else 
2. The whole Is greater than the sum ot the 
parts 
3. Knowledge Is coittetf-dependent 
4. Ths primacy of purpose over parts 
5. The unity of human and non-human nature 
Table 2 £ 
Grounds for an Environmental Ethic (adapted from Merchant, 1992). 
Equations of humanism: 
• 'overgrown' garden = laziness 
• uncut grass & unmanaged woodland = neglect, resource waste...ought to be 
managed and sanitised 
• untamed 'wilderness' = frightening 
• person outside urban areas = 'in the sticks' or 'middle of nowhere' 
Effects of the above: 
• slim awareness of the names of local plants and animals 
• little awareness of local edible and medicinal plants 
• (false) picture book images of farm management practices and sources of food. 
• psychological normalisation of life in degraded urban environments. 
• apathy, lack of knowledge, and lack of interest in demanding protection of local 
and wider environments, and a gravitation towards acceptance of intervention and 
'development'. 
Table 2.6 
The Humanistic Frame of Mind and its Effects. 
Managerialism is at the ethical heart of the debate on environmental management. It 
comes into play on the border between a survival based need for action and action for 
its own sake. 'Action' here implying intervention in and the moulding of the natural 
environment by people. It might be extended to 'by people, for people', but there are 
actions carried out by people for non-humans. This is where the issue becomes 
confused between selfish and altruistic actions. An action in defence of another being 
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or organism - which might at first seem to be altruistic - could actually be selfish, 
since to not act for the subject would cause dissatisfaction in the one acting through 
guilty conscience (refer also to 7.5 for 'transpersonal ecology' and the extension of 
'self to 'Self). Therefore, pure altruism is unlikely to be a 'real' motivation. 
In addition, the 'will to do good' for other organisms is not necessarily matched by the 
'ability to achieve' the desired goal: 'blind' intervention can be disruptive because of 
our limited understanding of ecosystems. The rabbit was not introduced to Australia 
for its own benefit yet now it is regarded as a pest problem. Similarly with the spread 
of mink and grey squirrel in Britain. The common lag time between cause and effect 
means many environmental problems do not arise immediately - a fact that is 
sometimes strategically exploited by development interests groups. 
It is useful to distinguish between 'intervention' and 'participation' in natural 
processes. 'Participation' can be defined as acting to fulfil the biological requirements 
necessary to live and perpetuate as a species. 'Intervention' can be defined as 
deliberately altering the course of natural processes where it is not necessary for 
living and the perpetuation of the species. This distinction is made awkward by some 
of the 'unique' qualities of the human species, namely those deriving from the large 
complex brain of these apes. We have physical and psychological needs. Hence we 
seek food, and food for thought. We also have desires, products of conceptualisation 
and imagination afforded by perception and mental analytical and assimilative 
capacities. These are particularly distinct in humans. 
We also have emotions which can lead us to desire more than we physically need. We 
also seek more than we psychologically need. This may seem to be striking deeply 
into psycho-constructual analysis, but it is necessary since the global consequences of 
our collective desires and demands on natural systems are charging a heavy toll on 
global surface integrity. An example is desires induced by advertising which offers 
life-transforming, but actually cluttering products - new/improved washing powder, 
or a new fast car (with brighter clothes, or a faster car, we might soothe and stimulate 
our ego). The media is very much responsible for ratcheting up our material and 
travel desires and expectations. 
It is the consequences of these psychological, but not biologically-determined, needs 
which are problematic. In some sections of the human species there exist 
materialistic, interventionist and ultimately self-destructive drives constantly seeking 
gratification. It is observable that increased economic activity does not necessarily 
mean increased quality of life. 
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Inflated desires/expectations of material consumption, the ratcheting up of financial 
units dealt with, and the growth of statistical and logistical complexity often actually 
arrest and even reverse the trend towards greater life quality. 
The power of money can become un-wieldy since it is hardly possible to effectively 
check the ethicality of all of the inputs to increased product/service consumption. 
Also stress between people, as well as haphazard and damaging 'environmental 
exploitation' can derive from inequitable material and financial resource distribution. 
Why do we want to manage our environment in the first place? To meet our actual 
and perceived needs and desires. Some human societies demand environmental 
management to satisfy consumption greater than biological needs. It has already been 
indicated that there is a feeling of security associated with the managed environment 
A greater level of interference in the natural world is seen as necessary - to satisfy 
habitual or media-induced needs as well as real needs. The dislocation of production 
and consumption (geographically - and in terms of perception) has led to over-
production of raw materials and products, artificial price supports and wastage (in the 
EC, milk and wine 'lakes', and grain, beef and butter 'mountains'). The Guardian 
(13/4/19%) reports that: 
One of the many bizarre aspects of the [E.C.] subsidy system is that intensive 
farming, using most fertiliser and artificial aids to production, is being most highly 
rewarded. Farmers who most need societies help to stay in business - those farming 
organically or hill farmers who also safeguard the countryside - are least likely to be 
generously treated. 
Simultaneously the 'total resource consumption' (or 'value added') between point of 
production of raw materials and consumption of the final product is inflated. Changes 
towards supermarket distribution lead to considerable wastage of foods bought on 
demand speculation, which when not sold are destroyed. 
This is a serious problem with considerable social, ecological and economic 
consequences (see Table 2.7). It has caused massive distortions in international 
trading patterns. In England, production of animals for guaranteed per capita prices 
has meant that stock levels have been maintain at disproportionately high levels. In 
some areas where land degradation is feared, stocking density caps have been applied, 
above which price support is eroded. 
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intensive agricultural systems + livestock per capita price supports 
• » 1/ Coupled with the international trade of 'livestock'; leads to a greater potential for 
per capita levels of suffering for the animals. 
21 Ethical bankruptcy as European subsidised livestock production, fed on cash crop grains 
imported from W. Africa and S. America (*1), is 'dumped' on overseas markets at 
(locally) undercutting prices. (*2) 
*1 - see socio-ecological impacts of this in Tables 2.1,2.2, and 2.3 
*2 - overseas countries victim to European agricultural policy (the 
CAP) which supports excess food production 
Table 2.7 
Distortions in Agricultural Systems. 
So how exactly is this related to managerialistic tendencies? 
The urge to satisfy (artificially inflated) desires is the key to the profit motive. These 
desires and the induced, enhanced, managerialist tendencies in human character are 
bound together. The attitude which accommodates these processes w i l l not 
'chameleonically' change in other activities. It is a framework of 'reason' that pervades 
all aspects of life. 
Gratuitously consumptive tendencies are conducive to insensitive and disharmonising 
lifestyles. Managerialistic inclinations are one component of the disruptive outlook 
(ecologically and socially as well as economically), one which is at the same time 
consciously and obliviously excessively demanding of the environment. The result is 
erosion of ethical consideration for all beyond the narrowest 'self. This means that 
ethical consideration is eroded to what are increasingly considered to be inadequate 
levels. 
In this discussion of managerialism, it is worth relating the contribution of the 
scientific world view to this outlook. This world view grew with the 'scientific 
revolution' (beginning in the seventeenth century). Before this paradigm was 
something of an 'ecological world view'. Merchant (1992) describes how "the earth 
was considered to be a beneficent, receptive, nurturing female". This philosophy 
"served as a cultural constraint restricting the actions of human beings" (ibid.) - it was 
a constant reminder of our complete organic dependence on the land, and a strong 
force in ensuring a sound psychological approach to living. 
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The seventeenth century (Western) scientific materialism encouraged experiment: 
breaches of the moral restraints the 'Mother-Earth' image offered against the 
exploitation of nature. This 'new experimental science' was coupled with a world view 
which saw nature as a dead and inert machine. Merchant (1992) describes how 
Francis Bacon 'prescribed' the inquisition of nature, how it ought to be "bound into 
service", moulded for human needs; that we ought to discover her "plots and secrets". 
She quotes the observations of Robert Boyle in the 1660's, that: 
...some men [sic] care only to know nature, others desire to command her [and] to 
bring nature to be serviceable to their particular ends, whether of health, or riches, 
or sensual delight. 
This experimental scientific approach was complemented by a mechanistic world 
view. It removed the "animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos" (Merchant 
1992), and saw organisms, including people, as being composed of interchangeable 
parts which could be repaired or replaced (perhaps the most literal manifestation of 
this belief is the use of pig and baboon organs in transplant operations). It is 
immediately clear how this system of thought, which is "now taught in most western 
schools" (ibid.), could contribute to the acceptability of managerialist tendencies. 
Merchant offers five key assumptions which allow for the human manipulation and 
control of nature: 
• matter is composed of particles; 
• the universe is a natural order; 
• knowledge and information can be abstracted from the natural world; 
• problems can be analysed into parts that can be manipulated by mathematics; and 
• sense data are discrete. 
For Descartes (1596-1650), motion was seen as a primary quality of matter 
introduced from instant to instant by God, whilst for Newton (1642-1727) new 
motion was added periodically (presumably by God) in the form of gravity, 
fermentation and electricity (lightning), "to prevent the non autonomous world-
machine from running down" (Merchant 1992). Nature is composed of systems which 
can be reduced to predictable rules and laws through observation. Context-
independent entities and quantities satisfy science's dependence on "a rigid, limited, 
and restrictive structural reality" (ibid.). 
Ethical codes are a human conception. 'Ought' and 'ought not' are expressions of our 
understanding of 'right' and 'wrong'. Animals rarely show signs of unnecessarily 
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devious, manipulative, exploitative or violent intent - recent footage of dolphin 
'violence' towards porpoises, and the throwing of seals by killer whales is not 
'immoral' behaviour. We like to believe that non-human animals, act not through 
moral code, but through instinct - which, unless under stress, dictates that they act in 
peaceful ways. A cheetah running down, killing and eating a gazelle is a violent act in 
human terms, but it is a necessary 'part of the process'. People on the other hand do, 
without doubt, act in 'unnecessarily devious, manipulative and exploitative ways' 
towards each other and the world around us. This is the nature of the managerialistic 
approach: to manipulate, adjust and exploit our surrounds unnecessarily because we 
think we will benefit, and we think we can achieve defined goals by doing so. The 
ultimately unanswerable question is whether it is morally acceptable to exploit the 
environment simply because we can, particularly when it is widely considered that 
there are extensive moral implications. Morals have no absolutes, they are subjective 
standards, but our impacts are more objectively clear. That it is unanswerable does 
not mean it is not worthy of consideration - perhaps moral precautionary principles 
ought to be exerted. 
In conclusion, "the mechanistic [managerialist] world view continues today as the 
legitimating ideology of industrial capitalism and its inherent ethic of the domination 
of nature" (Merchant 1992). Such mechanistic assumptions, whether or not they are 
accurate perceptions of reality, are problematic ecologically. Through the interactions 
between human societies, they are socially problematic as well. Merchants' tabulation 
of the 'grounds for environmentalism' (Table 2.5) denotes these philosophies as 
'egocentric'. The egocentric position is challenged firstly by the homocentric view 
(which seeks to safeguard the interests of people), and secondly by some ecocentric 
views (which seek to normalise respect offered by an intelligent species to other 
species and systems). A l l of these are challenged by some radical ecophilosophies. 
2.4 Speciesism. 
Speciesism is analogous to environmental racism. It parallels humanistic and 
homocentric attitudes in that it marginalises, and legitimises disregard of, the interests 
of non-human species. It is also in part a product of managerialist and mechanistic 
outlooks. It does not necessarily apply where there is direct survival competition 
between people and other species but this is not as common as it is perceived to be. In 
peoples' search for profit, for 'entertainment', the unquestioning acceptance of 
traditions, ignorance and indifference or 'each-to-their-own(-but-only-if-human)' 
acceptance of what is no less than malicious disregard for the interests of other 
species, humans abuse and exploit other species. 
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In environmental management the most direct and intentional application of speciesist 
attitudes are in animal agriculture and in many forest and land management practices 
(including strip/deep mining). Other effects might be termed 'indirect' or by 'default1. 
The latter includes the construction and maintenance of agricultural and other large 
scale infrastructures, and smaller scale forms of management such as the 
manipulation of 'game' animal populations and 'vermin' control ('varmints' in the US). 
Alongside game population and vermin control are other controversial issues such as 
'recreational countryside sports' and live ammunition use in military training zones. 
There is speciesism inherent in medical research and cosmetics testing; the fur trade; 
the use of dogs and horses in crowd control and 'dangerous situation investigation' 
(e.g.. mine fields); the animal entertainment industries (zoos, circuses, dophinariums, 
and household pets); and more contrived 'sports' (cock-fighting, bear baiting, rodeos, 
bullfights etc.) - but these really fall outside the realm of environmental management. 
However the environmental consequences of some of these practices can be 
significant - demand for African wild animals (coliseums in Roman times) brought 
about massive population reductions for many species. Seymour (1989) tells us that: 
North Africa was practically denuded of large wild animal life by the insatiable 
appetite of the [Roman] arenas. 
The question of 'tradition' associated with cultural continuation arguably explains 
much of the resistance to change in our treatment of other species. It does not morally 
excuse what some see as ethical negligence - negligence by those who are aware of 
the arguments against the continued abuse of animals which are farmed, persecuted 
through land management practices and in the name of 'sport' and 'pest' control. It 
must be emphasised that advocating the liberation of animals from their currently 
degraded status does not imply lowering the status of people towards some mean 
value. 
Where speciesism is entrenched, it makes decision making much 'simpler'. This 
simplification prepares the ground for moral erosion. The debate (exhaustively 
covered in literature) is without doubt one which stimulates strong feelings. The case 
against the continuance of current practices, and for affording greater regard to non-
humans is argued on utilitarian grounds (for example Singer's landmark book of 
1975, 'Animal Liberation') and on a rights basis (S. Clark and T. Regan for example). 
The essential shared implication is that animals have interests which are of equal 
importance to them as ours are to us, and therefore respect for their interests is due. 
To disregard the interests of people is considered to be immoral. The same ought to 
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apply to non-humans. Table 2.8 presents a simple breakdown of human un/abusive 
interactions with other animals. 
Consciously abusive 
Malicious abuse of animals for various reasons including anger release, and neglect of animals in ones 
charge (there have been convictions for this, though the punishment has only been petty). Many acts in 
this category are illegal, though cruel practices such as the use of leg-hold traps in North America, 
snares in Europe and elsewhere, and the most intensive forms of animal product production (such as 
battery farms, veal crates, and Fois Gras pate production) are legal in many countries. 
Naively/unknowingly abusive 
Includes abusiveness due to a lack of information, for example through investing capital in a bank or 
the stock market and therefor indirectly supporting abusive practices they invest in. Also includes 
thoughtless acceptance of abusive traditions, and this is linked to a lack of consideration. 
Regretfully abusive 
Where practices are recognised as abusive but are continued either through a genuine belief that they 
are necessary (though they might not be so); where one feels that it would be futile to try to change the 
status quo; or because there is actually no choice due to a survival type situation (during war or famine, 
polar residence...). 
Optionally abusive 
To chose abusive practices, knowing that they are so; for example "I couldn't live without bacon"; the 
farmer seeking profit from animal agriculture (particularly through the more intensive systems); 
agroforestry practitioners who ignore the ethical consequences of their actions in the pursuit of profit; 
and abuse of animals in the pursuit of country sports (some who participate genuinely believe they are 
not cruel activities, whilst others see the abuse as a small price to pay for an invigorating ride/run/walk 
through rural areas). 
Unabusive by default 
Where one is by chance unabusive, for example where one can not afford to buy meat and other animal 
products or one can not afford to own and manage land. Also investment in building societies, which 
are only allowed to invest in housing developments - limiting investment in, for example, animal 
agriculture. 
Unabusive by choice 
This might be on account of health-related dietary prescriptions (of a vegetarian / vegan diet); through 
choice for the positive health effects - still a selfish act; or where for moral or ethical reasons one 
chooses not to participate in any way in the practice of or demand for abusive practices. 
Table 2.8 
Outlooks of Un/Abusive Interactions with Animals. 
Human and non-human animals are to an extent territorial. Some non-human animals 
can adapt to living with people (such as dogs and cats), whilst others experience 
shortened and less fulfilled lives. Some experience severe deprivation and frustration 
(birds in cages, fish in 'domestic' tanks) and others are deliberately/naively mistreated. 
It is useful to distinguish between the treatment of captive and wild/feral animals, and 
to consider the effects of captivity on animals. The natural place of an animal is 
amongst its own kind (though some choose solitude for extensive periods of time), 
with the freedom to roam within the territorial complex of animal life. Human claims 
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to territory are 'natural' as well but the construction of fencing and walls are a direct 
interference with the movement of other creatures. The legitimacy of these barriers 
more often though, rests on their requirement for the control of captive 'livestock', a 
practice questioned by the arguments in favour of respecting the interests of animals. 
Before discussing the treatment of captive and wild/feral animals, the need for using 
animals wi l l be considered. Both the successful existence of herbivorous human 
communities and cultures, and scientific research, show that there is no inherent 
nutritional deficiency in a plant-based diet (though as with any dietary habits, a 'bad' 
diet is possible). Indeed there can be considerable health benefits from a balanced 
plant diet. This is confirmed by for example Dr. G. Langley's 1995 book, 'Vegan 
Nutrition', which is a detailed composite analysis of scientific studies in Europe and 
America to date considering the nutritional adequacy and effects of the plant-based 
diet on human health. Numerous other writers, including Garner (1993), and A l -
Hafiz B.A Masri (1989) support the same conclusion: that there are significant health 
benefits to a balanced plant diet. It is beyond reasonable doubt that animal agriculture 
and other sources of animal based sustenance are not biologically necessary for the 
healthy continuance of the human species. Since humans are also endowed with 
reasoning and a moral sense, and given the omnivore choice, they have a moral 
obligation to reduce/avoid consumption behaviours which cause unnecessarily 
enhanced levels of suffering. 
The question then arises whether or not is feasible to grow or gather plants adequate 
to sustain humans. This obviously varies depending on geographical and 
topographical location, but in general, a proportion of the inhabited earth can supply 
sufficient plant foods. In some areas, for example in temperate climates, there is no 
reason why an appropriate agricultural strategy could not support the human 
population with a good plant diet. Furthermore due to the nutritional efficiency of a 
plant-based diet, about a quarter of the current farmed land in Britain could support 
the current population on a plant diet since it takes between 10 and 20 units of plant 
protein to 'produce' one unit of animal protein. Clearly some areas, such as biotically 
marginal arid and desert zones and polar/perma-frost belts are not able to support 
human populations solely with plants. 
The way in which people are geographically distributed, with an ongoing urban 
convergence, is considered a barrier to wholly ecologically-sound, herbivorous 
human existence. Realistically, the trend toward ultra-mobile lifestyles wi l l not 
change in the foreseeable future, nor will the complex networks of people and goods 
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transport disappear. The logistics of a herbivorous food industry are much simpler 
than an omnivorous one. 
The use of animal power to farm land and move resources is another form of 
exploitation which, although it relieves considerable labour burdens from people, 
does mean the exertion of morally questionable control over other creatures and it can 
considerably enhance their suffering (through extreme and unbalanced load-bearing). 
Captive animals are used as 'tools' of production: 'beasts of burden'. Equine and 
bovine animals are the most common recipients of this treatment (canines are also 
widely used as work 'hands'). 
The first moral objection to the above is to the use and control of the animals. 
Secondly, in their maltreatment through the training process and during 'work' (the 
use of goads, whips, and other forms of violent physical contact). Where such abuses 
are banned in law, as with other laws, they are broken. Condoning the use of animals 
as above, even with welfare protection laws in place, is effectively sanctioning the 
inevitable abuses in the practices. 
The production of animal carcasses and dermis by-products (feather and hair) is the 
next issue to consider. Extensive literature supports the case that the process and 
products associated with animal agriculture involve enhanced suffering, stress, and 
interference in the liberty of the subjects (crowding, body part docking, cage/pen 
containment, disregard for family and group bonding sensibilities, direct control 
abuses, sex selection in bird production, and genetic manipulation). 
Indirect consequences of animal agriculture which to an extent might be classed as 
'externalities' include: 
• altering land for purposes of animal agricultural management; 
• feed crop production, transport, and preparation (human social consequences 
were described in 2.1); 
• carcass and animal-agricultural waste disposal by combustion or burying; 
spillage (milk having a particularly high biological oxygen demand in 
breakdown; slurry also causes problems including eutrophication in water 
bodies); 
• agrochemical pollution; 
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° the associated perceived requirements for vermin and predator control; 
• (waste) by-product application (slurry to land, resulting in gaseous and 
particulate contributions to air and water - greenhouse gasses and eutrophying 
nutrients); 
» excessive surface vegetation removal causing exposure to erosive forces; and 
• associated energy and nutritional consumption for an inefficient system of 
food production and distribution. 
Animal agriculture has ecological and ethical implications since they directly affect 
other animals in areas where the agriculture takes place and beyond - as air and water 
transport redistributes and dilutes the by-products. Since many of these effects on 
non-farm animals are predictable, the sanctioning of animal agriculture can be 
described as speceisist discrimination against non-farm animals in addition to farm 
animals. 
Wild and feral animals are affected as we manage the environment around us for a 
number of purposes other than agriculture. As mentioned above, they are subject to 
population reduction (as vermin or pests: wolves, foxes, hares/rabbits, crows, stoats, 
mink, grey squirrels etc.) by means of direct assault, trapping, snaring, poison, or 
genetic interference. They are subject to population 'streamlining' (e.g. deer culls) and 
are persecuted in the practice of country sports. Uncountable numbers of wild and 
feral animals are affected when vegetation is thinned, land cleared, ploughed and 
'moulded' for forestry and other agricultural, mining, and recreational purposes - as 
well as for infrastructure and urban developments. Wild and feral animals are 
particularly affected by crop maintenance and harvest (seasonal and longer term 
silvicultural) since they settle, and are then are displaced as the crops are harvested, or 
tree crops are thinned, cleaned and treated with biocides. 
Two issues, which purportedly have animals' and conservation interests as goals, are 
worthy of attention. Firstly, zoos encage animals stating that as well as education (and 
entertainment) the aim is the preservation of species (with the longer-term goal of 
reintroducing species, and boosting wild populations). This incarceration, in the same 
way as more intensive animal agriculture, often induces depraved states of mental and 
physical conditions. These are manifest as 'tameness', obesity and illness - and 
tormented creatures displaying stereotypical behaviours. Few animals are ever 
reintroduced: re-introduction has a hit-and-miss record of success and most zoos 
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either have insufficient funds and/or knowledge to provide basic appropriate 
conditions, or else they are conspicuous displays of extravagant wealth or imitations 
of latter-day entertainments. Many would go as far as to say that animals in perpetual 
captivity verge towards being sub species - for example an elephant in a small 
plantless enclosure, (otherwise) migratory birds in small aviaries, or 'big cats' in cages 
(they are all very depraved conditions of existence). 
Secondly, countryside sports are thought by some to be economically viable means 
for conserving species (see for instance various publications from the British Field 
Sports Society and The Game Conservancy). Even though woodland may be planted 
for the purposes of providing game bird cover or fox coverts, many would suggest 
that conserving to kill is a morally corrupt and corrupting mentality. The British Field 
Sports Society and the British Association of Shooting Clubs assertion that without 
country sports there would be far fewer deer, hedgerows, copses, and other small 
wooded areas, are simply emotive, illogical. Blood sports such as badger baiting and 
cock-fighting have illegal links with the wider country sport community. 'Sports' 
centred around killing sentient animals are a questionable basis for conservation, one 
that is incompatible with ethical, ecological and social consideration. 
In conclusion, it is most frequently the case when animals are subject to negatively 
experiential impacting treatment by humans, that the practices are not necessary. 
Whilst they carry on, they satisfy human trivial interests, such as food type 
preference, the search for profits, or entertainment, at the direct expense of the most 
vital interests of animals. Few would dispute that the unnecessary suffering is 
unfavourable. So the conclusion which can be drawn is that ethical consideration is 
usually of low status in evaluating our conscious interaction with non-humans, and so 
speciesism is a condition of contemporary society. Britain is often described as a 
'nation of animal lovers' but the failure to recognise the ethically problematic nature 
of many practices is part of the speciesist psychology. 
2.5 Dilemmas. 
A number of attitudinal and psychological constructs which seem to result in the 
ethically and morally problematic consequences of human activities have been 
discussed. It is now appropriate to search for an understanding of how these f i t into 
the daily reality of decision making in organisational and development situations. 
Development and organisation mean change and management. The direction of 
change, the means of change, and the structure and methods of management 
necessitate decision-making. It is in these choices that ethical consideration can, and 
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should act as a tool and guide. Decisions based on the advantages and disadvantages 
and the ethical implications of the option(s) chosen must be made. Such evaluations, 
where due consideration takes place, are rarely simple. Rather, dilemmas arise - a 
choice has to be made between two or more courses of action, all of which may have 
some undesirable consequences. Whatever decision is made, there wil l be some 
people aggrieved by the decision. In the case of the most common pro-development 
conclusions, ethically and ecologically problematic effects wil l result. 
Bennet (1992) outlines what he sees as the key types of dilemma that arise in decision 
making pertaining to environmental management He suggests that first and foremost 
there are ethical dilemmas. It seems fair to suggest that rigid standards are the only 
way to guarantee the maintenance of conduct fitting to a moral society: "in the 
absence of immutable principles, utility wi l l always tend to displace moral justice". In 
other words, unless there are clear, obligatory standards in development and 
management, the search for personal or group utility will reduce ethical standards to a 
low and/or optional status. 
Next Bennet suggests that there are efficiency dilemmas. This refers to how much 
environmental damage is acceptable in the search for utility. They are questions of 
degree. What is required is a mechanism to "deduce a proper balance between utility 
and environmental damage" (ibid.). Traditional mechanisms for achieving what was 
seen as an appropriate balance were economics based cost/benefit analyses. Now 
though, there are attempts at broader-scope mechanisms for establishing a more 
accurate representation of the costs and benefits of proposed actions, and assessing 
the effects of past actions (see chapters 4 and 5). 
The next two dilemmas are socially based: they are equity and liberty dilemmas. The 
equity dilemma refers to who benefits from and who suffers from the impacts of 
actions - who pays for the operations and management, and who profits. It is 
complicated in most of contemporary society by the existing distribution of wealth 
and power, and cultural/political systems which are not based on collective principles. 
Schools of thought which advocate 'from each according to their ability and to each 
according to their need' (communalistic), or suggest that 'claims to property are 
admissions of theft' clash with free market ideologies. The latter accommodate 
unlimited private appropriation of resources and assets with little emphasis on 
equitable distribution, a system which when functioning under the same umbrella as 
'nation state taxing' is a morally contradictory order. It is a system which plays into 
the hands of 'free market capitalistic hooliganism' (what Heider (1994) calls 'anarcho-
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capitalism'), one of the most divisive aspects of contemporary society and an extreme 
version of individual/industrial liberty. The Marxist school of thought emphasises 
collective security and social harmonisation through community obligations, not what 
Bookchin (1990) describes as a 'nihilistic anti-property obsession' which led some in 
the 1960's to feel they were liberating society by stealing from shops. However there 
is ample moral weight in the notion that "no one has a right to own property on which 
the lives of others depend, - either morally, socially or ecologically" (Bookchin 1990). 
Liberty concomitant with private accumulation of wealth, is a source of much 
disharmony and moral erosion. But as Bennet (1992) asserts, "certain interests 
strongly resist subordinating their private interests to the collective good". Why 
should A share the products of her efforts and work with others? I f B didn't work for 
it, why should B benefit from it? Why shouldn't A be allowed to maximise personal 
gain? Why should A sacrifice gain for the benefit of B? Because as an intelligent 
species we can choose mutual aid over competetivism without derailing the 
motivating force behind progress; because moral consideration would create a more 
equitable ideology than afforded by personal-gain fundamentalism. This ought to 
extend beyond the human species to include the whole of the Gaian collective. 
The f i f t h dilemma category raised by Bennet is uncertainty. As was suggested in 
relation to humanism and scientism, we have incomplete information on the 
functioning of ecological systems with which we interact. Therefore we are unable to 
make fully-informed predictions of the likely effects of actions. We can observe and 
predict effects but can never have considered all possibilities. Execution of convicted 
killers is argued against for the same reason, that 'beyond reasonable doubt' is not 
definitive. The execution (or the release of a genetically modified animal, the 
'placement' of a road through a forest etc.) can not be reversed. There are infinite 
possible impacts of actions. But within limits we are able to predict a number of 
possible significant effects of any action or abstention from action. This affords a 
basis for precautionary actions or restraint 
Associated with uncertainty and precautionary action is risk. Who is to assess risk? 
How? And who says what is acceptable? As described below in 'frameworks of 
environmental analysis' (4.1), risk-benefit analysis aims to balance risk against 
possible gains. But how much risk is acceptable for a given set of expected gains? 
Does the level of risk acceptable change with the expected returns of an action? This 
issue is a source of much heated debate, for example in the situations described in 
'environmental racism' (2.1), where poorer communities may be willing to accept 
higher risk - making operations potentially cheaper in terms of safety standard 
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expenditure. Should companies assert equal standards of environmental and social 
safety globally, or is it acceptable for them to be more lax in poor countries just 
because it can be got away with? The latter seems a repugnant choice. How then can 
even the efforts of environmental economics deal with moral questions? Who is X to 
decide what risk Y can acceptably be exposed to, and what i f Y states that s/he is 
willing to accept greater risk than what X would permit? Two social dilemmas 
emerge: how much autonomy should individuals have over their own life and safety; 
and what obligations in this respect do individuals have to society? Again, there can 
be no definitive answer. 
Lastly there are evaluation dilemmas. How can incommensurate values be compared? 
Chapters 4 and 5 describe and analyse methods of environmental economics. These 
are seen by many as the most progressive and useful attempts to reach a stage of 
comprehensive impact analysis, but - as is considered in chapter 5 - there are a host of 
dilemmas related to the usefulness of, and indeed legitimacy, of the products of 
environmental economics. Some market-derived values may be no less problematic 
than the market system itself. But others, such as the hypothetical market contingent 
valuation values are even more so. As Bennet (1992) suggests: 
...no matter how objective a rating system may appear, all ratings are value 
judgements. And if there is no objective measure of personal values, they can be 
neither quantified nor aggregated into group preferences. 
There seems to be a certain impossibility attached to the idea of a comprehensive 
legitimate evaluation process. Does this mean that we ought to let go of what 
fragments of such a system we have managed to collate? Of course not: we have a 
moral obligation, i f we can not find a perfect system, to move as far away from bad 
systematics as possible. 
Bennet presents several case studies of dilemmas, which broadly represent the kinds 
of situations that decision-makers face. The first is a river development project 
nearing completion, where it is found that the sole population of a previously-
unknown species wi l l be destroyed i f the project goes ahead. But i f the project is 
cancelled, there wi l l be no pay-back for the considerable investment. The next is a 
situation in which the economic basis for an area is a particular industry, the viability 
of which depends on the cheap disposal of waste into a river - but the dumping is now 
seen to be the cause of considerable ecological damage due to steady growth in 
production and discharges into the river from other industries. This is threatening the 
safety of downstream water-users in another country. A similar type of situation 
might be where an industry is only able to be competitive i f subsidised. Many jobs 
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depend on it as does the local economy. Due to exchange rate changes, the subsidies 
wil l have to be increased or the industry will collapse. What choice should be made? 
Next he describes a situation where recent evidence suggests that the emissions of the 
industrial base of a nations' economy are causing severe environmental damage in 
countries downwind. As new international legislation demands improvements, how 
can this country absorb the costs of cleaning up the industry when the benefits wil l all 
be abroad, and experienced by others? Another situation arises where part of the 
culture of an indigenous people involves a large mammal (such as the Inuit and the 
bowhead whale). Hi-tech hunting has reduced the numbers so drastically that it is 
threatened with extinction. What does the leader of the indigenous people do? End a 
part of traditional culture, or carry on with the tradition and risk controversy with 
conservation bodies and the possible extinction of the animal which is part of the 
culture? 
A multi-national company proposes to a financially poor country the development of 
a large industrial plant which wil l create jobs, stimulate the local economy, ...and 
pose a low, but potentially very damaging, threat since the industry wil l involve 
hazardous operations with toxic substances. Furthermore, the national inspectorates 
might not have the skills and resources to monitor such an operation effectively. What 
does the poor country do? Lastly he describes a situation where a picturesque coastal 
community with a small shipping industry is faced with a dilemma: the ship builders 
have won a contract to build some large ships. To do so they propose to replace the 
old estuary bridge with one that would allow larger boats to pass. There would be 
considerable economic expansion in the community but part of the community is 
concerned that the valuable qualities of the area will be lost as industrial expansion 
will follow this first proposed expansion. What should the mayor do? 
As was suggested in relation to humanism, we all too frequently trust that there must 
be a solution to any problem, that at all junctions there must be a favourable route. 
But this is not the case, and particularly in the context of environmental issues, often a 
choice must be made between some form of preservation or protection and the equity 
and liberty interests of sections of the human community: ethical consideration is 
pitted against economic potential. For impossible dilemmas one route must be chosen 
over the other - as both can not be had. The conclusion of Bennets' (1992) study is 
that in none of the trade-off situations did things turn out in favour of environmental 
protection. He finds that: 
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...economic constituencies are demonstrably better equipped to cope with conflicts of 
interest than are environmental constituencies. 
Bennet's study is unique in the literature available in that rather than being geared 
towards environmental or developmental persuasions, and rather than attempting to 
provide formulas for solution making, he presents a barrage of dilemmas. And as has 
been emphasised in this paper, individuals are rarely intent on doing harm to others: 
rather, the real world continually offers intractable situations. It is often the case that 
i f one is to gain, another must lose. There is not an ever-expanding cake for all 
interest sources to seek more and more of: media and the effectiveness of advertising 
mean that in a material world, aspirations wi l l always exceed their satisfaction. I f 
economics is to be the dominant paradigm, environmental interests wi l l be sacrificed. 
This would seem to be the case, though as wi l l be seen in chapter 7, there are those 
who consider green capitalism and green business to be a viable, indeed necessary 
and inevitable future. 
The application of a 'comparative advantage' (CA) places CA on a questionable 
pedestal in which 'economic primacy', based around economic theory, presides where 
wider considerations should sit. Yet this may not be through intent so much as the 
default nature of the real world. However this is difficult to accept. This is the same 
problem affecting minority and indigenous communities threatened by the actions of 
the wider society or development interests. But could this be a 'natural' state of affairs 
or is it the result of intent or narrow focused action-return analysis? 
Bennet (1992) observes that failure to invest in rigorous anticipatory mechanisms 
meant that the initiation of the activities which caused the impacts preceded proper 
assessment. This is one of the key criticisms raised against 'environmental impact 
assessment' (EIA): they are obligatory for many developments, but it is up to the 
developer to conduct them. Thus they tend to be undertaken with the development in 
mind. Whoever prepares EIA's which tend against the proposed development may 
well threaten future chances of being employed to conduct EIA's. Those opposed to 
the development very often do not have the economic clout to fight legal battles and 
conduct extensive 'scientific' investigation, while the developer is able to write these 
off as overheads for developments which are expected to offer financial rewards. 
This chapter has discussed some of the psychological constructs which define the 
context of the world we see ourselves in. Historical perspectives were considered, 
particularly in relation to environmental racism. Other aspects of human relations 
with and attitudes towards the natural world and other humans were raised. The next 
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chapter considers human social development and the emergence of capitalism; the 
socio-ecologically expensive implications of dependency theory; and what is 
recognised as a degenerative and seriously disruptive end-product of cultural and 
social change: a decadent consumerist culture of contentment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GLOBAL HUMAN SOCIETY/IES AND MANAGEMENT OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter attempts to trace social history development from early societies through 
to the contemporary 'culmination' of 'Western style' development, and investigates 
social structures as they evolved from communal to highly divided systems. Social 
development is of crucial importance with regard to the nature and level of ethical 
consideration in our lifestyles and activities. Capitalism is one of the conceptual 
products of social development, and whether it is seen as a natural evolution of 
trading systems, or as a tool of exploitation, it is a dominant system, and proponents 
claim it offers materialistically attractive possibilities. 
This chapter also considers dependency theory, this being the process which is 
problematic because it serves to reduce the status of the interests of the dependent 
population to one vulnerable to external (most often economic / profit oriented) 
interests and desires. It is very much linked to the discussion of environmental racism 
(section 2.1) in that the dominant peak of the dependency hierarchy are some 
'Western' white persons and multi-nationals. In the process of development and 
maintenance of this human social construction, ecological concerns are marginalised 
through disinterest on the part of some (seeking profits), and by others who come 
under serious survival pressures. 
3.1 Synopsis of historical societal development, and capitalist emergence. 
3.1.1 Historical Societal Development 
The structures and nature of society is of prime importance in the way it affects the 
management of the environment. Broad changes in the form of social developments 
result in changing impacts of society on the environment. Change in impact is 
predictable, but what is more subtle is the changes over historical time since i t is only 
relatively recently that the potential for drastic impacts over a short period of time has 
existed. Industrial culture offers considerable transformative potential for human lives 
and their impact. 
Whether one adheres to faith in the notion of evolution or old testament religious 
creation, it is undisputed that human society has developed and expanded in its 
51 
abilities to manipulate environmental circumstance. The concept of 'progress' from a 
subsistence lifestyle has become an existence option for large sections of human 
society. Prehistorians suggest that humans emerged as distinct from other apes 5-10 
million years ago, archaeological evidence from East Africa suggest that standing 
stone tool using, hunter-gatherers existed 1.8 million years ago, and 5,000 years ago 
the first forms of agriculture emerged (Peet 1991). 
Peet considers the nature of the pre-capitalist world, and conceives of three key stages 
in social development process that can be seen: primitive communism, kin-ordered 
societies, and tributary formations. Primitive communism is based around gathering 
and hunting and other non-agricultural food acquisition techniques, and was dominant 
until about 15,000 years ago. It is interesting to note that this means human society 
has been for 99% of its supposed time, gatherers and hunters. Aside from the smaller 
global population numbers during this time, the nature of such societies would mean 
low per capita impact on the environment. Indeed, a virtual absence of management 
would place such systems in the category of 'environmental non-management' by 
default (rather than intentional laissez-faire). It is generally thought that such societies 
were co-operative and egalitarian (Peet 1991, Bookchin 1991, and Seymour 1989), 
whilst the nature of the roles of the sexes was already as is widely conceived today : 
"in all societies women are associated with the power to give life, men with the power 
to take it" (Peet 1991) - so men generally hunted whilst women gathered and 
produced and cared for children. 
The kin-ordered society emerged with the domestication of plants and animals and an 
increased commitment of family labour to a particular piece of land or flock of 
animals (Peet 1991). Peet sums up the conclusions of a number of authors, saying that 
under conditions of resource stress as the Pleistocene glaciation retreated (Early 
humans living in East Africa which became more arid), something of a Neolithic 
revolution transformed the forces of production and domesticated plants and animals. 
Since women were the ones who had gathered plants in the past, they were the main 
driving force initially (planting crops), leading to an enormous increase in the 
productivity of their labour. Some suggest that this was where regular tradable 
surpluses began. 
As agriculture required continual and more ordered work for the production and 
storage of foods, what began as a logical extension of the primitive communal style of 
labour division increasingly became formalised - differences and specialisations were 
transformed into inequalities, and hierarchies emerged to ensure labour reproduction 
from life creating women. This is the beginning of the processes that Bookchin 
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(1991) observes in his social ecology: the domination of human by human began the 
hierarchical struggle between the sexes, which led to the domination of nature by 
humans. 
Bookchin asserts that this hierarchical struggle manifested itself in the: 
...breakdown of primordial equality into hierarchical systems of inequality, the 
disintegration of early kinship groups into social classes, the dissolution of tribal 
communities into the city, and finally the usurpation of social administration by the 
[male dominated] state. 
This also introduced the embryonic form of one of the socially problematic aspects of 
environmental management - men filling administrative roles, while women bore the 
brunt of agricultural effort (and so the dualistic nature of women's work load calcified 
as this land work was done alongside the domestic tasks of home making). Tribal 
leader systems emerged as heads of kin groups were increasingly mysticised and 
hereditary leadership was established. So men often functioned as leaders, women 
were controlled in conjunction with their reproductive and biological abilities in child 
care, and increasing demands for regular labour for agriculture (working the crops 
and livestock and improving the cropping landscape, for example by terracing) 
kindled systems of serfdom and slavery. Although male dominance is thought to have 
been most common, matriarchal societies are also thought to have been not 
uncommon (see for example Merchant 1992). But in analysis, as Bookchin (1991) 
states: 
'Matriarchy' merely changes the gender of domination and thereby perpetuates 
domination as such. 
Tributary formations grew out of the kin-ordered social structures, and productivity 
growth and the concentration of surplus in the hands of an emerging state (or 
kingdom) culture enabled disproportionate accumulations of social, agricultural and 
asset/material control. There emerged in different parts of the world different social 
and land management traditions as cultures evolved with diverse climatic, 
topographic, ecological, social and philosophical influences. 
Peet (1991) describes the Asiatic state as characterised by a pyramidal clan structure 
in which surpluses were absorbed by the transformation of old tribal aristocracy into 
state, and a central place system created a two tiered structure with core and 
peripheral areas. Geopolitical expansion occurred as the level of trade grew rapidly 
(especially in prestige goods) and so developed such concepts as market share and 
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monopolies. Parallel to this was the development of centres of trade; in conjunction 
with political and hierarchical competition, territorial and city states emerged. 
Increasingly, territorial and political interests demanded fortification of key areas. As 
habitation clustering formed larger towns and eventually cities, the importation of 
food became essential. Larger and more ordered trading systems, and regional 
specialisation for exchanges developed. Administration centres focused on the 
creation of tradables such as textiles and crafts (secondary goods), whilst the 
increasingly defined peripheral agricultural regions continued to produce land sourced 
products - foods, crop / livestock by-products and raw materials (primary products). 
One of the 'dynamics' thought to be of significance in social development processes is 
the ability to overpower 'natural' levels of production - particularly through the use of 
irrigation - so allowing greater regional autonomy in respect of food availability. Core 
areas could manipulate agriculturally dependent regions more effectively once the 
former could provide food for themselves (or the latter depended on resources from 
core areas to maintain the irrigation infrastructure vital to the expanding agricultural 
systems (Seymour 1989)). There is an observed correlation between irrigation and 
social dynamism in diverse parts of the world (South West Asia, Egypt, China, Peru, 
and Central America). There is some dispute over the actual level of significance of 
irrigation, just as there is debate about the importance of environmental determinism 
in societal development. Also, there is thought to be no clear pattern regarding 
whether irrigation and so agricultural productivity invited urban concentrations of 
population, or whether urban concentrations of population demanded the 
development of more productive agricultural techniques (Peet 1991). 
3.1.2 The emergence of capitalism. 
A dictionary definition of 'capitalism' is... 
...an economic and political system in which property, business and industry are 
owned by private individuals and not by the state, and in which companies are run in 
competition with each other in order to make a profit. 
(Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary) 
Bowles & Edwards (1993) describe capitalism as an economic system in which 
workers are hired to produce goods and services, to be marketed with the intention of 
making a profit. They refer to a 'capitalist epoch', suggesting that around A.D.1500, 
when capitalist organisation of work first appeared in parts of England and Italy, it 
only affected a few people. Prior to capitalism the majority of the global population 
54 
were born, lived, worked and died within small geographical circles. Migration, 
conquest and other forces of geo-political expansion translocated people to other 
areas. 
The development of more formal and planned trade, the reorientation of production 
towards exchange, and the rise of mercantile cities were the essential process changes 
marking the transformation from pre-capitalist to capitalist organisation of societies 
(Peet 1991). Accompanying these changes were the operational support processes -
those necessary to facilitate the emerging capitalist culture. Administrative structures 
and systems of transport capable of connecting increasingly distant sites of production 
and consumption, a paradigmatic shift in labour relations (towards employers with 
greater leverage over the lives of employees), and an overall increase in activity and 
lifestyle horizons forged changes in human ecology which offered scope for 
significant improvements in human life quality, and indeed seemed very attractive. It 
is important to note that population increase was a prerequisite to capitalist 
emergence, since without a potential market for the (mass) scale of production, 
capitalism can not exist. 
Capitalism's' emergence and development was accompanied by considerable change 
in respect of people and place: as just mentioned, the global population began to 
increase very rapidly; urbanisation created ever-growing clusters of populations; and 
scientific and technological revolution radically altered processes of survival and 
living for large sections of the global population. Manual production of all goods 
using hand tools and water wheel power till about 1500 then accelerated into 
mechanised operations which in some areas, made hand tools obsolete (especially for 
trade production) and considerably reduced the time taken to produce goods (Bowles 
& Edwards 1993). The tools of mechanised production are just a part of the self-
generating industrialism of capitalist production systems. 
As mentioned above, transport systems were of key importance to the emerging 
societal trading systems. Bowles & Edwards (1993) suggest that what was available 
in 1500 was little different to what was available to the Romans 1000 years earlier: 
overland transport was "arduous, costly, slow and highly unreliable", walking was 
normal and (occasionally drawn) wagons were used: only the wealthiest could afford 
to travel more than a few miles from home, and water transport was with small, slow, 
and unsafe ships. 
By 1600, ships regularly rounded the Cape of Good Hope and crossed the Atlantic, 
and by 1800 ship speed was greater, and crossing the Atlantic became routine. By 
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1900 steam power was increasingly common and canal construction (the Suez and 
Panama) had reduced the travel-time size of world water trade routes. During the 
1900s, ships grew to enormous sizes, carrying 2500 times the cargo of Columbus' 
ship of 1492. Land transport was also revolutionised: the digging of canal networks 
reduced the cost and increased the efficiency of 'overland' transport. The mid-1800's 
brought the railway, massively increasing the ease of movement for people and 
goods. By 1900, railways extended across all of the worlds' industrial areas, 
penetrating into Russia, China, East Africa, North America, and North India as well 
as Western Europe. The 1900s brought the automobile and trucks, continuing the 
revolutionary levels of transport development (Bowles & Edwards 1993). 
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These advances were matched by developments in communications, so 
administratively completing the course of capitalist emergence. The advent of 
refrigeration (in conjunction with improvements in shipping) was of particular 
importance to the capitalist culture since it allowed for the transport of farmed foods 
from the colonies back to Europe - for example from South America to Spain and 
Portugal. Medical improvements, and particularly increased awareness of hygiene 
afforded considerable improvements in health and life expectancy. 
3.1.3 The effects of capitalist emergence. 
At the household level there were drastic changes as the revolution ages progressed. 
Previously, production and consumption had been predominantly based around the 
household, with local exchange adding variety to consumption and tool use. 
Capitalism, especially with urbanisation and the mechanisation of agriculture pushed 
and pulled people into the employ of others. Even the use of a simple cattle drawn 
plow massively increased the productivity of the person-hour of labour. 
Bowles & Edwards (1991) describe how little was to be left untouched by the spread 
of capitalism and its associated physical and organisational phenomena. As more 
people moved into paid employment, so their links to other areas expanded, and at the 
same time their vulnerability to unemployment was enhanced in two key ways. The 
first was through inter-regional competition for mobile market shares. The second 
was vulnerability to redundancy as technological progress rendered old skills obsolete 
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- and, increasingly with mechanical productivity, reductions in the numbers of people 
required to do the same amount of work. 
Polarisation of development and underdevelopment is described in 'Dependency 
Theory'. The nature of the working environment changed as well. As machine 
production spread and domestic white goods became more common in the household 
a trend towards large factory scale production occurred (Goodman & Redclift 1991). 
Since this increased the labour productivity of the worker, unemployment growth 
resulted, and poor working conditions meant life quality was compromised. Bulk 
scale production also had the effect of standardising, to some extent, what was 
consumed. 
The crucial characteristics of capitalist society, time and timing, worked their way 
rapidly into the fabric of daily life: punctuality to external demand and demand from 
above became normal. Previously the pace of the worker and the rhythms of the 
weather and seasons clocked the time of day. Household life has been "reshaped, 
emptied of its functions and nearly eliminated'' (Bowles & Edwards 1991). Whereas 
previously family generations clustered nearby or together, now even the nuclear 
family is the minority. What used to be the domain of the family - the production of 
foods, clothes and basic education and medical care - is increasingly the job of 
outside 'professionals'. The family and community network has also suffered in the 
wake of capitalist shifts in the economies of societies. Previously families often lived 
in the same location for generations. But now each generation may move many times 
in the family unit even before the children leave school. This has social effects 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Goodman & Redclift (1991) assess the transformations that occurred in relation to 
rural society and the precedents leading to the modern agri-food industry. Family-
based farming has survived only through accepting radical changes in the nature of 
agricultural operations. The agricultural population has massively reduced both in 
North America and Europe. In 1990 the number of farms in the US was less than a 
third what it was in 1930. In the EC, the reduction in the number of farms was 
delayed and slower: it was reduced by about half between 1950 and 1990. It is argued 
that in both the extensive (pre-1939) and the intensive (post-1945) systems of 
accumulation of wealth and food security, 
...the role of agriculture has been to relieve downward pressure on the rate of profit 
by furnishing staple foodstuffs or 'wage goods' at low real prices to the urban 
industrial sector. 
(Goodman & Redclift 1991) 
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Thus agriculture, which in the time of early colonialism was the backbone of most the 
bulk of global society later became the tool of wealth creation wielded by colonial 
powers once it was feasible to transport foods from the 'colonies' to the 'motherland'. 
Later agriculture became again a crutch of security. The difference then was that it 
served to prop up the capitalist endeavours of elites in whose hands lay the rapidly 
growing and increasingly competitive commodity production industry. Seymour 
(1989) describes how across the globe, the detachment of elites from the land they 
owned became (and still is today) so distinct that they often never even visit the land 
from which considerable rents are drawn. This type of situation is one of the most 
socio-ecologically dislocated structures of modern man: that people living off and 
dependent on a piece of land should pay another for the use of that land, whilst the 
other may own much more land than her entire family might require to feed 
themselves, is an absurd and non-sensical result of greedy non-communalistic culture. 
How is it that the Duke of Westminster 'owns' 20% of the English countryside? 
Features of intensive capitalist accumulation after 1945 are these: 
the interdependent expansion of capital and consumer goods industries, rapid 
technical change and productivity growth, monopoly market structures, the 
transnationalisation of production and exchange, and mass consumption of 
standardised commodities. 
(Goodman & Redclift 1991) 
High mass-consumption in western society, which is classically the climax in 
development models (following a 'drive to maturity' in the economy), is now to some 
extent threatened by an environmental and cultural consumer backlash which 
questions its effects on social, ecological and indeed economic wealth in terms of 
impact and in the light of ethical consideration. 
Traditionalist and conservative resistance to change, particularly where there was 
established hierarchical orders (whether egalitarian (as propounded by for example 
Islamic Sharia law), or ultra stratified as in the case of 'kingdoms' (sic.)) was 
inevitable, but the magnetism of a cultural system offering great potential for material 
and financial wealth creation is very strong. Only dedicated egalitarians (by instinct 
or religious belief) can resist seeking the earning and material accumulation and 
indulgence available to the successful capitalist. 
It is unfortunate that the nature of capitalism has been a ruthless ideological pursuit, 
and that its natural gravity is towards inequity: 
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Capitalism was made possible by the raiding of stored wealth, the re-orientation of 
trade routes, the imposition of unequal exchange, the forceful movement of millions 
of people in world space, and the conversion of the people and territories of whole 
continents into colonies where all aspects of existence were subject to the purposes 
of the Europeans. 
(Peet 1991) 
Indeed "the poverty of the Third World is not natural, inevitable or even 
historically typical", it is a result of underdevelopment where once diverse and stable 
local economies had persisted, through the processes now described as 'dependency 
theory' (Peet 1991). 
Durka (1995) refers to the "savagery and violence of the American capitalist ruling 
class", noting their apparent "utter disregard and loathing of humanity" in the way 
"holocausts" have been inflicted on native Americans, Africans, Asians, Arabs, and 
Latin Americans. Durka details the scale of the trade in devices of war and torture 
(projected to be of the order of $334 billion for the period 1991-2000), the estimated 
US market share being 70% (whilst West European competitors collectively garnered 
less than 14%). Durka (1995) reports that in June 1995, the US House of 
Representatives voted to... 
...place the full backing of the government behind unlimited amounts of loans for 
weapons exports. 
This huge industry, globalised through US hegemony, is without doubt one of the 
most destructive and obscene aspects of capitalistic profit-search, and the care-free 
exertion of capitalism's indifferent profit motive onto virtually all peoples of the 
world. The motivation is political and financial, yet the considerable effects are 
ecological and social (see section 2.1). 
3.2 Dependency Theory. 
This is a dualistic theory in which core areas industrialise and develop in conjunction 
with peripheral areas not developing, or 'under-developing'. The process may work at 
the regional, national, and international level. Through it, a core elite (small as a 
proportion of population) benefits while a peripheral mass does not and indeed is 
marginalised. The imbalance derives from the core extracting the surplus production 
from the primary products based peripheral economy, either by having ownership of 
the means of production, and employing the peripheral populations as wage labourers, 
or by lending the means of production or the finance, and then collecting the loan plus 
interest. Peet (1991) suggests that the margin of return by this process for the core is 
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about 1.5% of the product value, whilst the cost for the peripheral area is about 15% 
of the product value. This is thought to be enough to cripple the development 
prospects for the periphery since the expropriated surplus is what the periphery must 
then borrow from the core to invest in future development schemes. 
Since this process of surplus (potential for cumulative growth) extraction may happen 
from the regional to the international level, the beneficiaries are thought to be the 
following. At the regional level, a local elite benefits (and may invest in luxurious life 
styles rather than the future growth of the local economy). Of course economic 
activity will stimulate the local economy to some extent, but more in the primary and 
service industries, and again, surpluses may be extracted from this level due to local 
or distant sources of loans. Regional capitals may emerge, such as Sau Paulo in South 
Eastern Brazil, hosting a proportionally small elite and a proportionally large poorer 
population. At the national level, the same systems can exist, with the surplus being 
extracted by national banks and the economic elite, resulting in disparities and a 
dependency of the masses on the elites (giving the latter the power to dictate the terms 
of resource exchange). 
At the international level, multinational companies (MNCs) can dominate possession 
of the mechanics of production and purchase cheap labour - the 'new international 
division of labour', as it is referred to, has only had significant spin-offs in the form of 
locally owned industry in a few countries (notably the 'East Asian Tiger' economies 
such as Singapore and Malaysia). Again, the production surplus is extracted, only in 
this case it is less likely to even stay in the country, but rather to go wherever the 
corporate body choose to invest next. Capital flight is a problem when national elites 
extract the surplus as well, with Swiss bank accounts and French villas being the 
common image of the capitals' destination. This is amplified through unofficial 
'removal'/appropriation (through corruption) of development funds to which elites are 
likely to have greatest access. 
Through the mechanics of capitalist enterprise, sections of national and international 
populations can be economically and developmentally marginalised and exploited, 
whilst an international 'elite' of MNCs and national elites experience asset growth. 
Further, regional 'cores' (metropoles) can only achieve a dependent form of 
industrialisation, so a hierarchy of growth potential (ranging from great manipulative 
and exploitative capacity to high degrees of dependency) binds the majority to 
insecurity whilst an elite of individuals and corporations can secure steady and 
considerable financial growth. 
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Two other 'dynamics' are thought to be involved. Peet (1991) suggests that where 
peripheral areas have had the closest ties to core areas, greater degrees of under-
development has been the experience. In Latin America for example, old mining areas 
and sugar producing regions have experienced ultra-underdevelopment - the 
expropriated surplus values from the production gravitating to the core areas. 
The second dynamic is that trade makes poor areas poorer, and rich areas richer. This 
is thought to occur more distinctly at the international level, and is due to the easy 
international mobility of capital in conjunction with : 
• the export of (primary) products of large quantities of cheap labour; and 
• the import of (industrial) products of small quantities of expensive labour. 
The terms of trade favour high cost (core produced) products and devalue the exports 
of economically peripheral areas. 
Having discussed the processes of societal development, capitalism, and dependency 
theory it is now appropriate to consider one of the more irksome cultural products of 
them. The culture of the more industrialised countries is increasingly recognised as 
being social devolution, and at the same time as being ecologically very demanding 
and economically inequitable. It is a synthesis of the conceptual normalisation of 
consumerist culture and either a naive ignorance of the plight of so much of the global 
population and sections of national populations, or arrogant disinterest in the same. 
3.3 Decadent consumerism and 'the culture of contentment'. 
'The culture of contentment' is essentially a conceptual stasis in which those 
concerned are trapped by fear or naivety in a self protecting cultural bubble, 
comfortably unconcerned about the future except in so much as they will fight 'tooth 
and nail' to protect their safe and comfortable circumstance from the rest of society. In 
the heat of urgent determination to fend off any legislative or policy threats to this 
status quo, those concerned often react with rash short-termism and little regard for 
those outside the 'safe net' circle (Galbraith 1992). 
It is fair to say that we in 'the West' live in a consumer society which to a considerable 
extent consumes without considering the inputs and their sources, the processing of 
inputs, the ethical standards of these, and whether or not we actually need the 
products at all. Western society encapsulates the belief that great numbers of products 
are necessary for a good life. Our collective culture has permeated expectations to the 
point where an individual is often considered unsuccessful if that individual does not 
61 
own a house or a car - the absence of household white goods is considered a poor 
standard of living. Galbraith (1992) suggests that the attraction of "often frivolous and 
dispensable consumer artefacts and entertainments" might be amusing sometimes, but 
what he sees as "the controlling appeal" of the same is a cause for concern. 
Consumerism is the belief that buying as many goods as is possible is good for the 
individual or community, and decadence is a state of low standards of behaviour or 
morality. The consumer culture is highly 'contagious', such that knowledge of what 
one might have often creates a desire to attain it. This is what Galbraith (1990) refers 
to as "the controlling mood of human instinct", a characteristic which he observes to 
extend beyond the capitalist world - it is an unfortunate dominant trait of the human 
species. As emphasised, individuals alone can rarely be fully blamed for their state of 
mind and depraved societal conditions are symptoms of the dominant culture. The 
way forward is to constantly raise questions about the nature and ethical validity of 
the traits under scrutiny, and to work towards greater information dissemination about 
products and services, that society might re-orient itself toward an ethically aware and 
active state - an obligation for the reasoning human species. 
Decadent consumerism is therefor an overwhelming propensity to seek to attain 
private possession of products and make use of a multitude of services. Consumerism 
is more of a problem in the West because disposable incomes are generally higher and 
goods more available, but the effect is to ratchet up expectations on a wider scale (via 
the media). That the expectations of many people will not materialise, or that if they 
are to materialise the subjects will have to work long hours and save up to achieve 
them is similar to the 'mind-lock' problem which also effects what Galbraith refers to 
as "the wealthy classes" and "the fortunate" - they are psychologically addicted to 
lifestyles which are costly in terms of collective social and ecological integrity. Finger 
(1985) notes how industrial society might be to blame for "high social fragmentation 
characterised by the loss of collective projects". His recommended action is the 
"humanisation" of actions and culture (not to be confused with humanism), a process 
which ought to be effected through education. 
As a whole the wealthy classes perhaps arrogantly assume it is their destiny to 
succeed, direct and manage others, to be 'successful' and to maintain through 
generations a 'high standard of living'. There is significant pressure within the 
wealthy classes to conform to these expectations. It is unfortunate that a 'high 
standard of living' has come to be associated with 'a high rate of consumption' on two 
accounts. 
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Firstly, social unease is an inevitable consequence of blatant consumption disparities. 
The fact that a majority of the global population will never reach the same levels of 
consumption as the more excessive consumer cultures broadcast throughout the world 
in television and other media channels means that discontent will be further fuelled -
even in the US estimates of poverty go as high as 40% - Galbraith (1992) states that 
almost 20% of children in the US were bom into poverty in 1988, up by 28% from 
1978. 
Secondly, the 'expectation example' set by Westerners and global elites is a very 
resource and energy intensive one. So 'the aspiring classes' and 'social climbers' might 
be led to seek the same unsustainable circumstances. Galbraith (1992) re-quotes 
banker JP Morgan testifying to a US senate committee: 
If you destroy the leisure class, you destroy civilisation...[the leisure class being J all 
those who can afford to hire a maid. 
This sort of attitude, which is by no means historically uncommon, and which still 
persists today, sums up the arrogant and self-satisfying social disease which afflicts 
many of those marginalised by great wealth. Reading (1995) attempts to justify 
disparities stating that: "The rich must be able to buy a week's work from others" - if 
the non-rich are to be employed, there must be a demand for the products of their 
labour. 
The environmental effects of a collective gravitation towards increased consumption 
are considerable actually, and potentially even worse. The contagious and divisive 
culture of consumption in the West have come to expect demands massive resource 
usage at the direct expense of people elsewhere - historically through direct 
appropriation and colonisation, and recently through the more subtle agency of 
economic colonialism (see 2.1,3.1, and 3.2). 
This was one of the most pressing issues at the UNCED meeting in Brazil in 1992: it 
is unacceptable for the West to request/demand that other countries should not follow 
the same development patterns simply because there is growing concern about 
environmental issues, but at the same time, if the rest of the world does follow the 
same pattern of development in terms of industrial and social transformation, the 
detrimental environmental and social consequences of Western style consumer 
culture will be further amplified and spread. 
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The ideas pressed by the Club of Rome (CoR) relating to the ecological limits to 
growth, and those put forward by F. Hirsch relating to the social limits to growth, 
come into play here as tools for conceptual analysis. The resource use necessary for 
all to achieve 'high mass consumption' would likely exceed resource availability, 
especially in terms of the energy acquisition processes. Finger (1995) though suggests 
that "output limits would jeopardise further industrial development", thus acting as 
the 'bio-physical limits to growth - as opposed to the 'input' limits to the expansion of 
industrial society that the CoR refer to. In terms of social stresses, great levels of 
"tensions and frustrations" (Hirsch 1976) would be the result - because of the 
competitive culture which is associated with mass consumption trading and 
purchasing, and the urgency of demand inherent in 'the controlling appeal' of 
materialism will not be satisfied. 
In relation to general societal developments, there are hurdles for those wishing to 
live more ecologically. High car ownership is such a hurdle. To cycle to work or the 
shops often requires riding through life-threatening road systems. Freund and Martin 
(1993) describe how the car culture has so overwhelmingly taken over that the layout 
of retail, service and work premises are geared towards car use. Out-of-town shopping 
centres replace the community shop, and significant commuting resources are 
expected for getting to work. The irony is that although distances covered 
conveniently are much increased, the surge of car numbers at peak times means that 
travel time to work might be disproportionately high. Average speeds in some cities 
(for example London) are much lower than that which is most efficient for the two 
litre combustion engines. It has even been suggested that at times London traffic 
moves no faster than the horse drawn carts of the 19th century. 
Would-be 'conscientious shoppers' must dedicate time and energy to ethico-ecological 
consumption. We are led to believe that a house requires tens of different cleaning 
and maintenance products. Shoppers are faced with ranges of choice from companies 
clamouring for market share. Labels become meaningless, loud (or green) with 
product claim slogans. To investigate the complete background of a product is 
difficult if not impossible. Even when a retailer is able to provide some information 
the conscientious customer cannot be expected to be of adequate environmental and 
social science knowledge to fully assess the effects of consuming the product (see 6.3 
for further discussion of this). This is another side of the industrial consumer and 
capitalist society, in which the individual can rarely be fully aware of the 
environmental impact of a product or service. 
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'Clumsy' environmental impact through purchasing power may be an awkward 
concept to grapple with, but it must be considered - this might call for suggestions 
that business ought to lead the public by product ethicalisation. 
Ethical concern over just about all forms of consumption from foods to construction 
materials, from transport modes to household energy efficiency, have touched the 
senses of virtually all citizens in the West through some medium. Even those which 
have been especially highlighted relating to products causing ecological decay or 
degradation (some peat extractions, intensive animal farming, excessive illumination 
in houses, or the unnecessary use of automobiles) have only been thought about or 
boycotted by a small proportion. The new 'environmentally friendly' sales pitches 
have confused and devalued reference to 'environment', 'recyclability', 'eco(logical)', 
'green', 'etc.. 'Green-speak' must now be scrutinised intensively (though the EC is in 
the process of legislating stricter definitions of advertising standards). 
To return to 'the culture of contentment', Galbraith asserts that "the power of 
contentment over belief is universal; it extends over time and space" (1992). This 
might explain the relatively low response to environmental concerns in terms of 
serious change (whether it be for immediately tangible positive effects or as 
precautionary in/actions). When people are contented, when they become used to 
certain comforts, interest in the circumstances of others and other concerns is often 
lost (for example, more pictures of hungry children, more images of destroyed 
landscapes, or more war-torn countries). 
Would the same critics who cross the pavement to avoid the awkwardness of facing a 
cold and hungry person also claim to be concerned about homelessness if questioned? 
Why do politicians talk of 'sweeping' them off the streets? 
Would the regular buyer of battery hen eggs and intensive beef claim to be a member 
of 'a nation of animal lovers'? 
Would the same person that says 'we must reduce our car usage' drive to work? Why 
do even the most enlightened environmentalists still use cars? 
Such is the all too common weakness of human conviction, even in societies where 
options are available, where survival pressures really are not a problem, and where 
the source of the human-ecological dislocation is the most prevalent. 
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Galbraith (1992) observes that now in the US (and this could apply to the U.K. as 
well with its swollen 'middle class') the 'contented' are a majority. He notes four key 
characteristics of the outlooks of this 'contented majority': 
»they are in receipt of their "just desserts"; 
• they favour short term public inaction - the long term may not arrive; 
8 they have a very selective view of the state and government - at the same 
time as wanting no intervention in their pursuits, they want protection from 
'the rest'; and 
• they are content to witness severe disparities in incomes 
He observes a "functional underclass" which the contented majority depend on for the 
execution of "repetitive, tedious, painfully fatiguing, mentally boring and socially 
demeaning" work. In many Western countries, because increasingly people are not 
willing to do such work, the last few decades has seen influxes of workers from 
poorer countries to do these jobs (for example in Germany, France and Switzerland, 
workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia, North Africa and southern European workers from 
Italy and the Iberian Peninsular). 
The first and fourth characteristic accommodate the fact that in the US in 1988 the top 
1% of family groups controlled 13.5% of all pre-tax income and the top 20% accrued 
just under 52% (Galbraith 1992). 
...what once justified the favoured position of the few - a handful of aristocrats and 
capitalists - has now become the favouring defence of the comfortable many. 
(Galbraith 1992)) 
Galbraiths' second observation of 'the contented majority' is of utmost importance in 
the context of ecological and social concerns. Their self-interest focus denies paying 
out for the benefit of future generations - there is an insistence on inaction to avoid 
present costs. An example of this is the unwillingness or inability of current European 
governments to clean up contaminated lands, and the allowing the North Sea to 
deteriorate in terms of biological cleanliness and integrity (see Appendix 1). 
Galbraith (1992) succinctly describes the inactivity instincts which pervade the 
comfortable sectors of societies in regard to ecological concerns: 
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...the policy avowed by the contented...it delays action. Notably, it proposes more 
research, which very often provides a comforting, intellectually reputable gloss over 
inaction. At the worst, it suggests empanelling a commission, the purpose of which 
would be to discuss and recommend action or perhaps postponement thereof. At the 
very worst there is limited, perhaps symbolic, action, as in recent times. Other long-
run environmental dangers - global warming and the dissipation of the ozone layer -
invite similar responses. 
This is the approach which is very close to 'reformism'. What Galbraith sees as 'the 
very worst' scenario, limited and symbolic action, is very much within the remit of the 
reformist approach. Tinkering with a few visible symptoms and petty conscience 
clearing actions are prevalent in current environmental consideration responses (se 
chapter 6). Economic concerns virtually always win over ecological (and social) 
interests. 
This then, is the contemporary culmination of historical development: a relatively 
content - or at least lulled to passivity - majority dependent on a tough working 
'remainder' who depend on the majority for their jobs. Socio-ecologically negative 
effects appear to the contented as issues to put off, question or ignore so as to protect 
the integrity of a divisive and damaging culture of decadent consumerist contentment. 
New York symbolically represents a contemporary culmination of this development. 
One of the bastions of industrial society constructions, it used to be known as 'the Big 
Apple'. Nowadays it may be rotten at the core. A monumental, shiny, imported facade 
of Italian marble is the international image of the city, but social decay and ecological 
elimination etches steadily towards the surface. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND EVALUATION 
In the last three decades environmental issues have become a prominent focus of 
public concern. Mounting evidence experienced directly (in the immediate living 
environment) and indirectly (through the media) influences daily life for many 
people, and has attained at least a lasting place in the psyche of many more. As 
awareness of local issues has increased, so has awareness of more distant threats to 
the environment, and the importance of the integrity of a Gaian-type linkage is 
increasingly appreciated. It is now widely realised that global scale problems (macro-
environmental problems) and global circulation effects (for example the long range 
transport of air pollutants and other waste by sea currents, or the heavily debated 
question of global warming) may affect everyone. As was emphasised in chapter 3, 
these concerns are more often than not bound up with other concerns over the 
treatment of people, animals, and biotic components of the environment. 
Concern and interest derives from two areas: direct experience and perception of 
intrusion/threat, and moral consideration for the interests of other people, animals and 
components of earth ecology. With awareness and concern has grown demand for the 
inclusion of environmental consideration as a core component of development 
assessment: 
...environmental interest groups and advocates have become vocal at every political 
level, especially in those countries with open political systems... 
(Field 1994) 
...and extensive national and international laws have either come into place or been 
activated from dormancy. 
Complications arise from the fact that most environmental phenomena do not have a 
clear, direct and measurable financial value, and so are difficult to incorporate into 
conventional evaluation methods. Coupled with this has been the absence of any 
strategic or systematic method for evaluating qualitative weighting and descriptive 
experience as factors in the decision making process. In order to tackle this emerging 
problem, economic analytical tools and perspectives were adapted to try and 
incorporate the 'new' ingredient of the decision making and development process. 
Thus 'environmental economics' was born. The rate of uptake of environmental 
economics as a tool for policy makers and implementers has led some to believe that: 
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...environmental economics has turned into one of the fastest-growing academic sub-
disciplines throughout the industrialised world. 
(Jacobs 1994) 
There has been much debate about the admissibility and morality of economic-type 
analyses of non-market, non-financial, and indeed subjective and quantitatively 
infinite phenomena. Equally, there are strong arguments in defence of the same which 
aim, wherever possible, to calculate figures of either financial value or indices for 
comparison so that environmental concerns can be more easily (than afforded by 
qualitative evaluation) included in planning and assessment procedures. This debate 
will be considered in chapter 5. 
Environmental economics attempts to focus on: 
...all the different facets of the connection between environmental quality and the 
economic behaviour of individuals and groups of people. 
(Jacobs 1994) 
It aims to determine the weighting due for environmental phenomena, based on 
values attributed and assigned by people, to components of this bio-social complex, 
and how that weight might be included in management and development. 
Related to the supposedly more 'pro-environment' environmental economics is 
'resource economics' (RE). Though some would assert that RE is almost 
interchangeable with environmental economics, RE is geared more towards serving 
efficiency interests of business (for the sake of profitability) and balancing rates of 
resource use with supply in human society, rather than towards environmental 
protection. Field (1994) outlines the breadth of the absolute dependency of people on 
natural resources (fuel, water, minerals, timber, food, etc.). He reminds us that some 
are renewable (they have a regenerative capacity so long as they are 'harvested' within 
'sustainable' parameters) while others are non-renewable (such as oil within the 
current use regime). 
Clearly though, there is the potential, if all costs including (Pigou'an) 'externalities' 
were to be included in costs for producers and consumers, for resource economics to 
offer substance in environmental protection. So perhaps Dasguptas' (1991) assertion 
that economic calculations and environmental concerns are not in conflict holds more 
water than is immediately apparent. For example, the marginal productivity incurred 
with increased quantities of fertiliser use on cropped fields diminishes as more is 
applied (potentially to the point where the fertiliser becomes toxic to the crops). So as 
well as being environmentally favourable, it is also economically favourable not to 
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apply quantities of fertiliser beyond a certain level, and low-input agriculture is 
increasingly common amongst cost-conscious farmers. 
Anderson (1991) gives some poignant facts about the anti-environmental nature of 
conventional economic measures of social development or progress. First though, he 
reminds us that the gross domestic product (GDP) can act as an indicator of 
environmental impact - the premise being that GDP is equal to the ecological demand 
(the sum of humankind's demand on the environment including resource extraction 
and waste dumping). I f per capital GDP is multiplied by the population level, an 
indication of environmental impact will result 
He reminds us of the crucial and controversial fact that gross national product (GNP) 
can rise twice through one episode of environmental destruction. I f a factory pollutes 
the environment in the production process, and this is followed by a pollution clean 
up operation, then both the value of the product and the cost of the clean up wil l be 
counted in the GNP - even though the clean up expenditure was to (hopefully) 
achieve close to the same condition as before. Ai r pollution is not counted in GNP. 
GNP counts the money value of coal and oil extraction, and the value of timber 
extracted, but not the depletion of either the fuel or timber resource, nor the ecological 
cost of the processes and practices involved. In conjunction with GNP, "...national 
income accounting favours the destruction of resources because money is more likely 
to change hands..." (Anderson 1991)...through this process than leaving 
environmental phenomena alone, where money doesn't usually change hands -
enhancement of the circular flow of the economy increases the GNP. 
4.1 Frameworks for environmental (economics) analysis. 
There are several frameworks within which tools of environmental economics can be 
used. Various forms of 'impact analysis' geared towards attaining information about 
particular sub-sections of the effects of any action or development are the first type of 
framework. The most important ones are environmental impact analysis (more 
commonly known as 'environmental impact assessment'), and economic impact 
analysis. Others might be geared towards social impact analysis. 
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is: 
...an identification and study of all significant environmental repercussions stemming 
from a course of action. 
(Field 1994) 
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Economic impact analysis is concerned with: 
...how some action - a new law, a new technological breakthrough, a new source of 
imports - will effect an economic system in whole or in terms of it's various parts. 
(ibid.) 
They have become a prerequisite to any significant social or developmental action in 
many countries and blocks of countries (such as the EEC). They are demanded by 
development organisations such as the World Bank as a condition for loans. EIAs are 
normally carried out in advance of an action, with the aim of predicting the likely 
environmental effects of that action, and so can shed light on probable positive and 
adverse effects. The plan of action can then be adjusted to reduce the adverse effects 
and where possible increase the likely positive effects, that they may mitigate against 
the negatives. They can be carried out after a course of action to monitor actual 
effects and assess the accuracy of the predicted effects, that they might be more 
accurate in the future. 
Strategic impact assessment is an analysis of the likely effects of an action within the 
broader context of either regional or national 'strategies' and aims. In Britain, a Local 
Councils' proposal wil l be considered on the local scale. It might also be appropriate 
for County Council consideration. Referral to the NRA, the DoE, the DoT and MAFF 
might also be appropriate or necessary, depending on the scale and nature of the 
proposal. This procedure aims to ensure that local developments and changes occur 
within the constraints and goals of wider areas, and that they do not breach national or 
international law. 
Risk-benefit analysis (RBA) is similar to cost-benefit analysis (described below). An 
example used by the OECD (1992) is that of a nuclear power station. The benefits of 
a proposed station would be the value of the electricity (and perhaps job creation 
could be included - though this would occur with other alternatives). Costs would be 
the resource costs and the risks to human health from a possible accident, from 
normal emissions of radioactivity and from waste products as they might threaten 
current and future generations. A comprehensive RBA would also attempt to assess 
the risks to non-humans. 
Another form of analysis is 'cost-effectiveness analysis' (CEA), which is a tool for 
assessing the costs of alternative methods of dealing with a problem, or the likely 
rates of 'improvement' return for investment in a change (whether the return be 
financial or in, say, pollution abatement). It can thus enable the most efficient use of 
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the ever-limited resource, money, in achieving goals (in this case, environmental 
goals). In a CEA, the costs but not the benefits are measured in financial terms 
(OECD 1992). It is a useful procedure within the context of defined goals but it does 
not assess the legitimacy or adequacy of those goals. CEA can be useful in 
conjunction with the next form of analysis, 'cost-benefit analysis' (CBA). 
CBA is a comprehensive assessment of the likely costs and benefits of a particular 
action, non-action, or policy change. It is analogous to a projected revenue-
expenditure balance sheet which might be prepared by a company, but there are two 
key differences: 
...it is a tool for helping to make public decisions, done from the standpoint of society 
in general rather than that of a single profit making firm; and it is usually done for 
policies and programs that have unmarketed types of outputs [such as improvements 
in environmental quality]. 
(Field 1994) 
When attempting to calculate the costs and benefits likely to result from an action, the 
most responsible aim would be to include in the equations the total value of the 
positive and negative effects (the benefits and costs), including both economic and 
non-economic. This differs from traditional economic thought, which sees value as a 
'utilitarian' concept (Bateman 1995) and is humanistically instrumental in its outlook. 
Though there are a number of ways to attempt to value all environmental goods and 
resources, there are countless occasions where conventional economic valuation is 
either awkward and unlikely to be reliable, or where it is not appropriate. On these 
occasions non-financial evaluations can be more useful. It is possible to provide 
information which is just as useful for many purposes (such as policy, development 
option analysis etc.). Though most cost-benefit analyses attempt to create something 
like a financial balance sheet, as mentioned above, i t is possible to create a non-
financial balance sheet with individual issues weighted firstly by how important they 
are thought to be by people (see section 43.1.2), and secondly by the likely degree of 
impact which can be elucidated by scientific investigation. The latter need not provide 
precise numerical results for this purpose, so long as agreement by qualified 
individuals and members of the public can be reached on what might be regarded as 
'very low', 'low', 'moderate', 'high', and 'very high' impacts. 
The way this works is that surveys of public views of issue importance are carried 
out, with issues rated as being of low, medium and high importance. These carry 
weights of 1,2, and 3 respectively. Agreement on what is 'very low' to 'very high' 
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impact would be achieved. These carry weights of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. A 
particular issue would then register one figure, a compound of importance times 
degree of impact. So an issue of low importance and low impact gains a value of 1 x 1 
= 1, and an issue of high importance and high impact gains a value of 3 x 5 = 15. 
These issues will have a descriptive label of good or bad, corresponding to benefits 
and costs. To make this into a balance sheet, it is presented as in Table 5.1. 
Issue COSTS Issue B E N E F I T S 
A 3 x 3 = 9 P 3 x 3 = 12 
B 1 x 4 = 4 Q 1 x 5 = 5 
C 1 x 2 = 2 R 2 x 2 = 4 
D 2 x 5 = 10 S 1 x 1 = 1 
Total costs and 9 + 4 + 2 + 1 0 = 25 12 + 5 + 4 + 1 = 22 
Benefits 
Table 4.1 
Example of a Non-Financial Cost-Benefit Analysis of Multi-Issue Action. 
In this example, the non-financial costs marginally exceed the benefits. In a real 
situation, this would be read in conjunction with a financial cost-benefit analysis. The 
latter might assess issues E-L, with E-H being costs, and I -L benefits. Total expected 
costs and benefits would be summed as in this example, but with financial costs 
attached to the values. I f the financial cost was predicted to be significantly less than 
the benefits, then it might be concluded that the marginal negative balance of the non-
financial issues could be sacrificed for the financial gains expected. 
So when a development proposal is being evaluated, two 'balance' sheets might be 
prepared. One would use whatever financial costings were deemed reasonable and 
accurate, sourced from the various economic methodologies detailed below in 4.3.2, 
and the other would include the results of an inquiry of the sort just described. 
This sort of non-economic 'balance sheet' has not historically been included as such, 
but as with several other techniques outlined, it has occurred in other forms - such as 
a list of issues for which money values were not available or attainable, but which 
were thought to be of importance. The list would have included details of whether the 
issues were 'good' or 'bad' (benefits or costs), and they might have in themselves 
swayed judgement through the discretion of those with authority or decision making 
power, or they might have assisted in swaying judgement where financial costs and 
benefits were predicted to be roughly equal (where there was a financial no-gain 
situation predicted). 
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4.2 What is value'. 
At this stage it would be useful to clarify the notion of value. I f something is of value, 
it is consciously or unconsciously of use and importance, or potential use and 
importance, to a living organism or living organisms, or to 'Earth Direction'. In this 
context, utility need not be conscious, and humans are of no special significance in so 
much as they are no longer the centre of things: simply they are part of a big system -
i f utility serves what Seymour (1989) calls the 'Life Force', that alone means 
something is of value. Bateman (1995) describes moving from utilitarian to Total 
Economic Value' concepts as: "allowing for a considerable widening of people's 
attitudes towards the evaluation of assets". However the restricting of parameters 
afforded by making "people as the arbiters of value" (ibid.) is an increasingly 
questioned bias. Unfortunately, though, it is within these parameters that most 
substantial discourse is set (writers on deep ecology such as Naess (1989) and Devall 
and Sessions (1985) recognise the more extensive scopes of 'use' and 'value'), so this 
is the context of this discussion of environmental economics. Indeed this is the 
context of what is of greatest urgency since, as mentioned below in 5.3.2.2, until the 
vital interests of all people are more than met, non-human interests wil l continue to be 
'second class phenomena' - to a great degree, human interests might be seen as a 
logical core focus for the foreseeable future. 
Barde and Pearce (1991) categorised value into four types (for this purpose, consider 
the subject to be a hill region): 
1/ use values (such as agriculture, forestry, walking, and camping) 
21 indirect values (such as water storage and flow regulation); 
3/ option values (future recreation by present individuals); and 
4/ existence value (people gain satisfaction from the existence of an area 
such as the Lake district - 'notional' utility). 
A more comprehensive Total Economic Value' (TEV) outlined by Bateman (1995) 
divides utility into use and non-use values. 
Non-use value is comprised of: 
1/ bequest value (passing un-damaged global 'assets' on to future 
generations); and 
21 existence value (described here as preserving biodiversity and wildlife 
habitat). 
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Use value is comprised of: 
1/ option value (same as with Barde & Pearce); and 
21 utilitarian use value, which is subdivided into primary use value (for 
example timber revenues possible from a forest), and secondary use 
value (potential employment creation for the management of the forest) 
Since there is debate about whether or not values put on ecological phenomena can be 
'economised', Total Value' (TV) might be amore appropriate label. 
In conjunction with 'option value' there is also 'quasi-option value'. There are two 
differing definitions of this form of value. Firstly, it refers to options which i f chosen, 
would eliminate the resource, or more precisely, they are irreversible options (both by 
human interference and natural processes, at least for the reasonably foreseeable 
future). Examples might be: the hunting of a species to below viable population 
levels, such that the genetic base of the species was undermined and it was 'doomed' 
to extinction - or felling the ancient redwood forests of the Pacific north-west of the 
US. I f they were all felled for timber production, they are not replaceable - at least not 
in the reasonably foreseeable future since it would take thousands of years for them to 
reach their current size. 
Secondly it is understood to mean "the value of preserving options for future use 
given some expectation of the growth of knowledge" (Jacobs 1994) and so potential 
utility of the 'resource'. This is one of the utilitarian arguments for the preservation of 
the biological integrity and diversity of tropical rainforests. 
The question of 'irreversibility' is one which ought to be considered in the planning of 
any development procedure or options. Often technological developments, which 
might at the experimental stage have had relatively benign purposes, have the 
potential to be used for ulterior ends. Knowledge is a particularly virile 'genie to be 
released from the bottle' since 'forgetting' something significant like 'potent' 
technology is not a realistic idea (see also 2.2). Doors of perception, once opened, can 
hardly be closed. 
43 Evaluation methods in environmental economics. 
Bateman (1995) provides a diagrammatic breakdown of methods for the valuation 
and 'pricing' of environmental goods and services. This has been further modified to 
accommodate non-financial numerical methods of environmental economics, and 
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other techniques absent from Batemans' presentation (see Table 4.2). The starting 
point is the division between attempts to assemble financial values for environmental 
phenomena and attitudes to the same, and attempts to form environmental indices that 
represent degrees of significance or preference which can be compared in similar 
ways to financial cost/benefit analyses. 
















































Methods for Valuing and Pricing Environmental 'Goods' 
(adapted from Bateman, 1995) 
• Non-financial evaluation methods 
Non-financial methods include contingent ranking and environmental indices. 
Contingent ranking involves experimental markets. 
• Financial evaluation methods 
These can be subdivided to: demand curve based valuation methods, and 
market based observations and pricings. Demand curve based valuation 
methods can function through expressed preference methodologies 
(contingent valuation) and revealed preference methodologies (household 
production functions and hedonic pricing methods). Market based 
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observations and pricings include five methodologies: opportunity costs, 
government payments, costs of alternatives, shadow projects, and the dose 
response method. We shall now proceed through the non-financial evaluation 
methods. 
4.3.1 Non-financial methods. 
4.3.1.1 Contingent ranking. 
Contingent ranking is a straightforward method in which individuals are asked to rank 
alternatives in order of preference. This differs to another experimental market 
approach to environmental valuation - contingent valuation - which is detailed below 
in 4.3.2.1. The methodology has not had much use so far, but in 1991, the Department 
of the Environment (DoE) thought it had some potential (DoE 1991). It was thought 
that it could be used in conjunction with the house price approach (see 4.3.2.2: 2a), by 
ranking house characteristics, anchoring these to house prices, and converting these 
ranked characteristics into willingness to pay figures for particular characteristics. 
It has also been suggested that it could be used in conjunction with the travel cost 
method (4.3.2.2: la), for example to value a site used for recreation (OECD 1992). 
Differing from the method described below in that it does not try to derive actual 
money values from the people surveyed, qualities of hypothetical sites similar to ones 
which do exist can be valued in terms of their popularity. People might be asked how 
far they would travel in order to visit a site with particular features. They might 
alternatively be asked to rank hypothetical site characteristics (which can then be used 
to 'engineer' the qualities of a site being developed for recreational use), or they could 
be asked to rank existing sites in order of preference. The information elicited might 
then offer an insight into what the public prefers and could assist in targeting site 
improvements. 
Contingent ranking is a method which could also be used to evaluate many other 
issues of importance in environmental management, policy and developments since it 
provides easy access to public preferences. Of course, when surveying, as with all 
surveys, the questionnaire must be composed in such a way as to allow for 
consistency checking by having similar questions located in different areas of the 
survey. This method is thought to be more reliable than valuation methods since it is 
reasonable to believe that: 
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...respondents are better able to give meaningful answers to behaviour questions 
than they are to direct valuation methods. 
(OECD 1992) 
This raises issue particularly with the contingent valuation method (4.3.2.1), because 
whereas the CV method can be criticised as being more appropriate for measuring 
disposable income - and for being open to 'respondent bias price warps' - contingent 
ranking simply asks for preferences, which are the genuine interests of the 
respondents. Contingent ranking could also be used in conjunction with CV to 
establish what biases to look out for in respondents answers to valuation methods. 
Contingent ranking could be criticised for not providing answers which can easily be 
included in cost-benefit or rigorous evaluation procedures, but it can be used for 
weighting indices (as described in 4.3.1.2) and its utility in targeting investment (and 
disinvestment, for example with regards to future road building in the UK), is without 
doubt important. It is a method used indirectly on a regular basis when citizens are 
asked what they think of particular issues and developments - they indirectly state 
how they would rank one option against another (news reporters and interviewers 
regularly engineer this type of enquiry). 
4.3.1.2 Environmental indices. 
Environmental indices are numerical representations of environmental qualities and 
quantities, based on scientific observation. Rather than being a totally new approach 
to providing figurative descriptions of environmental characteristics, they build on old 
descriptive methods. To describe an environmental characteristic or a change in terms 
of quantities and qualities, 'units' have always been used. They began perhaps as 
simple representation (the Kalahari bushman might have described a distance as 'two 
days away'), and evolved into more specific and competing terminologies such as 
pounds, kilograms, miles, kilometres, 'good', 'poor'...in fact descriptive terms are 
simply a part of daily language, applied to environmental features when these are the 
subjects. 
The purpose of environmental indices is to provide an easily comprehensible record 
of perceived or measured changes in environmental qualities and quantities. 
Environmental indices are distinct from strict environmental economics as discussed 
below in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Their purpose is different. Their distinction over other 
descriptive units is that they have a base level, against which qualities and quantities 
at times before and after that point in time are measured. The scales and rates of 
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change in environmental qualities can be very clearly presented, even without 
diagrammatic representation (assuming the observations and measurements are of a 
consistently high standard - i f not then, as with any data, the usefulness of the values 
quickly diminishes). 
The Canadian Minister of the Environment of 1991 likened the goal of environmental 
indices to a "comprehensive state of the environment index equivalent to the GNP" 
(quoted in Hope & Parker 1995). As mentioned above, GNP and associated economic 
presentations are less than courteous to environmental issues. Environmental indices 
are open to similar criticisms as GNP, that they offer no indication of the distribution 
of the characteristics they are comprised of. In the context of an environmental index, 
one summed indicative figure might offer the same kind of indication of overall 
environmental quality and quantity trends (as opposed to economic), but detailed 
breakdowns of the components of the summed environmental condition would be 
essential for the index to be any use in policy and practice changes for the future. 
The application of economic method to environmental management has produced 
some potentially valuable procedures. Environmental accounting is one component 
which is simply a logical product of environmental management records-keeping. A 
simple account might look like this: 
Forest area January 1st 1,000 sq. km 
Minus: forest area cut down in year 70 sq. km 
Plus: area of new forest planted in year 20 sq. km 
Equals : area of forest, December 31st 950 sq. km 
(from Anderson 1991) 
This sort of environmental asset accounting can be adapted to other types of 
'resource', some of which wi l l take this form, others would not contain the 'plus' 
component - those resources which are mined without natural or artificial 
regeneration capacity (non-renewables). In conjunction with some of the methods of 
valuing and pricing environmental goods mentioned below in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 (such as 
contingent valuation and some market based valuation systems), environmental 
accounting can be converted into financial terms. In the above example, the deficit of 
50 sq. km of forest could be priced through assessing the various use and non-use 
values of the harvested area (this is complicated by the different values of mature 
forest and freshly planted saplings). 
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This value can then be entered into an ecological balance sheet with other relevant 
and similar types of values (such as accounts of valuable wetland habitats, or high 
quality beach areas in conjunction with their tourist value). In combination with 
environmental damage accounts, such as the example provided by Schulz & Schulz 
(in Barde & Pearce 1991 - see Appendix 2) they contribute to the creation of what 
Anderson (1991) refers to as an "Adjusted National Product" - one which, to a greater 
extent than conventional accounting, includes a significant environmental component. 
This section wil l focus on the first part of this process. This in itself is a useful system 
for improving environmental information availability and comprehensiveness without 
the 'corrupting' attempts to convert it to economic values. Anderson (1991) and Hope 
& Parker (1995) offer suggestions as to what the characteristics of good 
environmental indicators would be. They both then propose some environmental 
indicators. Hope & Parker detail those proposed by the British Labour Party in the 
1992 General Election. Anderson focuses on global scale indicators, Hope & Parker 
focus on nationally relevant indicators. The Labour Party's proposals are specifically 
geared towards the British experience, with the inclusion of Britain-specific 
indicators. 
Anderson describes four indicator characteristics that he sees as unnecessary even 
though they might be seen as favourable : 
• They should not have to carry an automatic value (a move in a particular direction should 
not necessarily mean 'good' or 'bad' - they should reflect reality, not only what is easy to 
reflect); 
• They shouldn't have to have a policy instrument corresponding to its 'correction' if 
unfavourable (this would be bias against the recognition and study of more problematic 
issues); 
• They don't have to be new types of measurement (the most effective ones might be 
measurements with which we are familiar); and 
• Indicators should not be geared towards assessing particular styles of 'development' 
(objective needs rather than subjective and culturally variable needs will be more useful, 
especially since Anderson proposes that it is favourable for indicators to be internationally 
comparable). 
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Hope & Parker disagree with the first point, proposing that increases in the index 
should represent deteriorations, and decreases improvements. This is in line with 
price indexes but converse to the system proposed by the Labour Party. 
Both Anderson and Hope & Parker consider that public consultation in indicator 
characteristic selection is a good thing. Hope & Parker propose that indicators should 
be chosen by expert selection, whilst weighting of indicators can be done through 
public opinion polls. However Anderson highlights a number of problems with public 
participation in the processes, especially i f the public is to have subjective influence 
on the results (even though he also suggests that an obvious characteristics should be 
that it is thought to be important - presumably the public is the judge of what is 
important to themselves). The problems he sees are these: 
• Public pride may reduce their willingness to disclose negatives; 
• Cultural factors may effect the openness in answering; 
• International differences in standards thought to be a realistic basis for satisfaction and 
expectation; 
• Complex or relatively obscure indicators may not be appreciated as important by those for 
whom environmental concerns are not a particular focus of interest (apparently intangible 
increases in surface ozone concentrations might be quite meaningless to many - it is for this 
reason that Anderson suggests that indicators should be relatively easy to understand); and 
• Strength of public opinion is often more a measure of how much publicity there has been of 
something (for example people only became concerned about the enhanced greenhouse effect 
when they were told there might be enhanced processes of global warming happening, and 
without the publicity, most people would not notice the near extinction of some insects and 
whales). 
Two other characteristics Anderson (1991) and Hope & Parker (1995) agree on are: 
firstly, updates should be regular, say monthly, and a short lag time between 
gathering the information and completing the processing is favourable; secondly, 
indicators should be region-specific, so that comparisons can be made between areas. 
Anderson adds that international comparability should not exclude indicators simply 
because the differences will be huge (even between '0' and '100') and that i f possible 
distinctions between social groups could be made in order to contribute to 'correcting 
inequalities'. 
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Overall, Hope & Parker (1995) propose that there should be about 15 indicators, and 
this is the number they propose, whilst Anderson (1991), coming more from a 
greening-economics perspective proposes just five environmental indicators. He also 
proposes eleven social indicators and emphasises that with indicators in general, the 
aim is more to highlight what is most significant than to produce details of 
everything. It seems that Hope & Parker agree with this in so far as advocating 
'composite' indicators. 
The other characteristics seen as important by Hope & Parker are that indicators 
should have no units (they should be straightforward indices - Anderson does not see 
this as imperative) and they should be based on physical environmental characteristics 
(presumably to increase the scope for objectivity). Anderson also proposes that: 
indicators (or the information they are calculated from) should be easily available or 
easily made so (especially so that poorer countries can use comparable indicators); 
they should be measurable ('dissatisfaction' with environmental conditions is not 
readily accurately measurable, whereas rates of respiratory disease, and investments 
in double glazing and water filters etc. are); and they should measure something 
believed to be important - this will make the difference between indicators and mere 
statistics. Next, Anderson's proposed indicators wi l l be described. After this, those of 
Hope & Parker (plus the extra indicators proposed by the Labour Party in 1992). 
The measurements that Anderson recommends as indicators of the state of the 
environment (clearly the global environment) - some of which he suggests are not 
appropriate at the moment for various reasons - are these: 
1- rate of tropical deforestation in square kilometres per year (proposed). 
The loss of these forests are a particular problem due to the extinction of 
species (esp. their medicinal potential); loss of important CO2 sinks; the 
disruption of the hydrological cycle (causing flooding and droughts); the 
reduction of the integrity of the forest as a resource; and by no means least, 
the effects on the forest components (the plants and animals) and the 
indigenous inhabitants of the forest. 
Problems exist due to varying estimates as a result of a lack of data, data 
sources affecting the 'sway' of study estimates (NGO vs government or 
logging company data), and there is the problem of defining when a forest can 
be classified as 'deforested'. It is not as appropriate for non-tropical forests 
since (as Anderson suggests) they are replanted more when felled, and they 
are not being felled at such high rates. We should remind ourselves here that 
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'Western forests' are no longer of such considerable magnitude because they 
were heavily depleted before environmental awareness took off. It is therefore 
understandable that some countries of the South and East respond with 
reservations to suggestions that they reduce deforestation rates. 
2- rates of species loss (not recommended for now). This is an important issue 
since it seems that we are living through a period of massively enhanced rates 
of species extinction, degrading the base of Ecological life (of which people 
are a part) and the base of our economies; we under-appreciate the various 
forms of unseen labour it is easy to take for granted (the absorption of waste, 
recycling of nutrients, cleaning the air and balancing the gas levels, and the 
storage and circulation of water). Appendix 3 is a presentation by Gilbert 
White on unappreciated 'labour'. It is suggested that this could be measured as 
either the numbers lost per year, or as an annual percentage rate. 
This is a clearly problematic for a number of reasons: dispute about what is a 
species and a subspecies; the loss of genera or families is more significant 
than individual species; counting species equally, though it may be morally 
favourable, could be flawed i f some might be more important for economic, 
ecological, evolutionary, or other reasons; and finally extinction is unclear -
just because a species has not been sighted, it doesn't mean it doesn't exist 
(what time period of not being seen is reasonable?). 
But more seriously, there is a lack of information - we do not have adequate 
ability to monitor all species and their numbers (compromising acceptance of 
studies of only some species we think are important may be crucially flawed 
as our understanding of the ecological world, though extensive, is still small). 
Anderson calculates from various estimates of species extinction rates (a 
professor's estimates, the Brundtland Report estimates, and the estimates 
provided to the US president in 1980 in 'The Global 2000 Report to the 
President') that as a percentage they might be about 0.25-1.00 % per year - one 
every 20 minutes (Anderson 1991). 
3- production of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide from fossil fuels 
{proposed). This ought to be taken in conjunction with the rate of 
deforestation since deforestation compounds the effect not only by production 
as large tracts of land are cleared and the biotic content exposed for 
combustion and decomposition (releasing stored carbon as C02), but also 
83 
because it removes one of the earth's important carbon sinks (though oceanic 
algae is thought to be much more important, forests are still very significant). 
4- desertification and soil degradation rates (potentially useful, but as there 
are so many problems associated with i t , i t is not recommended). 
Desertification occurs through over-agriculturalising the land and encroaching 
on forest/vegetal integrity. The intensity and rate of cropping in areas all 
around the globe is taxing the structural and ecological balance as well as 
agricultural usefulness of soils (Anderson details the forms and regions of soil 
degradation: soil erosion in North America, acidification in Europe, and 
deforestation and desertification in Asia, Africa and Latin America). The 
overwhelming problem with this as an indicator is that there is scarce data 
available - the only reliable data comes from the US, and again there is the 
problem of quantifying gradual rates of soil deterioration and loss. 
5- average annual percentage increase in population (proposed). Population 
growth rates wil l clearly provide some indication of the demands on the 
environment but the crucial detail here is the distribution of any growth and 
lifestyle changes. Since the consumption of a million wealthy Americans will 
greatly exceed that of a million people in many other countries (for a 
multitude of reasons), a population growth of this magnitude in the US wi l l be 
hugely more demanding on the earth's bounties than i f the growth was 
elsewhere (the effects may be spread in all areas, though, by the 
'internationalisation of consumption'. Detail of distribution is important. This 
is not a new indicator - indeed it is a very well established one and relatively 
reliable figures can be expected. Anderson states that at current rates (1991 
being his time of writing), the global population was increasing at about 1.5 
million a week. 
6- the next is the number of nuclear reactors (proposed), and the second is 
pollution (thought to be impractical). The latter is not proposed due to 
different systems for measuring pollution. Another problem would be 
comparing areas or nations with different forms of pollution with their 
different qualities of information and its availability). The number of nuclear 
reactors is a useful measure since it is clear and easy to visualise, more so than 
a more detailed and less easily obtained figure for the quantities of plutonium, 
etc., which wi l l linger through hundreds of generations as hazardous waste 
(due to a half life in excess of over 24,000 years). 
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7- energy intensity: to be measured as "energy consumption in metric tons of 
oil per million [US] dollars of output" (proposed). I f it is observed that energy 
intensity is falling, then economic growth (the route seen as most likely to 
improve life quality to a decent standard for all) can occur in conjunction with 
a reduction in energy consumption. In other words, it might be seen as 
something to aim to reduce. The premise is that 'growth' and 'economic 
development' are necessarily desirable; that they automatically have a capacity 
for improving life quality (this is considered further in chapter 7); that they 
wil l result from a future based on technological determinism, which demands 
huge amounts of energy for research, production, distribution, use, 
decommissioning, disposal, and waste monitoring. 
Anderson acknowledges that his five key proposals for environmental indicators 
(deforestation, CO 2 emissions, population increase, number of nuclear reactors and 
energy use intensity - numbers 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 above) are internationally significant 
indicators (due to the gearing of his book). He also invites governments and 
communities to produce indicators specifically appropriate to them. 
The indicators proposed by Hope & Parker (1995) "reflect changes to the state of the 
environment rather than the actual 'stocks' of environmental resources". From a list of 
26 likely indicators they chose 15, the selection being based on the importance 
assigned to issues by European citizens in the 1982, '84 and '86 European Omnibus 
Survey (EOS) and two other similar surveys. The use of citizens as well as 'expert 
opinion' in the choice of indicators, as touched on earlier, was favoured since it was 
believed that the latter can claim no superior knowledge of environmental states at the 
aggregate level, and because "the major threats to the environment are socially 
determined" (Hope & Parker, 1995). The key selection criteria, in conjunction with 
those mentioned above, were these: data comparability, monthly data availability, 
environmental problem priority, and scientific credibility. The factors were split into 
air, water and land based indicators, and were these: 
Air 
(1) sulphur dioxide (SOx) emissions 
(2) nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions 
(3) low-level ozone (O3) 
(4) carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
(5) particulate emissions 
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(The Labour Party proposals included 1, 2 and 4, and added volatile organic 
compounds emissions, perhaps similar to 5, and also lead emissions from vehicles) 
Water 
(6) bathing water quality 
(7) oil spills 
(8) fresh water bathing quality 
(9) fertiliser consumption 
(10) pesticide consumption 
(The Labour Party proposals included only the number of water pollution incidents, 
and nitrates in drinking water) 
Land 
(11) population change 
(12) numbers of new dwellings 
(13) tourist numbers 
(14) road traffic volumes 
(15) municipal waste volumes 
(The Labour Party proposals included 14, and four different indicators: imports of 
hazardous waste, annual loss of hedgerows, Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
damaged, and number of noise complaints) 
It is clear that the Labour Party included quite 'topical' factors in their indicator 
selection, issues which have been the subject of public concern such as lead 
emissions, noise complaints, SSSI damage, and hedgerow loss. It could be cynically 
suggested that their selections were guided by party political interests as well as the 
core issue itself: monitoring our environmental impacts. However these are genuine 
concerns for the public, whether or not they might actually be the ecologically most 
important issues. The interests of the public are the purpose of the work, so they are 
of prime importance, but wider consideration and concerns, might well be justified -
and perhaps even of comparable importance to other organisms and ecosystems, if not 
appreciably to people. 
As with any method for environmental impact monitoring, it would be easy to reason 
that they have inadequacies, that the results will be unreliable and relatively lacking 
in usefulness. But it is only through genuine efforts to work on the problem that good 
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judgement of the utility of different approaches to this end can be achieved. Criticism 
is easy, finding solutions or appropriate methods is less so. 
At this point it is worth explaining the way composite environmental index graphs for 
the subject countries were achieved. The EOS assessed the concern of citizens by 
carrying out a properly prepared and carefully worded survey, taking due care to 
achieve representative results. The questions asked were answered in terms of degree 
of worry, rated as 'a great deal', 'a fair amount', and 'not very much'. The measure of 
concern was achieved by multiplying the proportion worrying 'a great deal' by 3, 'a 
fair amount' by 2, and 'not very much' by 1, adding the multiplied proportions 
together, and dividing by 100. So strength of concern was weighted, and where all 
were very concerned about an issue, the highest score of 3 was measured. Thus 
perceived issue significances were attained (indicator weights), and indicators could 
be selected. 
To align annual indicator figures against the base year (which in this study was most 
often 1980), they were divided by the corresponding figure from that base year. 
Indicator weights were normalised by dividing each one by the total of the index 
weights which were available for the year in question. The normalised weight was 
then multiplied by the corresponding normalised environmental indicator and the 
results for the normalised indicators available that year were summed. Thus an 
environmental quality index value for one particular year in a particular country was 
reached. These were then tabulated as a graph so that the trend in composite 
environmental quality (within the parameters of the chosen indicators) was achieved. 
Below is an adaptation of the composite quality of the environment index (QEI) 
produced by the UK Labour Party in 1992 (Figure 4.1), and a synthesised adaptation 
of the individual country QEI graphs produced by Hope and Parker (1995)(Figure 
4.2). The Labour Party's graph is visually 'favourable' in that an increase represents an 
improvement in composite environmental quality and a decrease represents a decline, 
whereas those of Hope and Parker are visually misleading - an increase represents a 
decline in composite environmental quality, and a decrease represents an 
improvement 
For easier comparability of the Labour Party's results and graph and the three for the 
UK, France and Italy by Hope and Parker, they have been placed onto one graph. One 
other change is the vertical axis scaling. The use of '100' as a base line is useful for 
representing change from that base date line which is selected, but it is misleading in 
that it suggests that an increase of, say, 3 is a 3% increase. It is also unfavourable 
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since it suggests that if the index value was to decline to '0', there would be no further 
decline possible. Thus the indices from the four graphs have been rearranged to be 
negative when representing a decline and positive for an improvement, and the values 
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Figure 4.2 
QEI for the UK, France and Italy (adapted from Hope & Parker 19921 
unitised either side of '0' instead of '100'. Table 43 is the remoulded indices, and 
Figure 4.3 is the graph produced from them. This is thought to be a more favourable 
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representation, but this sort of 'preference' is one of the causes of problems associated 
with all statistical presentations: methods of information analysis and presentation 























H & P 
UK 0 8 16 8 4 -4 -4 -3 n/a n/a 
H & P 
France 0 -1 1 2 17 18 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
H & P 
Italy 0 1 0 -1 -2 -3 2 a/a n/a n/a 
Table 43 
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Remoulded Adaptation of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 - QEI for the UK (two indexes), 
France and Italy. 
There are a number of problems associated with the collection of environmental 
quality data. Not only does it depend on knowing what data to collect, availability of 
resources necessary to gather and appropriately and rapidly process the data, and 
administrative and organisational coherence, it also requires the collection of 
representative data. This is a problem since variability in qualities of, for example, air 
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composition, occurs drastically - even within one town or city. Pollution gradients 
with distance from pollution sources vary depending on the level and consistency of 
production, and on atmospheric conditions. Wind direction change can massively 
alter pollution levels in a fixed location. Equally, 'still air pockets' may be found on 
street or city levels - Sheffield has topography conducive to still-air development. 
Variability in findings is apparent too. Hope and Parker state that their index shows a 
4 point deterioration in environmental quality in the UK between 1980 and 1987, 
whereas the Labour party found an 11 point decrease. They both noted an increase in 
environmental quality during the early 1980's economic recession. The French index 
only goes as far as 1985 since after that date some statistics were not available, so it 
would be false to include a different composite index - especially where the missing 
data is for an index considered 'very important' (for France, it was municipal waste 
volumes, which attained citizen 'significance' weight/rate of 2.15 where the maximum 
was 3). 
Hope and Parker (1995) conclude that although advances have been made in the 
development of useful environmental indices methodologies, "they can not be 
expected to play a major part in the policy process for some time". They emphasise 
that in order to successfully compete for attention with other economic indicators in 
the media, the index will need be published frequently, and regularly, and will need 
to be accompanied by a non-jargonistic interpretative summary. 
4.3.2 Economic, demand carve based valuation methods. 
These methods centre on the demand curve for different environmental qualities, and 
the preferences for these variations are captured in the context of actions and choices. 
43.2.1 Expressed preference methodology - contingent valuation. 
This methodology is based on the premise that individuals have preferences for 
goods, services and environmental conditions and might be willing to forego some 
financial sum in order to experience or achieve a preferred state. Other forms of 
'payment' could play a role in achieving a particular end, "but it makes most sense to 
talk about sacrificing generalised purchasing power" (Field 1994). Another sort of 
'sacrifice' might be the comfort of a car (riding from A to B on a cycle instead), or the 
whiteness of paper (by purchasing unbleached recycled paper). These might not 
actually be 'sacrifices' if 'higher environmental goals' or fitness are a priority; they 
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may serve to clear a conscience from other environmentally damaging acts (as 
mentioned in chapter 2). 
Contingent valuation (CV) can be used to elicit values where the 'goods' are not 
normally marketed, and can be used to get preference values for almost any 
environmental (or other) change. It is the only way to establish non-(human-)use 
values, and is therefore an attractive system to valuers. The CV procedure is to 
prepare a carefully worded questionnaire which will ask the relevant and strategically 
sampled population how much they would be willing to pay (or contribute) (WTP) to 
maintain an environmental condition (such as hedgerows and stonewalls as 
countryside field boundaries), or how much they would be willing to pay (or 
contribute) to achieve a certain environmental condition (such as improved urban air 
quality, or the preservation of a rare plant or animal). Alternatively, people may be 
asked to state how much compensation they would require to accept (WTA) an 
environmental deterioration (of for example air quality) or to lose a particular 
favourable condition (such as a peaceful home or pleasing view from the home to a 
new road or a tall building). 
This type of data is open to variability depending on a number of factors other than 
the respondents' degree of interest in environmental issues: 
• their income (esp. disposable income) levels - "willingness to pay depends 
on the existing income distribution" (Barde & Pearce 1991) [though Diamond 
& Hausman (1994) observe little income elasticity in WTP]; 
• their state of mind at the time of the survey (if anxious about more directly 
personal matters, environmental concerns may subside in importance); 
• their relative degree of informedness on the issues (as mentioned elsewhere, 
strength of opinion on matters environmental can be charged by good 
advertising by pressure groups - and the resulting opinion might be out of 
proportion and not indicative of the total environmental problem distribution); 
• cultural factors; and 
• national economic/social conditions (particularly important when 
international comparative studies are being conducted). 
91 
In order to attain useful and meaningful information, the quality of the survey in 
terms of 'sample representativeness' is crucial. Even so, in order to apply the values 
elicited to the general population, a large sample should be taken and an average 
WTP or WTA calculated - then the figure multiplied by the number of people 
expected to be affected by the action or policy. So something of a 'total willingness to 
pay' or a 'total compensation requirement' can be achieved. 
Clearly there is a wide scope for error since even a small inaccuracy in numbers of 
affected people, could severely effect the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis, or a 
cost-effectiveness analysis for a proposed change or action. As with most of the 
methods of environmental economics and evaluation, there are numerous possible 
criticisms of both methodology and the legitimacy in the first place of attempting to 
achieve a financial value for components of the environment we experience 
personally or via the media. It is, for example, quite reasonable to respond 'I do not 
know' when asked how much one would be willing to pay to save a particular type of 
bird from extinction. It is also questionable whether the values attained are worth 
anything since if asked for a sum value for protecting all things which might require 
protecting, and for improving all things which might require improving, most citizens 
would be stuck for an answer! Yet they are generally happy to provide a sum for one 
issue. 
4.3.2.2 Revealed preference methods. 
Unlike the expressed preference methodologies of finding values of environmental 
goods or conditions, the revealed preference methodologies aim to observe preference 
values actually manifest in the market culture. 
a) Household Production Function Approaches. 
Household production function approaches include the travel cost method, and the 
avertive expenditure method. 
• Travel Cost Method. 
The travel cost method (TCM) can be used to estimate the value of an 
environmental amenity to its human users. It is particularly useful when there 
is no actual use-price, but to experience the amenity people will travel a 
distance. They are therefore willing to spend a certain amount of money (and 
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time) to reach for example, a beach or National Park. The travel costs people 
are willing to incur are taken to indicate the value of the amenity to them. 
For this method to be effective, it is necessary to collect travel costs from a 
large, or at least representative, sample of the users since there will be 
variations in ability to spend on travel costs. In conjunction with surveys of 
the numbers of users of an amenity, an estimate of aggregate willingness to 
pay for a particular environmental amenity can be reached. It is more useful to 
carry out the procedure for several (competing) environmental amenities, so 
that comparative values can be examined and relative amenity values 
observed. 
There are a number of problems with this method: 
• it requires large/representative population sample; 
• it requires a survey of total user numbers in order to be meaningful; 
• surveys can be expensive, and must be appropriately prepared; 
• users must provide reliable estimates of fuel/other travel costs 
• the travel time component of travel cost is awkward to incorporate (even if a 
parallel study focusing on time is used instead of cost, there is considerable 
scope for error in speed of journey, directness of route, mode of travel, and 
accuracy of stated travel time); 
• the value of the travelling experience itself can be confused with the value of 
the environmental amenity; 
• competing recreation sites may complicate the assessment, especially when 
multi-purpose (-visit) trips are made; 
• frequency of use questions may reveal visits to be one-offs, so 
threatening the representative qualities of the findings for general use; 
• visitors on foot or cycle can not be accounted for, so it is more useful for 
remote sites. Even then, the type of visitor going a distance to visit, for 
example, a National Park may be more inclined to cycle than drive; and 
• unlike the CV method, the TCM can not elicit option, existence and bequest 
values so a total economic value can not be achieved. 
• Avertive expenditure method. 
The avertive expenditure method is thought to be of use in assessing the 
values people place on their physical and psychological health and safety, 
particularly in the home. It is thus related to the 'wage risk premium' method 
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below, under 'Hedonic Pricing'. It looks at what expenditures people make to 
offset some environmental risk, danger, or nuisance, such as smoke detectors, 
water filters, garden perimeter fencing to keep children off the road, or noise 
abatement procedures - double glazing etc.. It has not been, though could be 
feasibly used to estimate non-use values, for example payments to wildlife 
protection groups could be interpreted as payments to increase the likelihood 
of success in conservation efforts. 
This is a complicated method in that it requires econometric modelling to 
represent the relationships between household expenditures and the scale of 
demand for the subject environmental good(s). This can be expensive since it 
is a specialist subject so the method is not very widely used (DoE 1991). It 
could be useful in assessing the perceived (whether actual or imagined) threat 
or intrusion of environmental 'hazards' (water pollution, roads, and industrial 
externalities - smoke, dust and gasses). 
Problems arise in that as well as being potentially expensive to process the 
data through econometric modelling, the gathering of the data is full of 
complications: 
• ability to spend on avertive measures may not reflect the will to spend; 
• house owners may be more willing to spend on avertive measures than 
tenants; 
• a lack of expenditure on avertive measures may also be an indication of a 
lack of information - as was the case before the personal hygiene revolutions 
of the late 19th century; and 
• there is considerable scope for 'grey' areas in respect of what to count as 
avertive measures (the car user may not care if it has a catalytic converter or 
not, though it came with one). 
b) Hedonic pricing. 
Hedonic pricing methods include the house price and 'environmental risk based wage 
premium' approaches. They essentially try to assess the value of environmental goods 
as this is reflected in market prices. 
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The house price approach. 
This method of considering the values people place on environmental 
phenomena is only applicable to those able to choose where to live due to 
financial security. It seeks to find the strength of correlations between house 
prices and environmental characteristics associated with particular houses and 
house price brackets. So, for example the number of broad-leafed trees, the 
ambient levels of obnoxious gases from fuel combustion (CC»2, NOx, S02, or 
O3), the water quality, the ambient noise levels, or the degree of scenic beauty 
of an area may be the indices against which house prices are observed. It 
might be expected that cleaner and more peaceful areas would have higher 
house prices, but they may be isolated. The dominant market, dictated by their 
location, might be younger age brackets who seek a more cosmopolitan 
atmosphere. 
Again, it is a complicated procedure. A demand curve for the house category 
against a particular factor can be created. Problems in use can include the 
following: 
• it is confined to property owners who are aware of environmental 
issues and consider them in house choice; 
• house prices are open to many other non-environmental influences such as 
the state of the local economy, warps in prices due to either a buyer or sellers 
market (rented accommodation, particularly, for example where student 
populations are significant, may lead to artificial price inflation even if the 
ambient environment is unfavourable, due to accommodation availability; 
• it ignores the work environments of a town, which also affects the 
attractiveness of an area. People may choose to make a trade off between good 
work or living environments; 
• job availability is a strong factor in choosing where to live - the degree of 
discretion to the worker depends on balance between supply and demand of 
labour. House prices might be pushed up by an abundance of jobs in one 
town, whilst another town may have a lack of jobs, so pressure on housing 
stock may be reduced (and so the price). The former may occur if a new large 
employer moves into town, and the latter, for example, when a coal mine 
closes down; and 
• lastly, since no one factor is likely to be dominant in affecting prices, 
extensive and potentially complicated statistical factor analysis may be 
necessary. 
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9 (Environmental) risk based wage premiums. 
There are two variations to the 'environmental risk based wage premium' 
approach. Both attempt to assess the extent to which jobs in more risky 
environments (in terms of health or mortality risk) attract wage premiums. 
The first looks at the types of work available, individual types of industry for 
example, and the second observes differences between urban areas alike in all 
respects except in terms of, say, air quality or another ambient environmental 
condition - such as perceived radiation threats from a nuclear power station, 
an old toxic waste dump, or an 'aromatic' sewage works. 
At the level of the work place, it is easier to assess the environment-wage 
effect. Working in a mine poses a greater threat to life than packing 
chocolates; working in an underground mine offers less favourable 
atmospheric conditions, posing a greater threat to health -'black lung'- (as well 
as to life threatening disasters) than a surface mine or quarry; and work in the 
army is potentially more life threatening than as a bowls instructor. It is 
expected that these higher risks might be reflected in wages. If in one town 
there is an adverse environmental condition such as the radiation threat 
mentioned above, then it is presumed that to attract workers to that town as 
opposed to another town nearby with similar job opportunities (but without 
the extra hazard) wages in the first will have to be higher than in the second. 
These differential wages are assumed to indicate the extent to which more 
hostile environments are less favoured. This might assist when there are some 
proposed improvements to the environmental qualities of an area or work 
place. Wage differentials can be observed between one area or work place 
where the environmental quality is approximately equal to what another is 
expected to become. The degree of preference the improved environment 
might have over its current state can be gauged; the value of the improvements 
can be estimated. The cost-effectiveness of the proposed change can be 
deduced (in terms of peoples preference and the effect it might have on wages 
- effects which will have secondary impacts, for example, on house prices 
etc.). 
Again, the procedure can be complicated since it uses multiple regression 
techniques to establish the strength of the effects of different factors on wages 
since there is rarely just one difference between areas or jobs. This is also the 
reason why it is more a theoretically sound procedure than it might be in 
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practice. It is possible to do convergent validity tests, against CV estimates of 
preference for environmental conditions, to assess the validity of the results of 
wage premium studies. 
As with other methods of attempting to 'price' environmental conditions, there 
are a number of problems with achieving validity: 
• it assumes good levels of appreciation of the environmental conditions and 
their effects, and of 'competing'jobs or areas; 
• it assumes the workers are able to exert worker power. During apartheid in 
South Africa, mine workers (the vast majority being non-white) could not 
complain and could not readily move to work in other mines or jobs if they 
wished to, or, may not have held full information about the environmental 
threats or other work opportunities. Clearly there are obvious effects on 
health, especially as older workers reveal symptoms and even die, but longer 
term carcinogenic and extended respiratory stress might be less visible; 
• the degree of mechanisation and skill level variation will affect wages. There 
are countless variables which may influence wage levels, so to try and select 
one or even several key factors (using statistical factor analysis) and to gauge 
the strength of their effect is of dubious validity. 
• overall labour demand and supply in an area or community will affect wage 
levels; 
• externally imposed/influenced systems of value can affect regional and 
community wage levels. A national minimum wage might reduce the validity 
of the method for lower wage brackets; union activity may have the same 
effect; political systems of standardised pay can dislocate wage levels from 
environmental factors; company and other loyalties can over-ride 
environmental factors, etc.. 
4.3.3 Financial, market based pricing. 
These market based observations and pricings include opportunity costs, replacement 
costs, shadow projects, government payments, and the dose-response method. They 
can work quite accurately in terms of accepted values, since they are mostly 
comprised of actual traded or exchanged financial sums. They do include 'calculated' 
sums, for example some components of compensation associated with opportunity 
costs for land taken up in developments, but most values in these systems are directly 
extracted from 'the market'. 
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• Opportunity cost. 
An opportunity cost is the value of the best alternative use of an asset. In this 
context it relates to the trade-off of one environmental asset for another. 
Bateman (1995) uses the example of a 'New National Forest' proposed by the 
Countryside Commission (between Leicester and Burton-on-Trent in the 
English Midlands). The proposed 40,000 ha site includes a significant area of 
good agricultural land, the loss of the economic (and other) potential of which 
would represent an opportunity cost (OC). 
Ordinarily the OC would be the net market price of the agricultural products 
of the land which would be lost with the new forest. Compensation would be 
paid on the basis of this (added to which may be other losses such as job and 
home relocation/redundancy sums). This example is interesting in that it 
contains a fairly common complication: since the profits lost by the farmers 
would not only be the normal profits to be made in agriculture but also the E C 
subsidies, these would also have to be included as a component of the 
opportunity cost. 
This system of compensation for lost alternative utility can be used by 
displaced individuals or groups. For example if a coast road is soon to fall into 
the sea as the coast erodes and the council is considering replacing it with one 
100 metres inland, then the current owners of the land might apply for 
planning permission for some form of development, such as flats or a golf 
course. If this is achieved, then the potential earnings would have to be 
included in the opportunity cost compensation. In this case, the council may 
conduct a 'cost-effectiveness analysis' to see whether a sea wall might be 
cheaper. If the new road is chosen then an opportunity cost might exist if it is 
a particularly valuable stretch of coast-line which will be abandoned to the sea 
(if for example it hosts some rare plants or ecosystems). 
Thus the opportunity cost can include potential utility as well as current utility 
- it might include the loss of the potential agricultural use of the land to the 
children of the current farmer, the loss of saleable hunting right on the land, or 
even the loss of a good view from a village, which would be obscured by the 
forest. 
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• Costs of alternatives. 
This is a system of development management which is used in all forms of 
activity. It is in effect 'shopping around'. If a development or operation is 
under the auditors' scrutiny, whether it be pre-action or part of 
project/business performance monitoring, an open and creative board will 
consider alternative materials, operations or routes to achieve the goal. If, for 
example, a new road is proposed, multiple routes and alternative solutions 
(presumably to a problem of traffic congestion) will be considered. 
Construction cost and strategic and comprehensive environmental impact 
analysis ought to be conducted for different routes the road could take. 
Alternatives such as investment in public transport, canal and rail freight 
transport, and other development foci (to redirect the traffic) must also be 
considered. 
When alternatives have been considered and costed, a decision can be made 
about what action to take (including the zero-option of no action). Bateman 
(1995) uses the example of the M3 extension in Hampshire UK to highlight 
the 'trade-off process. The alternative to cutting a wedge out of the area of 
outstanding natural beauty (AONB), tunnelling under the Downs, was costed 
at £70 million (significantly more than the cutting option). It was decided that 
this outweighed the environmental and other benefits of preserving the area, 
and so the first option was decided upon. Thus the trade-offs (the beauty of the 
area, the ecological value, the intrinsic value of the non-human life there, the 
recreational value, the cultural heritage etc.) represented the opportunity costs 
of the road; andminutes saved in journey time for vehicles was the benefit. 
• Shadow projects. 
When an action is proposed and it threatens something or some things of 
value, a part of the assessment procedure ought to be the consideration of 
mitigation possibilities to offset adverse effects. This is really a stage beyond 
the above mentioned alternative-costing procedure. It should be carried out 
during the preparation of a proposal; if it has not been, or if it has and there is 
still strong opposition to the proposal, other options ought to be re-considered. 
If a proposal threatens a particular community or private asset, then there are 
three possibilities: the asset could be reconstructed on another site; it could be 
physically transplanted; or another degraded asset could be restored. It is in a 
sense a form or exchange or trade-off, but can manifest itself as a buy-out - a 
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powerful company may budget large sums to silence opposition, thus reducing 
the openly represented cost of a proposal. 
• Government payments. 
This is not a valuing system so much as an adopted-pricing system. It uses the 
values calculated and ascribed by government departments as appropriate 
subsidy sums targeting the protection of an environmental asset. For example, 
subsidies paid to farmers to compensate for crop loss through the adoption of 
less intensive agricultural practices in what have become classified as 
'environmentally sensitive areas' (ESAs or Nitrogen SAs), might be used as 
proxy environmental values (Bateman 1995). The protection of these areas 
from the effects of what might be used under 'conventional' arable agricultural 
practices (herbicides, pesticides and fertilisers) might be considered preferable 
to the loss of the ecological representativeness or uniqueness of, say, a marsh 
area. Agents of the government, 'qualified' ecological and financial assessors, 
will have priced the area according to any number of valuation processes. The 
figures they deem reasonable and affordable for the protection of the area may 
be offered in subsidies for the losses of earning potential. They can then be 
used when valuing the benefits (as compared to the costs) of, for example, the 
construction or maintenance of a sea wall protecting an area from potentially 
ecologically disruptive sea water. As above in 'a' and 'b', if the wall is not 
maintained or built, these can be used to represent components of the total OC 
(to be priced against the costs of the wall options). 
• The dose-response method. 
'Dose-response' is a method of studying the relationships between different 
levels of pollution (the dose) and the resulting damaging effects (the 
response). The procedure can be used at two levels: firstly to assess the effects 
of different levels of pollutants generally, say over a regional or national area, 
to determine pollutant effects; secondly, it can be used to assess the effects of 
particular industries or groups of industries producing the same emissions. For 
discussion purposes the latter case will be used. 
The procedure begins with measuring the emissions of a particular pollutant 
from a particular source, or measuring the collective emissions where there are 
multiple local sources of the same pollutant (individual sources can be 
allocated the costs in proportion to their own outputs of the pollutant). The 
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ambient presence of the pollutant is then measured (models of the relationship 
between the emissions and the ambient levels of pollutant are referred as 
diffusion models (Field 1994)). The next step is to assess the human and other 
exposure rates - from the ambient levels - as they differ with distance from the 
source through dispersion. This is linked to the next part of the procedure, an 
assessment of the effects of the exposure on peoples health, their aesthetic 
environment, their recreational environment, affected ecological aspects of the 
environment (especially if they are protected, rare or otherwise 'special' 
ecological phenomena likely to be affected), the effects on local business or 
industry, and even longer distance effects (such as the effects of acid rain 
resulting from the long range transport of air pollutants). 
The last part of the procedure is to estimate the values of these impacts. This 
and the previous stage of the procedure will use some of the evaluation 
methods described in 4.3.2 such as contingent valuation and avertive 
expenditures etc.. Once an estimate of the value of the damage resulting from 
the pollutant is established, these costs could be allocated to the appropriate 
source industry or industries. In the case where the effects of a pollutant are 
studied on a more general basis, the results can indicate favourable changes 
for the future as could be demanded by government policy. 
There are clearly problems as mentioned in relation to some of the methods in 
4.2.2 in that there is rarely a single pollutant or factor affecting any given 
subject. Again, one could approach this problem with statistical factor analysis 
to try and determine the importance of individual pollutants. Alternatively 
experiments in controlled environments can offer more pollutant-specific 
effects, but there are ethical dilemmas in the use of human or non-human 
experimental subjects, and models cannot realistically include the cocktail of 
pollutants and variable weather conditions. Complete ecosystems react 
differently to pollutants, and may even serve as effective sinks to some 
components of the polluting factors). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE TROUBLE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND 
EVALUATION 
When establishing financial and index values to represent environmental issues, 
qualities, and the effects of actions and policies, a number of methodological and 
principle based problems (or potential sources of problems) were highlighted. The 
presence of many of these is a feature of any evaluation and research procedure. For 
example, as explained in 4.3.1.2, public participation is a double edged sword in 
terms of the effects it can have on research: it can be beneficial since it involves more 
people in the process of evaluation but it can be problematic due to humans' inability 
to express their needs (due to cultural factors, information deficits, analytical ability 
deficits, question comprehension problems, priorities, and disinterestedness). A 
second example is the use of surveys: a survey that fails to capture a representative 
sample will provide only statistics rather than useful information. 
Before further analysis of the problems of environmental economics and evaluation 
(including the non-financial methodologies), the nature of the (environmental) 'issue 
process' will be described. Next the context of environmental economic theory will be 
explained. Following this is a discussion of the legitimacy of the methods and their 
aims. This then splits into the essence of neo-classical (environmental) economics, 
and it's problems. The question 'is some number better than no number?' is considered 
followed by the relationship between money and nature. Lastly ecological 
dependence, dislocation, and the morality of marketing the environment wi l l be 
discussed. 
5.1 The issue process 
This wi l l be considered at the individual issue level. It could also be looked at the 
macro level, say the revival of environmentalism in the 1990's, or in the way that 
issue/ideological cycles develop from the emergence of a notion (a much simplified 
summary might be: ridicule, interest, acceptance, spread, establishment). This is not 
of great importance as the aim here is to display the complexity of a response to a 
perceived possible problem (such as a pollution problem, traffic congestion, a 
proposed development or the proposed termination of a currently functioning 
operation). It also aims to highlight the inseparability of 'financial consideration' and 
'action' in response to environmental issues. It is much easier to criticise and list 
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problems thought to exist than it is to assess their nature, magnitude and appropriate 
counter-measures. 
The process begins with a person or group of people having the capacity to observe or 
conceive of a problem. That person or those people (TPTP) might then be alert to 
observing or imagining problems, or they might have a tendency to seek out problems 
(either through concern, malice, or vested interests). If TPTP then observe or imagine 
a problem, they may ignore it or decide to approach it. I f it is decided to approach it, 
questions arise (economic components of the issue process are highlighted). 
• Who will approach the perceived problem? 
• Who will study the perceived problem? 
• Who will pay for the study of the perceived problem? 
• Will experts and/or the public participate in the study? 
• Should the efficacy of the study procedure be monitored? 
• How can the efficacy of the study procedure be monitored? 
• Who will monitor it? 
• Who will pay for monitoring it? 
Then the study procedure needs to be worked out. 
• What kind of study is appropriate for the subject under question? 
• What depth and length of study is appropriate? 
• What type of study will be carried out? 
• What financial and technical resources are available? 
• What technical resources are affordable? 
• Will the financial resources cover the favoured length and depth of study? 
• If not, where might more resources be sought? 
• How much monitoring of study resource use is necessary? 
• Who will monitor study resource use? 
• Who will have authority to delegate component study tasks? 
• Who will have authority to allocate study resources? 
Next the study might be carried out, with all due considerations, and some results 
emerge. 
• How reliable, meaningful, accurate, representative and useful are the results? 
• Who is to judge their efficacy? 
• Who will be informed of them? 
• In what detail? 
• How will they be told? 
• How much will it cost to inform these parties? 
• What do the study results mean? 
• If they suggest a need to act, how urgent is it? 
• Does it seem that any other studies are appropriate? [If so, start at the beginning and work 
through the process again.] 
• How might we act on the results of the study? 
• How much will acting on the results of the study cost? 
• Who is to act on the results of the study? 
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• Are they willing to act on the results of the study? 
• Are they able to act? 
• What barriers might there be to them acting? 
• How might these barriers be surmounted? 
• How much might this cost? 
• How much can we afford? 
• Who is to pay for this? 
• Who is likely to benefit from acting on the study? 
• How much will they benefit and for how long? 
• Who will be negatively affected by us acting on the study? 
• How badly will they be affected? 
• Where does the balance of interest lie? 
• Should we act on the study at all if doing so will negatively affect some interest groups? 
• Do marginal interests of a majority outweigh the more important interests of a few? 
• Who will authorise and be responsible for any actions that might be taken? 
• Are those negatively affected simply on the down end of a supply/demand exchange? 
• Or are they in some way being persecuted or disregarded? 
• Who is to judge this? 
• What else will be affected by acting on the study results? 
• Are the beneficiaries likely to be people or other species? 
• To what extent will they benefit? 
• What is the balance of interests and regard due? 
• To what extent is it legitimate to impinge on either the interests of people or other species 
that might be affected? 
• What might the side effects of acting on the study results be? 
• Who/what will the side effects affect? 
• How much effect will there be? 
• Are they good or bad effects? 
• How good or bad are they? 
• Do they outweigh the likely direct effects of acting on the results of the study? 
• Should we then not act on the study? 
• What might the full cost of deciding to do nothing be? 
5.2 The context of environmental economics 
In analysing the use and possible future use of economics based tools for 
environmental assessment and analysis, i t is important to know the context from 
which the tools are drawn and in which they were therefore designed to function. 
Jacobs (1994) states that 
...it is fair to say that most environmental economics is being carried out within [the 
neo-classical] framework, and, more importantly, that the most influential work in 
the subject is of this kind. 
He suggests that it is important to distinguish between the neo-classical approach to 
environmental economics and the property rights/'public choice theory' approach. The 
latter proposes that the best approach to environmental protection is to assign 
property rights to environmental assets, creating a market for environmental damage 
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protection: through the privatisation of environmental assets in a free market an 
optimal level of environmental protection wil l be achieved. As well as avoiding sub-
optimal protection of resources, commodification is thought by economists to be the 
best way to ensure maximum resource allocation efficiency. But, as is considered 
below, in the market context, optimisation most often means 'short-term financial 
optimisation'. 
The neo-classical approach to environmental economics is more committed to 
creating hypothetical markets than real markets; then through government 
intervention in real markets (with taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits etc.), 
appropriate environmental protection is supposed to ensue. It is market oriented, but 
less in favour of the free market, and does not distinctly favour privatisation (ibid.). 
In practice, governments and policy do not simply apply one of the above two types 
of theory but rather a combined approach that employs privatisation - and a relatively 
free market system - and the neo-classical approach. In the UK there appears to be a 
trend towards privatisation but it is limited by public discontent and opposition party 
protest (the bigger picture might bring a different party to power, with the goals of 
reversing the privatisation process). 
In the UK, subsidies for less intensive agricultural practices and restraint in 
'environmentally sensitive areas' (ESA's) are in operation, throughout Europe 
something of a positive incentive rather than a negative push presents cleaner [sic] 
unleaded fuel at lower prices than leaded, and tradable pollution permits were 
strongly advocated by the US at the 1992 UNCED meeting. 
This leads into the first type of problem with environmental economics, the 
legitimacy of the methods and their aims - the numerical and financial value results 
which will be the basis for decision making in environmental management. 
5.3 Legitimacy of the (aims of the) methods. 
5.3.1 The essence of neo-classical (environmental) economics. 
Neo-classical environmental economics has the core aim of commoditising the 
environment so that it can be analysed with conventional economic tools, as any other 
commodity. One might suggest suggested that would-be straight economists chose to 
focus on environmental economics in order to secure their future as the environment 
becomes more and more of a focus in all circles, but it is irrational to assume that 
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simply for having economic training, people are oblivious to the importance of 
environmental issues. 
The environment has been viewed by many economists as the provider of free goods. 
According to G. Hardins1 'tragedy of the commons' principle, all lose out i f the 
environment doesn't have an appropriate price attached. I f it did, then it might be 
appropriately protected for all. Indeed it would be hard to deny that i f environmental 
'goods' had 'appropriate' prices they could be more justly acknowledged in the market 
economy cultures which prevail. So claims by environmental economists that they are 
being more 'environmentally friendly1 than 'emotional greens' could have substance. 
It is worth noting two linked issues here. Firstly, as asserted by Jacobs (1994), 
...most environmental economists are genuinely concerned to protect the 
environment, and are engaged in the subject to assist this cause. 
The dominant paradigm at the moment is an economics based one; it is widely 
believed that it is through economics that effective environmental protection can be 
achieved (though deeper questioning questions the economic system itself). 
The second point, asserted by Haw ken (1994) and others, is that the world of 
commerce is the only mechanism powerful enough to 'save' the global environment. 
Unless further and more serious degrees of ecologisation take place in big business 
'interests', or at least are demanded of them by law, any improvements wi l l be 
marginal and relatively insignificant (though of course any improvement is an 
improvement). 
Jacobs (1994) outlines five premises on which neo-classical (environmental) 
economics is based: 
• Economic activity is comprised of methodologically individual activities (individuals act on 
their own, with their own psychology, preferences and environmental demands for 
satisfaction); 
• Individuals act rationally and consistently to (perceptively) maximise their own utility; 
• The rational person described in '2' operates in free markets with their own equilibrium, and 
exercises freedom of choice; 
• Preferences and technology are static in the economic system (the effects of time on taste 
and preferences is ignored); and 
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• Neo-classicists consider themselves to be (or at least aspire to being) morally neutral -
conclusions drawn from their methodologies are simply the best policies to fulfil defined 
societal preferences. 
Under these premises, evaluation, as outlined in chapter five, produces values for 
environmental 'commodities'. The next part of the process is to incorporate these 
values into the market through policy and economic tools, so achieving the 
collectively preferred level of environmental protection. 
5.3.2 The problems with neo-classical (environmental) economic assumptions. 
The key problem associated with the neo-classical approach is that it attempts to 
analyse what might happen / / components of the environment were exchanged 
between producers and consumers in the way 'real' commodities (such as 
manufactured or grown products) are. Yet, as Jacobs (1994) observes: 
• The environment often is not a commodity traded and consumed by individuals like other 
goods and services; 
• Private ownership of components of the environment is not the norm - it is a source of much 
controversy when a small proportion of individuals assert 'ownership' of elements of the 
environment and try to exclude the majority from its use (freedom to roam, camp and gather 
still exists for example in Norway and Sweden, and 'commons' exist in the UK). 
• The consumption of 'the environment' by one person can not be separated from that of 
another; and 
• Preferences are inadequate for valuing public goods since the majority of aware individuals 
will not pay for a good which 'free riders' (those who use without paying, or use without 
consideration for other users) will exploit. 
Neo-classical environmental economics can provide some measure of the worth of 
environmental components, albeit deficient in many ways, which could integrate 
previously under-accounted factors in decision making processes. 
This leads to some questions: Is some number better than no number i f it allows for 
some environmental representation? Is the often-perceived gulf between 
environmental and economic interests a reality, or is it a product of 'green paranoia' / 
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'economic intransigence'? Is it the case that there are irreconcilable conflicts of 
interest between ecological and economic interests? 
5.3.2.1 Is some number better than no number? 
To date, more work on the contingent valuation (CV) method of environmental 
economics has been done than on any other. Papers on it appear regularly and 
extensively in journals and text books. However in the US, cost-benefit analysis has 
been extensively researched over the last twenty years, and has played a significant 
role in environmental evaluation and decisions affecting environmental protection. 
Diamond & Hausman (1994) discuss the question of whether some number is better 
than no number. They look at the quality, meaningfulness and so the usefulness of 
survey results produced by CV. 
They conclude that for a number of reasons, CV survey results are not appropriate for 
defining policy and actions regarding environmental protection. Though some 
numerical values are produced, they should not be used in the decision-making 
process that precedes actions. In part, this was because in their use for measuring non-
use values, by the nature of the study, there are no direct market values to compare 
them with (the extreme case of this is the bequest value of an environmental 'asset', or 
the not-possible time travel necessary to verify future option value estimates), and so 
their 'validity' is hard to confirm. 
As with all surveys, before results can be used for future purposes, it is important to 
evaluate their qualities. Diamond and Hausman suggest this is done in terms of 
response credibility, reliability, and precision. Ceteris parabis, precision can be 
improved with an increase in the size of the survey sample, but credibility (referring 
to whether the respondents are answering the questions the interviewer is trying to 
ask) and reliability (the magnitude and direction of biases in the answers) can not. 
They found that CV surveys do not measure what they intend, and that this would not 
change with a change in method. 
They find the main anomaly in CV to be the imbedding effect' which is: 
...the tendency for willingness to pay responses to be highly similar across different 
surveys, even where theory suggests (and sometimes requires) that the responses be 
very different. 
(Diamond & Houseman 1994) 
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This problem is acknowledged in the literature on the subject, but to date no solutions 
have arisen. Two other failures in the CV method are that 'willingness to accept 
compensation' (WTA) values always exceed willingness to pay (WTP) - and WTP 
shows little income elasticity. Thus there is a contradiction when compensation for 
the loss of something is greater than the respondents would be willing to pay to 
protect it. Perhaps unexpectedly, higher incomes do not lead to a greater willingness 
to pay. This could be due to the hypothetical nature of most CV work, such that 
'idealised' values are always offered by environmentalists (perhaps only until they are 
asked to pay up). Also, a certain psychological base level of (financial) concern wil l 
be displayed by those not particularly concerned with environmental issues. But it is 
not possible to verify these findings against an actual situation since CV is based on 
hypothetical markets. 
Problems are compounded because: 
...it is not adequate to assume that any response that is not obviously wrong [through 
misunderstanding the question or other methodological incongruities] is an accurate 
response to the question the survey designer had in mind. 
(Diamond & Houseman 1994) 
The meeting of minds between surveyors and surveyed can never be absolutely 
confirmed, in part because: 
...within the confines of the time available for survey instruments, [respondents 
generally do not have the time to] focus successfully on the identification of 
preferences, to the exclusion of other biases for answering survey questions. 
(ibid.) 
The often rushed and/or unexpected context of answering questionnaires is 
incongruent with the production of genuine answers. 
Finally they conclude that: 
...the internal consistency problems come from an absence of preferences, not a flaw 
in survey methodology. 
(ibid.) 
That is, they do not believe that people hold views about individual environmental 
sites so much as environmental sites and species in general. Other than for well-
publicised concerns (such as rainforests), and endearing species (such as seals), this 
seems reasonable since most subject sites or species are not directly familiar to 
respondents. It is likely that they hold general attitudes to all sites and species they 
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may be asked about (as suggested earlier, WTP differs little for different sites). Those 
particularly concerned about environmental issues wil l have consistently stronger 
feelings about all sites (though for example bird enthusiasts may have a particular 
bias towards the interests of birds, and those not particularly concerned or aware 
about/of environmental issues will show consistently lower interest). 
On account of the problems raised here, which also are pointed out in other sources, 
there do seem to be grounds for serious doubt about whether some number is better 
than no number. It is the nature of 'expressed preference'-based studies that they are 
open to the vagaries of human unpredictability and unreliability. A spontaneous 
answer to the question might be that yes, a figure denoting some value for the 
normally un-priced might be favourable i f it can lead to some protection. But deeper 
consideration might lead to the conclusion that environmental phenomena would be 
better off remaining 'priceless' than under-priced. This would entail cut-off/absolute 
standards rather than subjection to the vagaries of financial and market based 
'tradability'. To give an analogy, what W. Churchill said of democracy was that 
although it might be an imperfect system, it may be that others are worse - although 
market pricing of the environment has its flaws, perhaps it is the best option. Would 
other systems of environmental protection, such as blanket laws of preservation, be 
less effective in 'protecting the environment1? This point leads into something that 
wi l l be discussed in chapters 6 and 7: the nature of philosophical and value positions 
which are moderate and reformist compared with those which are uncompromising. 
The numerous problems of environmental economics were outlined in chapter 4. 
Generally, although some figures may be achieved, it can be argued that the results -
which come from house prices, wage rates, money spent to reach a place or 
experience, money apparently spent on improving the personal environment, or 
figures plucked from government subsidy tables - are of limited use in defining the 
total value and total cost/benefit of an in/action or phenomenon. 
As suggested in many places throughout this paper, value other than instrumental 
value to humans go widely unrecognised and is often ignored when recognised. 
Disregard for the interests of other people is also historically and currently common. 
The unaccounted costs of 'externalities' - the interests of every critter, plant and 
complex ecosystem adversely impacted by human actions outside the realm of 
necessity - are hardly included in environmental economics: it is in fact still a 
homocentric evaluative process. 
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5.3.2.2 'Money Vs Nature'. 
A recent (May 1995) 'enviroethics' internet newsgroup debate on the subject 'Money 
vs Nature' serves as a good basis for this discussion. It began with Ellis' suggestion 
that: 
...the very root of our global ecological crisis lies in the incompatibility between the 
Laws of Money and the Laws of Ecology. 
He went on to state that this incompatibility revolves around the two value systems: 
ecology 'values' are based on optimisation, whilst money 'value' is based on 
maximisation. Thus in ecology, for every biological value there is an optimum level 
(too much or too little is un-homeostatic), and "in the artificial world of money...more 
is always better" (Ellis 1995)). Ignoring that there is a difference in the level being 
referred to in these two cases (with reference to ecology he speaks of components of 
ecology - "every biological value", of which there are an infinite number, and with 
reference to money he refers to "the artificial world of money " - more general), he 
furthers with a typical scenario. 
He gives the following hypothetical example of a community set in an East Texas 
wetland with high regional biological value for groundwater recharging, flood 
control, wildlife habitat, and biodiversity preservation. The community, caught up in 
a global money system beyond its control, is suffering chronic under-employment and 
is constantly being tempted by goods advertised on the television. To them it is 
nothing more than a swamp and a breeding ground for mosquitoes. When a developer 
offers to drain i t , f i l l it , and make i t into a shopping centre, offering jobs in 
construction and then in the running of the outlets, selling the products they had seen 
advertised, the community authorities, with the backing of the people, wil l welcome 
the proposed change of land use. 
Working on the maxim 'think globally, act locally', he suggests that in the money 
game it always pays to transform nature into commodities (or commodity outlets). In 
consequence, decisions made locally add up to a global ecological crisis since as he 
indicatively suggests, the scenario can be multiplied by 2 million to reflect the same 
type of decisions being made all around the globe. 
We add [money] value to land by logging and farming it, then by building houses, 
shopping centres, and factories, so that the land acquires the highest economic value 
when it is a biological desert. 
(Ellis 1995) 
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He concludes that 'The Money Game' is a recipe for ecological disaster. 
Ellis' argument is countered by Wandemberg (a Ph.D student of Environmental 
Economics and Monetary Policy at New Mexico State University), who asserts that 
money can and should be the only non-utopian means of avoiding "an ecological 
debacle". He considers the idea of "a rebirth of moral, ethical and spiritual values" 
(presumably from a currently degraded state) to be unrealistically Utopian. Field 
(1994) suggests that it is more the case that "environmental problems are too 
important to wait for a long process of moral rebuilding" - the cause of 
environmentally damaging activities is not a lack of morals so much as "the way we 
have arranged the economic system within which people go about the job of making 
their livings" (ibid.). 
As Wandemberg sees it, the core of every environmental problem is "an artificially 
low price of a natural capital stock", much in agreement with Weizsacker (1994), 
Hawken (1993) and others. This he suggests is mainly due to two key problems: 
firstly, powerful vested interests; secondly, an insignificant willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the protection of a given resource - the way forward in ecological protection is to 
work with the 'money game1. Calders' (1967) book The Environment Game' describes 
a world view in which everything is a game - sports, ritual, entertainment, knowledge, 
conservation, and environment games etc. For the environment to achieve an effective 
status the need is to exchange "money wealth and human power" for "non-monetary 
wealth and human knowledge". Thus the environment needs to achieve a higher 
money-value status which would effectively compete with other money sinks. 
Moyle (1995) counters Ellis' assertion that the laws of money and ecology are in 
conflict with each other - indeed he asserts that they have much in common: 
optimisation behaviour, equilibrium, and dis-equilibrium behaviour, hysteresis etc.. It 
is here that Ellis' argument is problematic. As mentioned earlier, at the sum world 
level (the macro level) of money or the national level, it may be the case that more is 
better. However at lower (or 'micro') levels, such as within budgetary constraints, 
more money in one sector might mean less in another - an un-balanced budget. So, as 
Moyle asserts, here money might have an optimal level (of sector allocation), just as 
in ecology excess or inadequacy of nutrients can mean toxicity or deficiency. 
Moyle does however agree that there is a fundamental divergence between ecology 
and the 'money system', (to be referred to as 'economics' from now on) in that in 
ecology values are objective, whereas in economics values are subjective. He also 
asserts the flawed notion that anticipatory behaviour (a characteristic of economic 
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players) is not observed in nature - a squirrel's winter store, and autumnal (fattening) 
feeding habits before hibernation (perhaps this is instinctive anticipation) of other 
creatures seem to defeat this notion. He also takes issue with Ellis' and Wandemberg's 
constructs of the economy, suggesting that: 
...subject to certain institutional requirements being met, economics neither 
guarantees an ecological crisis will occur nor guarantees its solution. 
This sort of premise - that certain institutional requirements must be met - is 
increasingly appreciated in both development and environmental protection circles -
until the human population achieves basic necessity satisfaction (and also has some 
disposable incomes/assets), environmental protection wil l come second to (perceived) 
chances of achieving these needs. 
Hawkins appreciates Ellis' labelling our (human) 'artificial' constructs, such as 
'economic activity', as 'games'. He takes issue with Ellis' suggestion that the East 
Texas community was "caught up in the global money game", asserting optimistically 
that although "it might be quite difficult for individuals to bring about changes in the 
[economic] superstructure", the money game is a human creation and so is more open 
to refashioning than the natural world. Goodman and Redclifts' (1991) book 
'Refashioning Nature' extensively discusses the link between people, work, food, 
agriculture, the environment, technology, trading systems, and genetic engineering. 
They address human efforts to 'direct' nature and 'second nature systems' (such as 
'ecosystem structures' and 'market demands' respectively). 
One of the questions to arise in the book is whether or not "when the North eats, does 
it eat the South?" This symbolically suggests that as far as many people are 
concerned, economic systems (superstructures) might as well be out-of-our-control 
natural processes in the same way as harsh weather conditions are, because many 
people have no chance whatsoever of altering them. Hawkins (1995)seems to have a 
rather Utopian outlook when he suggests that "we can show a little more self-
understanding and flexibility" than to allow our own creations (economic systems) to 
force us to destroy ecologically (and potentially and actually to us) valuable natural 
phenomena. Economic systems, now more than ever with the global economy and 
trading systems, are beyond the control of the majority. 
Nevertheless, observing 'the bigger picture' over time, changes can occur in the 
economic, social, creative and organisational systems of human agency. Hawkins 
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points out that we do not have to conceptually extract ourselves from the natural 
world to accept and work with the notion that we are: 
...the flexible products of evolution, having a much greater degree of appropriate 
control over certain kinds of things in our environment - our own conceptual 
creations [our econo-socio-ecological interfaces]. 
Before moving on to the next significant source of problems with environmental 
economics, a few key points wi l l be made regarding the market system and the 
environment. Firstly, some suggest that the environment exhibits 'market failure' and 
that this is a contributing factor to its degradation. It is more the case that it did not 
have a market in the first place. Use is 'primarily natural', the market is only 
'secondarily natural'. 
Secondly, in markets people generally make decisions without knowledge of other 
peoples' decisions or the effects of the aggregate of individual decisions. As 
mentioned elsewhere, inadequate information denies consumers the possibility of 
actually making the fu l l moral choices which they might, and indeed which they 
might prefer to make, given the option. 
Thirdly, economic 'resource optimality' is only one version of maximum societal 
benefit - its aim is to ensure that: 
...the marginal cost of the last 'bit' of environmental protection equals its marginal 
benefit, aggregated across all those participating in the market. 
(Jacobs 1994) 
But 'resource optimality' is just this: an aggregate instrumental reference with humans 
as the measure of value. It says nothing of the distribution of the benefits within 
existing and future generations; it ignores what might be described as 'indigenous 
rights' - especially since, for example, tribal peoples can hardly be expected to offer 
competitive bids in a market where they are competing with short-term return minded 
developers. The interests of other species and complete ecosystems are also 
disregarded. 
It is also worth considering another suggestion made by proponents of environmental 
economics: that it is as a commodity that people behave towards the environment. 
Jacobs (1994) details a number of objections to this assumption, some of which have 
already been mentioned: 
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• Many people refuse to participate in environmental pricing surveys - he suggests that in a 
number of surveys, up to 50% refused to participate since they thought it an inappropriate way 
to express their environmental values; 
• As mentioned above, WTP bids depend on the degree of informedness on issues, and biases 
and incredulity at being asked to value birds or long horned cattle protection are real; 
• Aggregation of survey results is problematic since it is likely to lead to sum offerings in 
excess of what people would actually be happy to pay if asked for one lump sum value; and 
• People value losses higher than apparently similar gains. 
Psychological 'play' is surely an important aspect in evaluation. I f asked to value a 
whale, people other than whalers might think it an absurd question, and might answer 
that they value it 'highly' or 'don't know'. I f a value was demanded of them, they 
might state a very high sum to avoid under-valuing it . So values here are an 
expression of strength of feeling. This is the crux of the problem with much of 
environmental economics. Jacobs (1994) asserts that: 
...it is not preferences which people have for the environment, but attitudes. The 
environment belongs in the sphere not of monetary, but of moral valuation. 
People may have preferences regarding the environment they experience, but in terms 
of the value they place on environmental components in general, they have a general 
attitude towards them. This brings us to the next question: of the legitimacy and the 
morality of pricing and commodifying the environment and its components. 
5.4 Ecological dependence, dislocation, and the morality of marketablisation 
To describe the environment and its components is (ideally) to try to objectively 
measure their perceived and physical characteristics. This approaches 'empirical' 
observation. Standard dimension units of lengths and weights and descriptive terms 
(colours, smells, shapes, textures, structures etc.) simply serve as communication 
tools between people. These are things which can be relatively objectively collated. 
Description elaborated with less objective, judgmental additions is a way of 
communicating impressions of the physical characteristics and processes affecting 
(and caused by) components of the environment. When the process is used with 
ulterior motives, it is the motives rather than the processes which are questionable. 
From observation and perception emerges "ecological knowledge" as distinct from 
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"fundamental knowledge" (Goldsmith 1992). Fundamental knowledge is inherited 
and instinctive/intuitive, whereas ecological knowledge is systems understanding 
afforded by organising knowledge in the mind (ibid.). 
The essential constructs of (neo-classical) environmental economics were outlined in 
5.3.1; social development and capitalist emergence was described in 3.1. The latter is 
particularly linked to the development of social arrangements and contracts between 
people and attempts at their application to non-human components of the Earth's 
ecology. Whether one adheres to Darwinian/Kropotkinian evolutionary theory or 
religious faith/revelation, we absolutely depend as a species on the earth. 
'Determination' to persist (through infinite chemical instability and energy 
differentials and flows) is what Seymour (1989) calls "Life Force". The collective 
components have a resilience that hugely exceeds the durability of individual species. 
Biological products (plants, animals and fungi) are vulnerable to breakdown - by 
physical, chemical and structural erosion. This is our physical nature. As Oelschlaeger 
(1991) observes: 
...humankind...can not live without even such elementary phenomena as sunlight and 
photosynthesis. In short, the human species is thermodynamically and biologically, 
and therefor inescapably, bound with natural processes. 
It may seem unnecessary (or even distasteful) to describe people in terms which point 
out the essential vulnerability of the human body. Without biological integrity, human 
life is less favourable (as we all know from when suffering sickness or physical 
bodily damage), and so it must be in our interest not to violate the essential ecological 
basis of our biological (and so psychological) well-being. In all these ways (aside 
from psychological well-being in the case of non-conscious organisms such as 
plants), organisms other than humans are equal to us. What is more, and as is 
suggested elsewhere in this paper, too many of us (especially in the West) are not 
aware of our considerable dependence on the integrity of our surroundings. As Noss 
& Murphy (1995) state of America, and again, the trend is echoed in other more 
industrialised areas: 
So alienated are the majority of Americans from the natural ecosystems around them 
that they rarely think about, much less understand, the importance of habitat to the 
survival of humans and non-human species alike. 
Differences between humans and other species such as the supposedly defining factor, 
the ability to reflect on reflection, are simply species characteristics. As considered in 
3.4, different species excel in varying ways. Yet the basic biological functions, 
requirements, and well-being interests remain equal. People and rats both have 
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interests which can be eroded and violated, and it is purely subjective to suggest that 
they are not intrinsically equal. 
The rest of this section 6.4 will be split into six parts: defining commoditisation and 
monetarisation; explaining the reasons for having moral concern and for expressing 
moral regard; why it is not always expressed; the implications of maketablising the 
previously un-marketed; discussing whether there is a breach of morality in this 
process, and how it affects people directly and indirectly. 
5.4.1 Commoditisation. 
Commoditisation is a change in the way in which a given subject is viewed such that 
it comes to be seen as a commodity that is fair game to be bought and sold by 
economic players. One scenario might be where a previously present object such as a 
rock is found to have some use, say as a source of a mineral for which there is an 
emerging demand. As it gains instrumental value it becomes a 'resource', and once 
ownership is claimed, it is a 'commodity'. Thus the rock is commoditised. 
The change in the status of an object requires no particular previous status: 
commoditisation was the change in the attitudes of Europeans as Africans were taken 
to be sold as slaves; commoditisation occurs is when fish ('resources') are caught and 
ownership of the fish is claimed (commodification) - the process is commoditisation. 
Commoditisation is attitudinal change which reduces an existing object/subject to an 
owned and tradable commodity. An object/subject might be a commodity to one and 
not to another. 
5.4.2 Monetarisation. 
Monetarisation is the process of giving an exchange value to an object/subject. Thus 
monetarisation is a part of the process of commoditisation. When a price is set for 
what an item will be available for purchase for, it is monetarised. 
Monetarisation does not require that the subject be an object of matter, it is simply the 
pricing of a phenomenon or an organism, or a change in the condition of a subject 
such as air quality, aesthetic qualities of a given area, or the instrumental value of a 
resource. 
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5.4.3 Moral concern. 
Moral concern affects the way in which we 'price', judge, and opine values - it 
manifests itself in our wilful interactions, or conscious non-interactions with our 
environment and its components. 
Moral concern can be either reasoned and/or instinctive, expressed or withheld. When 
reasoned it can be a product of objective and/or subjective observation/assessment 
and becomes a philosophy - philosophy can lead to the conceptualisation of an 
ideology or a faith which may or may not be adopted as a guide in actions. Instinctive 
morals are best illustrated in the example of 'instinctive moral revulsion' of an act 
such as brutal killing. They are feelings from deep within, possibly difficult to 
explain, yet distinct in the urgency with which they come to mind . Instinctive morals 
may work in conjunction with reasoned morals though they can operate in a split-
instant such as when someone grabs a child from the path of a vehicle. Instinctive 
morals may have an element of reason, since one may hypothesise how one would 
react in such a situation, so pre-determining to some extent the way in which one 
would react in a situation. 
A form of objective analysis leading to reasoned morals might be studies aiming to 
conclude whether or not, say, an animal suffers when placed in a confined 
environment, or analysis of whether the release of particular substances will affect 
organisms in a adverse or beneficial way. Thus if the conclusion is that the animal 
will suffer as a direct result of confinement, or that the release of a substance will 
adversely affect organisms in the receiving space, it might be concluded that it would 
be immoral to confine the animal or to release the substance. 
There is of course a fine line between objectivity and subjectivity (some would even 
suggest that there is no such thing as objectivity since all understanding filters 
through our perception faculties). For example, if the effect of nutrient release is that 
algae flourishes, this is good for the algae, but unfortunate for the vertebrates whose 
oxygen supply will be depleted by the decay of the bacteria that decompose dead 
algae. If, for example, a farmer reasons that the interests of the algae and the 
vertebrates are subordinate (or even non-existent) to his/her interests in crop 
production (which may require the application of agrochemicals), the farmer may 
apply the agrochemicals knowing they might cause the algal bloom in order to satisfy 
his/her interests. (Table 2.1 in chapter 2 considers in detail the consciousness of 
un/abusive behaviour towards non-human animals. It is often the case that individuals 
will try to back up apparently subjectively-reasoned moral choices with apparently 
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objective evidence to support their decision. If originally objectively reasoned moral 
tendency becomes internalised, it might become instinctive moral tendency (the 
instinctualisation of belief)-
In considering the nature of moral concern, it will be useful to remind ourselves of the 
'moral subject' debate. The question of 'who/what is a moral subject?' is too big for 
this paper, but the often asserted positions will be briefly described. 
It is argued that in order to be a part of the moral sphere, a subject needs to be able to 
engage in moral contracts. Humans are normally granted this status as a birth right (or 
more precisely, as a right from conception or a decided stage after conception). Even 
those who are very young, old and experiencing faculty decline, or the mentally 
handicapped receive rights by proxy. Historically there have been advocates for 
granting (or rather recognising) 'moral subject' status in non-human animals. 
Since the early 1970's there has been an acceleration of interest in the notion of 
'animal rights' - 'rights' that ought to be offered to them as moral subjects without 
requiring them to be moral agents. This is generally thought to have taken off after 
the publication of P. Singers' (1975) book 'Animal Liberation', which argues for a 
serious change in the way human society uses non-human animals for food, labour, 
research and entertainment purposes. He reasons that they have interests, just as we 
do, that ought to be respected. Others disagree about whether or not 'rights' can be 
held by animals unable to enter contracts, who though they agree with the conclusion: 
a need for interest recognition. For example R. Ryder asserts that animals don't have 
rights, but that they have interests and can suffer means they are due moral regard. 
More recently, Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri have instigated something of a 
strategic movement to raise specifically the status of the Tiigher' (non-human) apes to 
equal status with people, The Great Ape Project' (Singer & Cavalieri 1993), in order 
to gradually break down discrimination towards other animal species. It is 
acknowledged that it is a compromising proposal, but i f successful it could set a 
morally favourable precedent. 
Insincere expressions of moral concern may be sarcastic or strategic - the latter might 
be, for example, to enhance credibility in the eyes of a morally interested public, or to 
comply with job requirements that favour expressing feeling for what company policy 
or government law advocates or demands. Thus moral concern might be expressed 
through 'heart-felt' feeling, considered opinion, expressed opinion, or inter-personal 
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deception. When it comes to human decision-making, the vast majority of choices 
involve balancing one set of positives and negatives against another. 
In environmental economics, moral concern is presumably a driving forces in an 
attempt to effectively include non-financial factors in the decision and development 
process; a reason to invest time, effort and resources into the development of effective 
and appropriate methodologies. 
5.4.4 Why express moral concern? 
Expression of moral concern has the aim of asserting greater degrees of Ahimsa 
(peacefulness) between subjects, reducing to a minimum the unnecessary violation of 
interests and integrities. We express moral regard on the basis of what 
significance/importance we recognise in things other than ourselves (7.5 considers the 
expansion of 'self), and this manifests itself in a hierarchy - the further down the 
hierarchy another subject is, the more willing we are to discriminate against it. 
Expression of moral regard is widely seen as favourable in order to avoid disharmony 
and conflict. Where moral concern is not expressed, the lowest denomination of 
character often emerges. With the potency of technology available, even a minority of 
immoral individuals can be very disruptive. There is therefore an instrumental basis 
for expressing moral regard - unless we seek to maintain high standards of moral 
expression, the collective moral receipt will decline. 
But how does this relate to an apparently passive nature (in terms of retaliating 
quickly against negative treatment) or to other animals which can not match the 
violent force human disregard? When people act unnecessarily violently in one type 
of situation, they are unlikely to chameleonically alter their character in others - so if 
we are violent towards other creatures, that same disregard will spill over to people as 
well, a scenario most people don't favour. As Seymour (1989) states: 
Man's cruelty to his fellows always seems to go hand in hand with his cruelty to the 
rest of nature. 
It is ironic then that we still perpetuate meat industries (see 2.4) which 'normalise' 
bloodshed, incarceration and deprivation. 
Non-animal interest groups/phenomena are the basis of existence: if we abuse them, 
we debase ourselves morally, and in the longer term, the 'services' afforded us by 
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them may decline - life quality can decline through abuse of the non-sentient. This is 
against the will of homocentrism (as well as other more holistic outlooks). Thus it is 
immoral both with the interests of people and the interests of other components of 
Earth systems in mind, to disregard and abuse any component of the web of the 
'Gaian whole' of primary nature. 
The fabric of human culture can not readily absorb violent moral anarchy - though 
natural systems are thought to function in a sort of 'ordered chaos' (a 'directional 
anarchy'), great and very hard to resolve social dis-harmony which may carry on 
inter-generationally is the normal outcome of moral disregard. History shows this 
abundantly. 
In environmental economics, since moral concern (as well as resource utility 
maximisation) is the driving force behind its development, its expression must be 
welcomed - it seeks to incorporate some weight of argument attributed to intangible 
concepts such as 'intrinsic value', 'bequest value', and it seeks to effectively include 
public participation in the valuation process. 
5.4.5 Why is moral concern not always expressed? 
This has been explained to some extent in other sections, particularly in chapter 3 
where certain attitudinal and outlook traits were discussed. But a key explanation is 
that real financial pressures often do not offer space for moral consideration -
conventional economic systems are not even designed to be equitable amongst 
people, let alone other organisms. As described in 5.3.2.2, there is a strong argument 
that economics simply seeks to maximise (profits). Pressures to satisfy share-holder 
expectations and to attract investment and business by being a profitable organisation 
are very real. Investment made now (for example in conventional banking 
institutions, the conventional stock market, and government stock) is simply with the 
goal of high interest earnings. Little or no regard is paid to the types of operations 
being invested in or their morality. Why? Because of information deficits about the 
investments, a failure to appreciate the implications of some investments, and because 
investors are often either disinterested when aware, or trust the moral integrity of 
financial mediators. 
But there is a growing movement against this kind of transaction - blind enough to 
welcome investment in the arms industry, exploitative and ecologically damaging 
industries, morally questioned 'medical research' etc.. 'Ethical investment' is now a 
catch-phrase for some financial institutions such as the Co-operative Bank, Mercury 
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Provident, and the Ethical Investment Agency in Britain. There are also strong 
movements to establish further Shariah based banking and stock investment systems 
(pers. com. Dr Sheikh G.S. Abod), which have the goal of distributing more equitably 
the costs and benefits of investment between the investor and company concern (for 
example through the termination of 'interest-based investment returnsand loan costs). 
There are a number of other explanations for moral regard not being expressed as 
detailed in Table 3.1 in relation to animal abuse, but which are equally applicable in 
other activities - conscious abusiveness, naive abusiveness, regretful abusiveness, 
optional abusiveness. In the wider context of environmental management, the 
following are examples of how these four abuse conciousnesses might manifest 
themselves: 
1) Conscious abuse might take the form of illegal and indiscriminate arson of forest areas, or 
release/application of dangerous substances into the biosphere. 
2) Naive abuse might result from unquestioning participation in a culture that is wasteful of 
resources and unconcerned about waste disposal methods and quantities - this is one of the 
most prevalent forms of participation in morally-questionable systems, since institutionalised 
and 'normal' processes, such as the decades of unprotected landfill and sea dumping of waste, 
can not wholly be blamed on citizens participating in a status quo. 
3) Regretful morally-questionable behaviours again might come about through the normalised 
nature of so many actions, such that working to get a prestigious car (such as an ORV for 
urban living), an over-sized house and to go on distant holidays are symbols of 
unquestionable success. 
4) Optional action immorality is the function of much big business - for example forest 
clearance for board feet of timber, and huge expenditures and immorality tolerance levels in 
order to profit from the sale of arms to known violators of human rights. 
5.4.6 Marketablisation : implications, a breach of morality? 
This issue is at the core of the question of environmental economics: what is the 
effect of attempting to assign or create values for the previously un-marketed, how 
meaningful are the values achieved and how useful are they in attempting to widen 
the comprehensiveness of consideration in environmental management? 
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When money values are assigned to products, the price is comprised of the costs of 
raw materials, manufacturing/processing costs (overheads, energy and labour costs), 
transport costs of inputs and the product itself etc.. Therefore, when a price is set for a 
level of air quality, or if we attach a money value to a forest or landscape, we are 
applying a descriptive market exchange tool to a non-market phenomenon. Jacobs 
(1994) believes that this: 
...devalues the cultural and the spiritual meaning which the environment has for 
human society and ignores altogether the rights [read 'interests'] of other species. 
What is even more disturbing is when committed environmentalists struggle to find 
'new' uses and values for environmental phenomena in order to protect components or 
sections of our surrounds. A typical scenario is an endangered species. The arrogance 
of homocentrism often dictates that a last and disrespectful resort for the preservation 
of a species might be to make it pay - turn it into a tourist attraction, build lodges, 
develop road and other infrastructural supports for allowing paying viewers to look 
for or at that species and its home, or worse still, to incarcerate it in a zoo. We can 
only speculate over what a beast might favour if choosing between cramped 
incarceration and deprivation of the means to pursue instinctive desires to roam, 
climb or fly - or to perish as a species. Yet this is the proxy situation we so often offer 
to other species, especially the more complex species. These sorts of notions lead us 
to consider that perhaps a moral growth process is in order. 
It is not to romanticise to suggest that many non-western societies live with a more 
ecological outlook. But some clearly are attached to a life style which accommodates 
and indeed consciously respects the environment. This is further considered in 73. To 
haphazardly or decisively dislocate ourselves from the organisms we live alongside, 
on and because of, must be a mistake. However far we are from the sites of damage 
we cause, our mental capacity will carry the baggage of our past. Surely there are 
ethical problems with despoiling natural quality simply because we can make a profit 
from it, might be able to replant and pretend it never happened - leaving a problem for 
others now living, and for future generations? 
Although environmental economics is for now seen as a tool to legitimise improved 
protection of primary nature and might strengthen arguments for the ethicalisation of 
lifestyle, this can change in the future. If financial cases for preservation or protection 
are the basis for defence of environmental integrity, development interests need only 
make their operations more profitable to show that the benefits are worth the costs. It 
is much easier to create a financially profitable business operation than to seek to find 
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more values for environmental phenomena and complexes. If a road is the subject, its 
value can be boosted by attaching an industrial estate development or some other 
money-based perk ('mitigation'). Ecological components do not require financial 
activity to maintain their integrity - indeed financial activity is more likely to threaten 
them. 
Environmental indices, as proposed in environmental economics, attempt to describe 
rather than evaluate, to study human preferences rather than to get people to put 
prices on things. Thus they are less likely to be morally contentious per se. 
The issue is further complicated since study methods and abilities change, so 
rendering old estimations of environmental quality incompatible, i f not obsolete. 
There is considerable debate about the quality of environmental statistics thought to 
describe changes in environmental characteristics, such as those pertaining to 
enhanced climate change. There is strong doubt as to whether the figures presented in 
association with 'global warming' are credible, or rather, whether they mean much at 
all, estimates vary so widely. 
In conclusion, the sentiments that propone environmental economics are to be 
welcomed, as is the enhanced social and environmental consideration which might be 
afforded by the results. But in the longer term, more concrete and unimpeachable 
ethical standards might be favourable - because they recognise the priceless value of 
ecological phenomena and, in the longer term, financially-based environmental 
defence cases are surmountable by development interests, which can relatively easily 
ratchet up the 'benefits' of a cost/benefit analysis. Environmental economics is a 
reformist approach - it seeks to work with the current system of reason, rather than to 
question the wider basis of philosophical, ethical, and life-outlook approaches. 
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CHAPTER 6 
APPROACHES TO THE FUTURE : 
ENVIRONMENTALISM / SHALLOW ECOLOGY 
There are two broad approaches to resolving the socio-ecological damage of the 
culture and commerce that has accompanied the industrialisation of societies. Firstly, 
reformist and secondly a more serious ecologisation. The first seek to work with 
current systems and orders, so as to move towards 'sustainability'. The second 
considers the current systems to be essentially flawed. A more radical and serious 
ecologisation is called for - merely adjusting components of the status quo is 
inadequate and a futile attempt to arrest the degradation process. 
Other approaches to the future including 'business as usual' and further dislocation 
and attitudinal detachment from primary nature and its systems are not viable options 
for the future. Most governments now offer environmental platforms geared towards 
vote-catching, the resolution of acknowledged problems, or a serious reconsideration 
of strategic systems of culture and development. 
This chapter's discussion of reformist approaches is split into three parts: development 
and strategic reform; corporate and business reform; and popular reform (reform 
trends by the public). 
Reformist approaches can be described as 'shallow environmentalism' (Sylvan & 
Bennet 1994). One of the cornerstones of the reformist approach to resolving 
contemporary socio-ecological problems is the 'sustainability' movement. A second is 
the greening of business. In 5.2.2.2 it was noted that some see big business as the only 
'institution' powerful enough to engineer the changes required to arrest the processes 
of socio-ecological degradation. 'Green business' is a part of the sustainable future 
looked forward to by proponents of the movement and, as mentioned elsewhere, 
might be termed a 'growth industry'. 
6.1 Development and Strategic Reform 
The 1991 'Caring for the Earth: a strategy for sustainable living' (CftE) report 
produced by the IUCN, UNEP, and WWF is an impressive manifesto and prescriptive 
guide designed to act as goals in reform and development. It lists and then explains in 
detail nine basic principles for a sustainable society: 
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1- Respect and care for the community of life 
2- Improve the quality of human life 
3- Conserve the earth's vitality and diversity 
4- Minimise the depletion of non-renewable resources 
5- Keep within the earth's carrying capacity 
6- Change personal attitudes and practices from the present 
7- Enable communities to care for their own environments 
8- Provide a national framework for integrating development and 
conservation 
9- Create a global alliance 
Thse are commendable goals to strive towards. They would bring about considerable 
'Earth liberation' if they were to be effected. But as was considered in chapters 3 and 
4, there are some profound barriers to this process. Industrial society, as it has 
developed in what the above report describes as 'high income countries' hardly 
adheres to many of these principles. In fact it goes directly against the grain of 
principles 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9. Much potential for improvement is hampered by the 
competetive and ruthless search for profit, a societal outlook clouded with objects, 
property, disparity, security measures, crime and ecological disruption. There are real 
pressures to participate in these systems and organisational frameworks to survive in 
commercial and private life. 'Green technologies' are blocked by a focus on the 
residual potential for profit from 'dirty' technologies; and when rich countries move 
on to cleaner processes, the older dirty ones are sometimes 'dumped' on overseas 
markets - weapons and agrochemicals are two common examples. 
The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was a 
watershed of sorts. Exhaustively discussed and acclaimed, this gathering of over 170 
world leaders to focus on the state of and trends in environmental conditions was 
significant. The product, 'Agenda 21' (A21), which "envisions a future that will be 
prosperous, equitable, and sustainable" (Brown (UNEP director) 1994) is thought to 
carry weight in scientific, political, economic, social, and ethical debate. The 1972 
Stockholm Conference "...placed environmental problems on the global agenda" 
(Conca 1995), and the UNCED gathering was a 20 year anniversary of this event. It is 
stated that: 
Agenda 21 stands as a comprehensive blueprint for action to be taken globally from 
now into the Twenty-first Century - by governments. United Nations Organisations, 
development agencies, non-governmental organisations and independent-sector 
groups, in every area in which human activity impacts on the environment. 
(Brown & Quiblier 1994) 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully describe and analyse the meeting, the 
implications of A21, and the local level response to the directional prescriptions that 
came from it. However, some ethical implications can be mentioned here. Henderson 
(1994) tells us that the commitments signed by the nation heads at the conference 
were a fair and realistic bare minimum, as development directions move towards 
'sustainability'. She reminds us of the "co-operative agenda for accelerating 
sustainable development" as is presented in the A21 document, and of the two key 
agreements: 
1) to overhaul economic indicators and systems of national accounts to more 
accurately value environmental change and costs as well as resources. 
and 
2) to institute user fees and other forms of 'green' taxes on pollution, resource 
depletion, and waste. This overhauling of economic theories, macro-economic 
management indicators of 'economic growth', as well as general wealth and 
progress, is vital. 
(Henderson 1994) 
So environmental economics is to be the focus of fine tuning and development. The 
rise of environmental economic investigation and research, not to mention attempts at 
inclusion into organisational and development procedures, is a welcome answer to the 
A21 proposals. Henderson (1994) suggests six other implications and observations in 
relation to A21: 
1) Though A21 calls for more international trade, it would further enhance 
current "social exploitation and environmental destruction" if this was to occur 
before a reformed system of national accounts, economic and social indicators 
become accepted as a standard for all trade negotiations. 
2) The debt crises, the non-utility effects of GDP as a measure of progress and 
the emphasis on material growth similar to the "credit-fuelled material 
consumption" which underpins 65% of the GDP in the US are in serious need 
of re-assessment. 'Indigenous' measures of status, where the highest regard 
goes to minimal consumption are models we would do well to re-incorporate. 
(See chapter 7 for 'Indigenous professorialship' 
3) Currently, the 'trickle down' models of centralised economic growth are 
losing popularity to "local, people centred, 'trickle-up'" development models -
leaning towards more equitable and ethical developments. Henderson 
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describes how Euro-American traditional economists and the politicians they 
advise have in the past quibbled about such ideas, leading to a state where: 
...economics [was] hyped with debt and deregulated, while warfare, 'workfare', and 
welfare took up the slack. 
(Henderson 1994) 
4) There is a need for co-operation with the mass media if over-consumption 
by Euro-Americans and others elsewhere and material values/life-styles are to 
change. 
5) She states, drawing from Chapter 33 of the A21 document that: 
...the existing economic system is the core problem in perpetuating old models of 
economic growth and their externalities: widespread gaps between rich and poor 
and increasing environmental damage. 
(Henderson 1994) 
6) She notes the change in the role of money, as information and money have 
come to be one and the same thing to a certain extent (information = money = 
power). 
Whereas money was originally "...to track, score, and facilitate the application and 
exchange of human resourcefulness" (Henderson 1994), now vague morality 
surrounds commodity and futures exchanges, and obscure investment in indexes of 
electronic money. 'Conventional' (Western) economic systems are increasingly 
questioned and rejected in favour of 'local exchange and trading schemes' (LETS 
schemes - discussed further in 7.4); widespread rejection by Muslims of unethical 
dominant systems of capital investment are revitalising drives to establish more 
equitable Islamic financial trading and banking systems (pers. com., Dr. Sheikh G.S. 
Abod). 
As mentioned earlier in the context of environmental economics, there are calls for 
pricing with ecological costs incorporated. Ecological taxes are important economic 
tools which carry growing popularity; inevitably there is huge opposition, for 
example from automobile interest groups. The suggestion of fuel price rises through 
increased duty (analogous to carbon taxes) and sustained increases in prices stirred 
considerable passion (amongst those with vested interests in fuel and combustion 
engine use) in Britain when a Royal Commission (on Environmental Pollution -
RCEP) considering transport proposed such changes. 
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Recommendation 28: 
We recommend that fuel duty be increased year by year so as to double the price of 
fuel, relative to the price of other goods, by 2005. 
Recommendation 29: 
We recommend that the government press for revision of the EC Directive on fuel 
prices so as to ensure a sustained year-by-year increase in fuel prices across the 
Community. 
(RCEP 1994) 
Weizsacker & Jessinghaus (1992) discuss the demand for 'ecological tax reform'. 
Weizsacker (1994) further analyses the framework for ethical and ecological 
consideration-enhancement in the light of massive social, political and ecological 
disruption and destruction. The economic instrument possibilities include: tradable 
pollution permits; special charges (such as waste collection charges); ecological tax 
reform (shifting emphasis to taxing consumption rather than income); and the cutting 
of subsidies which: 
...may have given some momentary relief to social problems but...have failed to 
attain their long range socio-economic goals. 
(Weizsacker & Jesinghaus 1992) 
The 'polluter pays principle' has already become enshrined in law to a considerable 
extent in Europe, with for example the National Rivers Authority (NRA) and HM 
Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) monitoring and prosecuting for breaches of 
standards in Britain. However, it is only to prescribed standards that polluters must 
adhere, and these have been criticised as being inadequate. 
Also examined is the importance of price elasticity for pollution abatement charges -
thought to be of great importance in determining the likely effectiveness of economic 
pressures/incentives in reducing pollution. Weizsacker & Jessinghaus (1992) surmise 
that: 
In reality, static or immediate elasticity is systematically much lower than dynamic, 
long-term elasticity. And the elasticity in response to a short-term change is 
systematically lower than with a sustained, calculable price increase over a longer 
period. 
Hard hitting sanctions against pollution will not readily lead to the internalisation of 
cleaner practices. However, if a business can predict that the cost of pollution will 
rise, it is more likely to plan to strategically reduce its impact - a more congenial 
approach, since working together might bring better results than 'confrontational' 
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policy approaches. This is thought to be the trend in environmental interest 
group/business relations (Weiszacker 1994). 
Weizsacker and Jesinghaus (1992) consider the objections and obstacles to ecological 
tax reform including: 
1) fiscal policy objections - they would either destroy the economic activity 
which drives the economy and so would be unacceptable to finance ministers, 
or they would be unacceptably weak in the eyes of an environment minister. 
2) social policy objections - green taxes would be unfair - they would hit the 
poor and the small business most heavily. 
3) environmental policy objections - revenues should have purpose, not be 
punitive. 
4) economic objections - ecological taxes would be a burden on the economy. 
5) voter objections - ecological taxes would be unpopular with many. 
6) efficiency objections - other instruments might work quicker and with 
greater precision than ecological taxes. 
7) "inertia objections" - financial and tax disorder would ensue i f ecological 
taxes were implemented. 
8) "harmonisation objections" - it would be hard to implement them in blocks 
of countries such as the EEC. 
9) those directly targeted by the taxes would offer outright resistance. 
Weizsacker (1994) considers the likely net effect of ecological tax reform to be an 
economic gain, the core reason being that: 
..on a world scale new increases in labour productivity bring fewer economic 
benefits than increases in resource productivity... 
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If this is the case then increases in the costs of resources (through resource taxes 
linked to their use) ought to bring economic benefits as well as ecological benefits -
and social benefits ought to accrue from the combination. 
Weizsacker (1994) confirms the reformist nature of his approach by questioning 
whether bureaucrats can be trusted to chose an optimum path to technology 
substitution ('green' technologies replacing current ones) and arguing that market 
forces would be better at finding an optimum path. This can be seen as faith in a 
(market) system which is questioned for its tendency to focus on profit, but with 
ecological tax reforms the most profitable actions should be those which are least 
ecologically disruptive (with the premise that the trade/production should/needs to 
continue). 
It is interesting and relevant to consider the role of the UN in conjunction with NGOs 
generally in environmental matters. When looking at the roles of different UN 
affiliates and 'projects', as was suggested in the context of environmental racism, it is 
difficult to construct dividing lines between environmental and other projects: 
...it is often impossible to say where an environmental organisation [in the UN} ends 
and one dealing with a host of other issues - human rights, grassroots development, 
public health, the concerns of indigenous people, women in development - begins. 
(Conca 1995) 
Conca (1995) suggests that: 
These blurry boundaries and the alliances they make possible can be a source of 
great strength for environmental organisations and coalitions. 
There are a large number of NGOs which work with varying degrees of affiliation to 
the UN and many more which work at a local/grass-roots level. Conca mentions the 
larger UN affiliated bodies whose agendas overlap heavily with environmental 
concerns - the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and the World Bank. These are singled out for particular 
consideration since they control massive budgets. The World Bank lends something 
of the order of US$20 billion per year and the IMF, its sister organisation which 
focuses on shorter-term loans, lends a similar amount. They are at the environment-
development interfaces. It is unfortunate then that such organisations: 
...have standard operating procedures that were formed, and deeply institutionalised, 
with little attention to environmental considerations. They are also classically 
bureaucratic entities that exhibit the full range of turf-grabbing, mission-defending 
and budget-enhancing behaviour common to large buroeaucratic organisations...The 
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environment has been a powerful argument for programme expansion, but also a 
threat to traditional operating procedures. 
(Conca 1995) 
It is not surprising a much enhanced status (at least in terms of word and apparent 
intent) has recently been attributed to environmental and ethical consideration since 
these credentials are demanded by an increasingly interested public, and because 
environmental flags are 'good for business' and public relations. 
There are strong links between the environment and development, and since it is such 
a prominent and great-development-impact organisation, the World Bank (WB) will 
be considered in greater detail. 
In the WB: 
Internal reorganisation has boosted staffing in environmental positions, and created 
a somewhat greater incorporation of environmental considerations into project 
evaluation. 
(Conca 1995)) 
The WB created an inspection panel for public accountability in 1994 and has begun 
to operate projects with specific environmental goals. A 1991 WB Environmental 
Status Report for Sub-Saharan Africa (ESRSSA)(World Bank 1991a) states that 
environmental work is increasing rapidly, with more than half of the approved 
projects in the area being environmentally focused or 'containing environmental 
issues'. In the report, Christoffersen states that: 
There have been concentrated efforts to help integrate environmental analysis into 
preparation of I World J Bank/ID AI International Development Association] projects. 
(Christoffersen 1991) 
Christoffersen tells us that at the time of writing (1991), twenty African countries 
were involved in National Environmental Action Plans associated with Bank projects 
and that these processes have become linked to the UNDP's Long Term Perspective 
Studies. There is also a new 'tri-partite' arrangement (the Global Environment Facility 
- GEF) between the UNDP, the UNEP, and the World Bank aimed at funding 
environmental activities of high international priority. He states that these 
'endeavours' are linked by local participation, but that in order to properly implement 
environmental action plans, effective Environmental Assessment needs to take place. 
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Also in 1991 the WB produced a three volume 'Environmental Source Book' (World 
Bank 1991b) detailing World Bank policies, procedures, sectoral and cross-sectoral 
guidelines, and guidelines for environmental assessments of energy and industry 
projects. This comprehensive document was preceded in 1990 by one entitled 'Living 
with Wildlife' (ed. Agnes Kiss), a guide for WB projects aimed at 'wildlife resource 
management with local participation in Africa', complemented in 1992 by a guide 
intended for linking protected area management with local communities entitled 
'People and Parks' (Wells & Brandon). 
Clearly the big development agencies such as the WB have taken on board 
requirements for environmental consideration and in doing so move towards greater 
ethical consideration (recognising the importance of avoiding encroachment on 
environmental integrity if human interests are to be protected and enhanced). 
Although the above documents and others, such as the 1989 'Sub-Saharan Africa: 
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth', (World Bank 1989) indicate serious 
environmental agendas in the operations of development projects, there is still 
scepticism about the degree of reform achieved and the potential for reforming 
development bodies such as the WB. Rich (who worked in the Environmental 
Defence Fund) offers a striking picture of why there is doubt: 
Environmentalists were guardedly optimistic about Conable's [the then WB 
President] new-found commitment to reform...Now [1990], three years later, it is 
apparent that the emperor's new clothes bear only faint traces of green. Instead of 
becoming an environmental leader, the Bank has become an arena where the 
political, practical and theoretical difficulties of reconciling economic development 
with ecological sustainability are most glaring. The Bank continues to stress it's 
commitment to the environment, but deep institutional and political contradictions 
prevent it from implementing reform in any meaningful way... 
(Rich 1990) 
Mikesell (1993) strongly encourages caution in observing the effectiveness of these 
changes in procedure as well, since: 
Frequently...the EIA [environmental impact assessment] is conducted after the 
project design is completed, and the environmental team is under pressure to avoid 
recommending major changes in the basic plan. 
He suggests that this means the EIA becomes more of an environmental impact 
statement which presents a 'rosy' light on the impacts of projects. 
Moreover, the WB is considered by many to be a big cog in the engine of 'under' and 
'mal'-developments - in terms of the development of debt crises, support for 
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controversial 'development' methods based on export earnings, their participation in 
questionable dam projects and the implications of a 'utilitarian' submission to expect 
'sacrifice' for a net 'gain'. 
The debt crisis and the nature of export based routes to economic development were 
explained earlier (see 2.1). More can be said of the effects of cash-crop export 
development drawing on Sutton (1994). She observes a frightening dynamic at work 
in conjunction with changes towards large agricultural holdings aimed at mass 
production for export. Her work is based on Brazil where: 
Of particular concern to many is the position of landless peasants driven into a 
never-ending downward cycle of deprivation and poverty in a country rich in land 
and natural resources. In their desperate search for an income to support themselves 
and their families, they put up with gross exploitation; when this takes the form of 
forced labour, of immobilisation through debts imposed on the workers, of trafficking 
of women and children, it is no longer exploitation, it is slavery....many [of the 
landless poor] are exploited as slave labour. 
(Sutton 1994) 
Mass cash-crop agricultural production developments have been one of the 
cornerstones of World Bank-supported development paradigms in countries 
dominated by primary product production. Sutton asserts that slavery is a link in the 
chain of modernisation - disparities of wealth in the most financially inequitable 
nations such as Brazil portray a serious failure in development utility - here, the 
richest 10% own over 48% of the countries revenue, whilst the poorest 10% own less 
than 1% (ibid., figures from a 1992 census). The 'slavery' Sutton observes occurs by 
virtue of poverty rather than colour, a condition development strategies to date have 
failed to eradicate and have, arguably aggravated in some instances. 
Sutton observes that some of the most violent suppression and abuses of people in 
Brazil have come about as land speculators and 'land reform' by large land-holders 
have boosted land prices. Between 1980 and 1990 the rural population in Brazil 
declined by 23 million due to the impasse of land reform and also to this violent 
occupation by land speculators. She notes how: 
When examining this violence one can detect that it is exactly in the areas of large 
scale 'modernising' developments, such as the World Bank and EC-funded Carajas 
programme [*] that the incidence of violence has been greatest..The speed of 
expansion of the agricultural and industrial frontiers, and of the introduction of 
large scale capital enterprises [such as World Bank funded roads to the interiors] 
and capital, was not matched by the development of mechanisms within civil society 
robust enough to defend the interests and rights of the local population. 
(Sutton 1994) 
[* - This was part of a huge ore extraction/processing program covering 900,000 square miles 
of eastern Amazonia. World Bank participation began in 1982 with a $304 million loan.] 
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There has been considerable popular resentment of World Bank supported 'Structural 
Adjustment Programmes' aimed at boosting exports and controlling dependence on 
imports. The devaluation of currency overnight (for example in Nigeria, the 
devaluation of the Naira to one twentieth of its previous value) hits the poor most 
drastically. Though some suggest that the poor with a plot of land are hit less due to 
their self-sufficiency, the accompanying pressures of land aggregation can soon 
destabilise them. These land access changes lead to considerable socio-ecological 
damage (see 2.1). A part of the justification for such economic policies has been that 
short-term struggle is necessary for long-term health of the economy, which ought to 
benefit the population: the sacrifice of comfort now will be rewarded in the future. 
Population displacement is a particularly problematic effect of many WB-supported 
development projects. Wilks & Hildyard (1994) state that millions of people in less 
industrialised countries are forcibly displaced each year. This results from a number 
of developments including the building of dams (which account for 63% of World 
Bank-funded displacement): the construction of roads; urban redevelopment; other 
infrastructure developments; and wildlife parks and land use/ organisation changes 
towards cash-crop/livestock production on previously agricultural land and also forest 
lands cleared for the purpose (ibid.). 
In 1980, the WB developed a policy for dealing with 'involuntary displacement' - the 
first major development group to do so. However, as Wilks & Hildyard (1994) report, 
a 1994 internal review (Resettlement and Development: The Bank-wide review of 
Projects involving Involuntary Resettlement (1986-1993)(World Bank 1994): 
...makes clear that the policy is being systematically flouted by bank staff. 
(Wilks & Hildyard 1994) 
Wilks and Hildyard list the four basic requirements that should have guided WB 
projects from 1980: 
1) baseline surveys of affected people should be conducted; 
2) a resettlement plan aiming to restore incomes should be in place; 
3) timetables for resettlement should be co-ordinated with civil works 
construction; and 
4) a budget for resettlement should be included in all projects causing this. 
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Wilks & Hildyard (1994) assess the 'the displacement problem' in projects the WB 
supports, under a number of headings. Their observations reveal a lack of 
consideration or concern which at times is extreme and ethically indefensible. The 
failures they found in World Bank supported projects included these: 
s societies torn apart 
• chronic miscalculation 
• lack of appraisal 
9 affected peoples last to know of projects 
• dismissing local knowledge 
• lack of compensation 
• obnoxious belief in 'the flexible migrant' 
Societies torn apart: displacement results in severe social upheavals and 
disorganisation, community trading and farming systems are broken up, it causes 
cultural disruption and even dissolution, and women are disproportionately affected. 
Chronic miscalculation: the WB has 
...consistently overlooked, downplayed or underestimated the number of people 
displaced by projects it funded. 
(Wilks & Hildyard 1994) 
The 1994 revue states that between 1986 and 1993, miscalculations ran at 47% 
(625,000 people), and that there were at the time of writing roughly 2 million people 
threatened by projects. These figures might be seen as unreliable, since the revue 
suggests that: 
Given the inadequacy of the baseline data, and the uncertainty of the numbers, it 
would be meaningless to speculate as to the number of resettled people. 
(World Bank 1994) 
Lack of appraisal: the 1994 revue states that: 
...an average of about 55% of Bank assisted projects could claim to have appraised 
full resettlement plans. 
(ibid.) 
Last to know, affected peoples often first learn of projects when surveyors arrive and 
a weeks notice to move is not abnormal - for example, Wilks and Hildyard (1994) 
note this to have been the case with a $363 million Angot Water Supply project in the 
Philippines. 
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Dismissing local knowledge: Wilks & Hildyard state that: 
When local participation is invited, it is primarily with a view to making the eviction 
process easier [,] 
and that appraisal is generally done by WB staff experts, whose prime focus is: 
...the projects potential economic and technical performance, rather than its social 
and environmental impact. 
The 1994 revue by the WB acknowledges deficiencies in the systems at work, and the 
failure to adhere even to the standards of conduct which were the 'improved' goals 
following the 1980 statement of intent: 
Many engineering consulting firms, responsible for the technical design of major 
infrastructure projects world-wide, routinely display obliviousness to the adverse 
social implications of the designs they propose. 
...most relocation timetables were driven by construction timetables...rather than 
resettlement needs. 
These can lead to inappropriate resettlement provision. Wilks & Hildyard give an 
example from the Chinese Daguangba Multipurpose project, where there was nearly 
universal rejection of contractor-built housing that was supposed to accommodate the 
displaced. 
Lack of compensation: the Resettlement and Development review (World Bank 1994) 
concedes that long delays in compensation payment are common and sometimes no 
payment is made. 
Downgrading of living standards: Wilks & Hildyard state that: 
The World bank lowers rather that improves the living standards of those it evicts 
who tend to be the poorest sections of society - landless labourers, urban squatters, 
cultivators with customary rather than legal tenure, indigenous peoples, ethnic 
minorities and pastoral groups. 
The flexible migrant and the pressure to lend: Wilks & Hildyard state that there had 
been two previous reviews (in 1983 and 1986) which revealed similar shortcomings 
to those revealed in 1994. Despite the 'words of concern' in all three: 
...many [WorldJBank employees consider the disruption caused by forced 
resettlement as a minor inconvenience. 
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They suggest that outlooks such as one they quote from a June 1993 report, from a 
working group considering involuntary resettlement in China, might explain the 
disregard shown by the WB to those displaced by its projects. 
The growth of the economy has been aided by the development of a relatively mobile, 
low cost source of labour - the so-called floating population1...[which] is the 
vanguard of labour market reform. Those individuals must find their own jobs and 
have no tenure beyond their contract period. All of China is moving toward this 
model to allow flexibility and incentives needed to enhance labour's contribution to 
continued development. 
They note that the continuous systematic abuse of evictees suggests deep-seated 
structural faults within the WB as an institution. 
Rich (1994) tells us that from its inception in 1944 at Bretton Woods, the WB 
suffered from a lack of demand for its services. It had hoped to get involved with the 
reconstruction of war-torn Europe, but when only four countries took loans they 
looked to emphasise the development side of their full title (The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development) in the future. This was strategically tackled so 
as to establish 'nest eggs' as rapidly as possible, by encouraging the formation of 
semi-autonomous governmental agencies in the member countries (there were 176 by 
1993) who would have little accountability politically or financially, except to the 
WB. They were to be regular borrowers and formed the now renowned political ties 
the WB has with countries - contrary to one of the original and core principles of 
operation established in 1944. 
A further expansion of political leverage developed through the 1956 establishment of 
the Economic Development Institute (EDI), which offered development theory and 
practice training courses to senior officials from borrowing countries. By 1971, more 
than 1,300 officials had been through the EDI and many had risen to the position of 
minister of planning or finance or prime minister in their countries. 
The creation of such patronage networks has been one of the World Bank's most 
important strategies for inserting itself in the political economies of Third World 
countries....[this] has given the Bank some of the powers of a surrogate government. 
(Rich 1994) 
Another strategy Rich observes to have been used by the WB to increase its influence 
has been the encouragement of other aid agencies (such as USAID, the GTZ (the 
German Corporation for Technical Assistance), the UNDP, and the FAO) to become 
consultative groups: 
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...whose purpose is to co-ordinate and programme all foreign assistance to a given 
country. 
(Rich 1994) 
By 1970, the WB had, by deliberate strategy, established strategic and considerable 
positions of political and developmental leverage in the internal organisation of 
borrowing nations. 
Rich argues that the WB became deeply involved in 'supporting the insupportable', 
for example in Brazil. They declined to support the democratically-elected 
government of Goulart in the early 1960s but after the 1964 military coup, which 
began a 20 year military dictatorship, lending rose to an average of $73 million per 
year and reached nearly half a billion dollars per year by the mid-1970s. 
The predilection of supporting anti-democratic regimes that tortured and murdered 
their subjects became the hallmarks of the Bank during the 1970's, under the 
presidency of Robert McNamara 
(Rich 1994) 
McNamara was president of the WB from 1968-1981 and is widely acknowledged as 
the one who 'led the WB to be what it is today': 
Obsessed with statistical tallies and numerical data to measure progress, his 
[McNamara's] grandiose vision for alleviating poverty depended on a fatal hubris 
about the Bank's ability to know, plan and direct the evolution of human societies 
and the natural systems they depend on. 
(Rich 1994) 
It can therefore be seen that the WB has internalised some of what have been argued 
in earlier chapters to be problematic outlooks, such as discrimination 
against/disregard for the interests of people and an adherence to systems of economic 
thought which inadequately (either inherently or in the way they are applied) account 
for and respond to the interests of other groups. Particularly tangible is the apparent 
disregard for the interests of some people and the sanctioning (and promotion) of very 
disruptive social engineering projects in the name of 'development'. 
Rich observes a considerable pressure to lend as much as possible an in the same 
dynamic, not to promote logical and favourable environmental and social 
consideration within the developments. He tells us that by the end of the 1970s, the 
WB had become a self-serving bureaucracy, driven by 'an institutional culture of 
expansion' with a will to power for the sake of power. The pressure to lend 
emphasised quantity over quality: this he believes was accommodated because: 
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...the Bank never [had] to answer directly for the disastrous consequences . 
(Rich 1994) 
Systems developed such that the first priority for 'developing nations' was the 
repayment of WB and IMF loans, since credibility for future borrowing of any sort 
depended on good relations with them. Rich observes a dualism that strongly 
encourages energy inefficiency and inappropriate scales of power generation 
investment: it would be "foolish" for any politically rational energy minister to 
advocate energy efficient light bulbs and irrigation pumps: 
...when four or five times as big a loan could be secured for a gigantic dam to 
produce the same amount of power, with immensely more attractive opportunities for 
building political patronage. By the same token, a World Bank country director 
would have to be naive to promote an energy efficiency loan that would alienate the 
developing country's energy minister he or she is trying to cultivate, and at the same 
time move only one-quarter the amount of money for a greater amount of staff work. 
(ibid.) 
Rich ends his paper assessing 50 years of World Bank endeavours thus: 
The attempt over the last half-century to superimpose the World Bank's make-believe 
vision of the world upon the day-to-day lives of real people has had disastrous 
consequences for hundreds of millions of the poor and marginalised, along with 
untold numbers of non-human species and their habitats. Fifty years is a short time 
in the history of the world, but as far as the World Bank is concerned, is has already 
been long enough. 
Thalif Deen (1995) tells us that there is a role for the World Bank and IMF in the 
future, but that there is a great need to reform their operations. He reports that: 
...a coalition of 132 developing nations is seeking to democratise the WB and IMF as 
a part of the ongoing restructuring of the UN system. 
He quotes the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohammed demanding that 
the WB and IMF: 
...cease acting as debt collectors for the mighty and rich bankers. 
The call from the indebted nations is for transparency in the internal decision-making 
processes of the WB and IMF and for the voting systems to become one-member, 
one-vote, rather than voting power being weighted in favour of 'industrialised 
nations'. 
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Mikesell (1993) analyses the trends in environmental/ethical responsibility of the 
large multi-lateral development banks - suggesting, as was pointed out earlier, that 
through experience, and the adoption of EIA components in project evaluation: 
...responsible governmental and external assistance agencies will be sponsoring 
more successful projects in the future. 
This optimistic prediction makes clear that he shares the reformist outlook and 
disagrees with Rich, who questions whether there is a legitimate place for the WB in 
the future. 
Mikesell also considers in detail some case studies of 'environmental and resource 
management problems in development projects'. 
The failures in these project are not unique, and hundreds of environmentally flawed 
projects have been found. 
(Mikesell 1993) 
To give an example, the Narmada River Project in India: the largest dam project in 
the world. It includes 30 major, 135 medium, and 3000 smaller dams, to be built over 
the next 50 years. The total cost of the Sarovar project alone - the first stage of the 
project - is estimated at $1.9 billion (excluding irrigation and drainage costs) and it is 
expected to displace roughly 70,000 people. An associated project (the Narmada 
Sargar) is expected to displaced further 80,000 people. Together they are predicted to 
flood 43,000 ha of cultivable land and 51,000 ha of forest. Considering the Sarovar 
dam particularly: 
No comprehensive EIA for the Sardar Sarovar project was ever conducted before the 
World Bank loan was made in 1985 and a number of environmental studies still have 
not been completed. 
(Mikesell 1993) 
Mikesell states that the entire project is thought to be flawed because: 
...the total economic benefits (whether discounted or not) are less than the total 
monetary costs plus the non-monetary social costs, including the adverse 
environmental impacts on the land, the river basin, and the people that are 
displaced. 
Mikesell tells us that many other large multi-purpose dam projects have not achieved 
their expected benefits in terms of increased productivity of the land, because of a 
multitude of reasons, including poor management; a lack of training of farmers to the 
techniques applicable for new farming approaches; salinisation; waterlogging; and in 
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some cases the soil has not been appropriate for the type of irrigation provided. There 
has been no comprehensive assessment of the alternative means to achieve the 
industrial power supply that the scheme is aimed at providing; energy conservation 
investment could considerably reduce projected future energy demands. 
He also importantly indicates that 'dilemma' is the nature of the question over whether 
the whole project should be stopped, and the numerous uncompleted other 
development projects completed, or whether the project ought to continue (see 2.5). It 
is a real problem: so much money has already been invested in the project that it 
would be politically disastrous to scrap it. But as with other projects, spiralling costs 
and doubts about the likely net benefits exceeding the costs are real (the costs of the 
Tawa dam, completed in the 1970's, increased 232% over the initial estimate 
(Mikesell 1993)). 
Another controversial project to be financed by a $30 million WB loan (total 
investment over a five year period of roughly $136 million) is the Cameroon Forestry 
Project. The project is based on the recommendations of the UNFAO and the UNDP 
and aims to open up a large forested area in the South and South-East of Cameroon 
with a 600km road and a large Atlantic port (see also 2.1). Criticisms are typical of 
those related to tropical forest management. There is too much emphasis on 
commercial logging for export, and that it: 
...gives insufficient attention to natural resource conservation, the provision of fuel 
wood, and the impact of logging on indigenous people. 
The major interest of the Cameroon government is to exploit the forests for export 
income, which the country greatly needs because of its large external debt and its 
projected decline in foreign exchange earnings from petroleum. 
(Mikesell 1993) 
Other criticisms are that there is little intention for involvement of local communities, 
indigenous peoples, or NGOs, either in the planning or operational stages: 
The only role for the people living in the forest will be that a few of them will serve 
as labourers for the timber companies. 
(ibid.) 
Also, land tenure and community land rights are ignored, both for the farming 
community and the large population of 'semi-nomadic' Pygmies. There is inadequate 
planning towards sustained yield management, and doubts about the economic 
justification of the project, in terms of expected revenues, once comprehensive cost 
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assessments have been conducted. It is thought that the $136 million could generate 
more jobs through investments other than this, which is expected to generate up to 
100,000jobs. 
Mikesell considers five other development projects: the 'Brazilian Northwest Region 
Development Program', the 'Resettlement of Persons Displaced by the Manantali 
Dam in Mali', the 'Indonesian Transmigration Program', the 'Ok Tedi Mine in Papua 
New Guinea', and the 'Carajas Iron Ore Project in Brazil'. All of these of give rise to 
concerns related to the effects of projects on local people; wildlife; environments; the 
economic utility of the projects; the comprehensiveness of the assessments of these 
factors in the planning stages; the long-run management proposals for them; and the 
notoriously inaccurate projections of costs and effects. 
Clearly, then, at the development and strategic level there is movement towards 
reforming systems and actions in terms of socio-ecological and ethico-environmental 
consideration. Both in ecological tax reform, and reform in large project systems there 
is far to go before words of intent will match actions. 
6.2 Corporate and Business Reform 
There is growing faith in the idea that business and commerce can and are 'greening' 
approaches and operations. Elsewhere in this thesis the ideas of Hawken (1993) have 
been referred to in this context. He points out that big businesses are recognising that 
there are multiple benefits to be accrued from environmental awareness in business. 
The CftE report also provides evidence that it is in the interests of business to strive 
for sound environmental consideration in terms of operational efficiency and financial 
gain. The ethical benefits, if not a direct concern in the operations, can serve as good 
public relations (PR) and corporate image upgrading tools. Many in the business 
world are genuinely concerned about environmental matters and ethical 
considerations: 
Recently we have seen the dominant ideology among senior management in industry 
shifting towards a less ruthless view of the planet in which we live. 
(Welford & Gouldson 1993). 
What has caused this change in attitude? Smith (1993) observes a struggle in 
corporate groups "to maintain their legitimacy in the face of more stringent public 
demands" and thus a need for business educators to provide current and future 
trainees with the necessary skills to cope with this 'new environmentalism'. However 
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Welford & Gouldson (1993) project a more complex source of pressures to 'green up' 
from a web of stakeholders: 
1) the customer increasingly demands environmental credentials for goods; for 
example, the EC's eco-labelling scheme introduced in 1993 is aimed at 
providing the information required to make informed decisions on products 
(practice may differ from aims); 
2) trading partners may pass on end customer concerns about environmental 
credentials of products. General awareness of environmental concerns means 
that increasingly companies prefer to associate with others that adhere to 
certain standards of environmental performance, such as the British Standard 
on Environmental Management Systems (BS7750); 
3) local communities in the vicinity of industry are increasingly demanding 
higher levels of environmental performance and assurance that they are not 
being exposed to dangers; 
4) employees increasingly demand safe and secure working conditions, and 
health and safety regulations and inspections serve to enforce such concerns; 
5) investors and insurers are now highly aware of legal liability for negative 
environmental effects of business operations. Coupled with the 
aforementioned growth in demand for 'ethical investment', companies unable 
to demonstrate high environmental performance standards face spiralling costs 
and difficulty in attracting operational financing; and 
6) media and pressure groups can put great pressure on companies to perform 
with higher environmental standards. 
Acknowledging the increased pressures on business to clean up processes and 
products, what is to be gained from such moves? CftE reports the findings of an 
evaluation of 500 industrial case studies representing old industries and new high-tech 
enterprises. Waste reduction rates were 85-100%; a host of other benefits were 
accrued from preventing pollution: 
1) lower raw material costs; 
2) lower energy costs; 
3) lower waste disposal costs and reduced dependency on waste 
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4) treatment and disposal facilities; 
5) reduced or no future liability for clean-up of, or contamination by, buried 
wastes; 
6) fewer and lesser regulatory complications, lower operational and 
maintenance costs; 
7) lower employee, public and environmental risks and expenses, both present 
and future; 
8) reduced liability insurance costs; and 
9) better employee morale, productivity and product quality. 
Welford & Gouldson (1993) note that the benefits to companies achieving higher 
environmental standards are both directly financial (consistent with principles of 
profit maximisation) and also in terms of ethicality. They suggest that the latter is an 
integral part of doing business and assert that managers must work towards sound 
long term ethical rectitude since: 
...the environment is too important an issue to be treated as a gimmick for short term 
advantage. 
(Welford & Gouldson 1993) 
In order to take on the environmental consideration aims effectively, it is thought to 
be necessary to develop a strategy. The International Chamber of Commerce offers a 
'Business Charter for Sustainable Development' which recommends 16 key aims 
geared towards prioritising 'environmental managerialism' (section 2.3 considers this 
in more detail) including: process; product; employee and customer considerations; 
research; precautionary approaches; readiness for emergency situations with regard to 
environmental or person danger exposure; corporate transparency; and positive 
participation and contribution to the common 'good' of the business world and its 
community neighbours (Welford & Gouldson 1993). 
More loosely, Davis (1991) proposes 6 key aims: 
1) discriminating development towards more benign resource use; 
2) conserving resources; 
3) maximising repair, reconditioning, reuse and recycling; 
4) favouring 'creative work' in terms of skill enhancing and user friendly 
technologies; 
5) gearing to accommodate and appreciate non-material growth; and 
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6) transparency to allow for self-directed personal investment (the ability of 
the investors to know what they are investing in and its ethico-environmental 
impact). 
Davis (1991)also proposes eight points of reference for ethical and environmental 
managerial realignment in business, which will "profoundly" challenge companies at 
all levels: 
1) a corporate vision of stewardship; 
2) an appropriate scale of development; 
3) the measuring of Sustainability; 
4) flexible work arrangements; 
5) an 'orchestral style' of management (a move from autocratic and 
paternalistic management towards more laterally consultative based 
management systems); 
6) enduring quality (maximisation of reparability and resource efficiency in 
terms of packaging, processing and preserving); 
7) just forms of ownership, a revival of inter-business ethics; and 
8) systemic technology (moves towards more congenial technologies and bio-
fuels and materials). 
Some broader proposals put forward by Davis incorporate 'global community 
accountability", 'total quality management' (effectively a recommendation of 
comprehensive operational analysis) and lastly, that whatever the deficiencies of 
current 'improvement' proposals, business interests ought to start the process now and 
answer to the possible urgency of environmental, social, and lack of ethical 
consideration that is increasingly the subject of critical assessment. 
Such are the pressures to evolve towards 'sustainability', the benefits to be accrued by 
business and proposals of what to aim for. Smith (1993) offers a diagramatical 
representation of the structural dynamics of the issues related to business, the 
environment and corporate responsibility (see Table 6.1). 
This may seem simplistic, but the responsibility and ethical concerns (which Smith 
suggests ought to be core concerns) have historically been more peripheral. Within 
this framework, increasingly environmental and ethical considerations in the 
management of business gravitates towards social obligations. Anticipatory, 
precautionary actions ought to push business towards sound corporate responsibility 
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ahead of customer demand and assist with the desired, but frustrated, 'environmental 
orientations' of some shoppers (see section 4.3) - and lead other consumers towards 
greater environmental and ethical responsibility. 
core belief 1 corporate responsibility / business ethics 
A 1 A 
organisational assumptions 
A 
1 politics and technical expertise 
1 A 
organisational rituals 1 functional areas of business 
A 1 A 
Organisational plans 1 corporate response to environmentalism 
Table 6.1 
Business/Environment Structural Dynamics 
(adapted from Smith, 1993) 
Weizsacker (1994) sees scope for business to move forward towards a 'sustainability 
consensus': 
It is largely up to business to bring about a new support and European consensus in 
our rudderless society; by helping to shape and support a European consensus for a 
sustainable model of prosperity, it will help bring an end to the present lack of 
direction. 
Forrester (1990) observes a movement towards partnerships between corporate and 
environmental groups. Even those which have historically shown themselves to be 
radical and direct in their actions for environmental protection - and who remain so 
(such as Greenpeace) - are moving towards working with business interests. Forrester 
wonders whether they are a natural partnership. 
As an example Greenpeace is quite useful in the reformist framework. Their focus is 
expanding, from identifying, publicising and protesting against environmental abuses 
with the addition of: 
...a solutions agenda giving positive support for new technologies, products and 
companies where appropriate...we will do whatever it takes to get results, even if it 
means becoming fridge engineers as well as boat drivers. 
(Greenpeace 1994) 
For example they have promoted ozone-inert fridges with food retailers and a "win-
win" situation is thought to be on the cards (Greenpeace 1994): 
New technology providers are expanding, retailers will benefit from sounder 
environmental practices, and the ozone layer will begin repairing itself more quickly. 
Only chemical producers ofHCFC and HFC replacements are losers on this issue. 
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This is right in line with the 'reform' outlook which seeks to 'green' current systems 
with no drastic change. 
Weizsacker (1994) also considers co-operation between business and environmental 
groups as the way forward. He notes that the environment movement emerged out of 
conflict with business. Industry is cautious of interactions with environmental groups, 
who are seen as a threat. He suggests that: 
One of the essentials of common interest between environmental groups and far-
sighted business leaders is structural change towards a sustainable economy. 
He provides a useful diagram showing the effects of different approaches to 
environmental advocation, which clearly shows a positive correlation between 
consensus politics and higher environmental quality (see Table 6.2). 
Weizsacker suggests that conflict is necessary in the initial stages of environmental 
advocation but once issues are recognised in principle, more effective environmental 
protection is likely to derive from seeking a consensus. 
ICI proudly proclaims that: "Good safety, health and environmental performance is 
essential to the long term success of the ICI group" in their 1994 environmental 
performance report (the fourth year of its production). The same report presents the 
four objectives set by ICI in 1990 to effect environmental improvement (or rather 
reduced environmental impact): 
1) All new plants should be built to standards that meet the regulations it can 
reasonably anticipate in the most environmentally demanding country in 
which it operates that process. 
2) It aimed to reduce waste by 50% by 1995, using 1990 as the baseline year. 
The company is to pay special attention to hazardous waste. It also planned to 
attempt to eliminate all off-site disposal of environmentally harmful waste. 
3) It planned to establish a revitalised and more ambitious energy and resource 
conservation programme, with special emphasis on reducing environmental 
effects so that they could make further progress by 1995. 
4) It was to encourage recycling within its business and with customers. 
This appears to be a very forward looking agenda from one of the largest global 
producers of paints, chemicals, polymers etc.. It must be welcomed for the general 
socio-ecological effects (or effect removal) as well as economic effects within the 
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1/ I I Japan 
2/ I I Netherlands 
3/ I I Luxembourg 
4/ I I Sweden 
51 I I Switzerland 
6/ I I Austria 
II I Denmark I 
SI I I Norway 
91 USA I I 
10/ I West Germany I 
11/ I Finland I 
12/ I Belgium I 
13/ I France I 
14/ I United Kingdom I 
15/ Italy I I 
16/ Canada I I 
17/ Portugal I I 
18/ I Ireland I 
19/ Yugoslavia I I 
20/ Spain I I 
21/ Greece I I 
22/ Turkey I I 
conflict « « « « < orientation » » » » > consensus 
Note: the numbering is a rank order o f environmental quality for the period 1970-86. 
Table 6.2 
Consensus Politics Correlation with Higher Environmental Quality 
(adapted from Weizsacker, 1994) 
company that it ought to have. Also in the 1994 environmental report ICI records 
considerable reductions in both hazardous and non-hazardous waste - for example a 
40% reduction in hazardous inorganic gases to air; an 82% reduction in hazardous 
waste to water, a 48% reduction in non-hazardous waste gases to air; and a 44% 
reduction in non-hazardous waste to water (to 51,000 tonnes, 700 tonnes, 154,000 
tonnes, and 1,879,000 tonnes respectively). But the waste and the products, many of 
which are ecologically obnoxious, are still a part of the process in this reform 
approach. Vehicular support, and the infrastructure for road freight etc., are still in 
operation. 
Weizsacker (1994) and Hawken (1993) provide another good example of corporate 
greening. 3M, an American company, introduced policy '3P', meaning 'Pollution 
Prevention Pays' (replacing the older version of '3F which referred to the polluter-
pays principle). In fifteen years from 1975, the company saved roughly US$535 
million by reducing air pollution by 120,000 tonnes, waste water by 1 billion gallons, 
and solid waste by 410,000 tonnes per year. More than 3,000 separate initiatives 
contributed both to the company interests and environmental interests. Now known as 
'3P+', the plan requires the incorporation of environmental consideration of issues at 
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all levels of business planning and is used as a factor in employee performance 
review. That a company listed in the Dow-Jones '30 biggest in the US' should set 
such an example is without doubt a welcome and forward move. Environmental 
efficiency 'streamlining' is now a common goal in business/industry, though 
environmental education and awareness drives amongst employees are crucial to 
effectiveness. 
Business has also 'welcomed' the notion of recycling; increasingly out-of-town 
supermarkets have recycling facilities in the parking areas. But again, superficial 
'greening' is the sum of changes (such as the ozone-inert refrigeration system). What 
is more, people are lulled to excusing driving a few miles by supermarket provision of 
recycling facilities, easing the conscience of driving a few miles to purchase foods 
from countries scattered around the globe. It greys the issue - obscuring the more 
fundamental questions of the direction culture is moving in terms of normalised 
socio-ecological disruptiveness (see also 2.3). 
The same systems are at work with a car-based shopping orientation, mass production 
for mass sale and bulk dealings deleting small competitor viability. 
The trend towards large out-of-town retail outlets is increasingly perceived to have 
negative effects on the urban environment, with the closure of many shops pushing 
town centres towards barrenness. Some cities have suffered drastically from these 
changes, particularly as the convenience of a one-stop-shop for any combination of 
products, with free parking, has poached demand from other local stores so that their 
economic viability is threatened. 
Superstore dominance has destroyed local shopping centres, making it difficult for 
those without a car...the number of smaller shops [continues] to decline. 
(Guardian 13/4/96) 
Lang & Raven (1994) succinctly describe the nature of the supermarket shopping 
paradigm: 
The ability of supermarket chains to provide a range of products at competitive 
prices has enabled them, over the last 30 years, to secure a stranglehold over the 
food industry from seedbed to dinner table. Supermarkets keep their prices low 
through their control over producers, economies of scale and through transport and 
packaging strategies for which the industry does not pay the full costs - while the 
consumer choice they offer is not accessible to everyone [as they gravitate to out of 
town locations]. 
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In spite of the problems associated with 'edge-of-town grocery temples', a 1992 
Department of the Environment literature review, commissioned to BDP Planning 
and the Oxford Institute of Retail Management, found that: 
There is little substantive research that can demonstrate an adverse feconomic} 
impact of large food stores. As yet little has been done about the impact assessment 
of large non-food stores or regional centres. 
Social impact of major developments has been largely ignored. [Research and 
shopper surveys J have not gone on to indicate how such trade impacts manifest 
themselves in the social roles of town centres. 
and 
The environmental impact of major developments should be the most obvious form of 
impact, but it is least well researched. Effects are difficult to identify or quantify 
because of the long time scale over which effects need to be identified and 
researched. In traffic terms, out of town shopping is regarded as generally reducing 
town centre congestion. 
(DoE 1992a) 
Apparently little in the way of official social and economic impact assessments has 
been made; there is little official evidence of negative effects. This goes against the 
grain of observable demise in city centres. The last extract is particularly interesting: 
environmental impacts least well researched, hints at soft terms for shifting the traffic 
problem laterally, and the sapping of town centre trade described as 'reduced town 
centre congestion'. The Guardian (13/4/96) reports that: 
While mass buying [by the supermarkets J favours factory farming, national 
distribution systems are also blamed for an increase in food transport and thus 
pollution. 
As the supermarket has taken on the role of countless smaller outlets, economic clout 
has been concentrated. The pressure supermarkets are able to place on producers is 
considerable, so downward pressure on prices have played into the hands of more 
intensive, larger producers, capitalising on economies of scale to produce cheaper 
products. Animal food-stuffs are more viable to produce in intensive conditions, for 
example, battery poultry products. Thus ethically unsound operations become 
fortified in the agri-food industry. In the past, as will be confirmed by anyone over the 
age of 50, foods were local, foods were seasonal, and more ecologically-sound 
fertiliser materials were used - compost, bird lime (guano) etc.. 
One welcome move is towards a more efficient and less wasteful car culture: more 
efficient engines; better filtering systems for the fumes produced by 'cleaner' fuels; 
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lighter vehicles; body and engine recyclability made easier by coding and using less 
types of metals (BMW have pioneered this move in Germany) and stricter emission 
regulations to reduce pollution. Nevertheless, the car culture that industry favours 
demands more, and maintained, roads. Although pollution from the production, 
distribution and use of vehicles is declining per vehicle, the remaining pollution is far 
from 'residual'. The growth in numbers of vehicles to an extent negatively 
compensates for the cleaner units. 
Before moving on to 'popular reform' it is worth considering the business interest 
backlash against environmental movements. Stauber & Rampton (1995) describe how 
'public relations companies': 
...can package for their clients a global campaign that includes not only advertising, 
news stories and video footage but also crisis management, industrial espionage, 
organised censorship, infiltration of civic and political groups, and the manufacture 
of synthetic 'grassroots movements'. Their work is central to the strategy of 'divide 
and conquer' which the corporate world has adopted against the environment 
movement. 
They explain with extensive examples how the public PR industry uses a multitude of 
methods to manipulate public opinion in favour of destructive corporate interests: 
smear tactics to discredit writers critical of polluting companies; 'dirty tricks' 
campaigns to 'divide and rule' (or defect) environmental campaigners and 
organisations; the formation or support of pro-industry groups that: "...forment hatred 
and physical harassment of green activists" (Stauber & Rampton 1995). 
Stauber & Rampton state that business in the US now spend an estimated $1 billion 
per year on the services of anti-environmental professionals whose purpose is to 
'green-wash' the corporate image through 'astroturf lobbying (ibid.). They observe 
'greenwashing' campaigns to have begun when Rachel Carson's book 'Silent Spring' to 
be published. This was the one of the most prominent books corporate interests tried 
to stifle the publication of. Stauber & Rampton state that PR firms are: 
...waging a war against environmentalists on behalf of their corporate clients in the 
chemical, energy, food, automobile, forestry, and mining industries. 
The goal of their work is to achieve anti-environmental activism that outsizes 
environmental lobbies through the cultivation of a caring and community minded 
image, such that opposition to 'dirty' business operations at the community level is 
diluted (also by achieving relationships with large environmental groups and schools 
through small 'eco-project* donations). Strategic planning allows corporate interests to 
insert 'moles' into some groups and dilute potential campaign strength through 
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financial dependency. Corporate sponsorship of, for example, the WWF, Nature 
Conservancy Council, the Audubon Society, and the National Wildlife Federation as 
examples. Even the annual 'Earth Day' in the US has attracted sponsorship from 
otherwise unscrupulous corporate groups. 
At the broader level, a so-called 'good cop-bad cop' strategy which undermines and 
courts at the same time explains the observed fact that corporate interests: 
...fund anti-environmental extremists [as well as] mainstream environment groups. 
(Stauber & Rampton 1995) 
This strategy leads environmental groups to compromise through 'win-win' 
agreements with industry. Again, financial donations allow industry to 'guide' their 
future campaigning. 
Stauber & Rampton observe the 'battle' being fought in the classroom and the 
community meeting hall - as well as the boards of directors of mainstream 
environmental groups, journalist and radio circles. Lennard (1995) provides a good 
example of the kind of cheap but potentially very effective publicity that corporate 
interests can achieve. Under the heading 'McEducation Packs Target Kids', he tells 
how over 1,000 'education packs' had been sent to teachers in the UK, many of whom 
(especially in financially hard-up schools) have accepted the free packs for teaching 
maths, geography and English. The teaching packs are 'crammed' with references to 
the fast food chain; for example maths questions ask children to add up baskets of 
fries, geography questions ask where one might find McDonalds outlets, and English 
questions ask children to identify key words in text, such as Chicken McNuggets, 
Happy Meals, and milk shakes - humorous, but sinister as it effects a form of 
'McBrainwashing'! 
Stauber & Rampton (1995) report that about 40% of 'news' in the US flows virtually 
unedited from PR offices and that less than twenty corporations own over half of all 
US media. They point out that the distribution of 'engineered' and 'favourable' 
footage, both visual and audible, to television and radio, can be very effective. 
They conclude that corporations and governments spend billions every year 
manipulating the information the public receives. They liken the systems at work to 
'democracy for hire'; (synthetic) grass-roots movements can be created by PR strategy 
backed by corporate investment. 
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63 Popular reform. 
Since the 1970's there have been some considerable changes, especially in terms of 
environmental/ethical awareness at the popular level. As a result, a lot of work has 
gone into at least psychologically appeasing the conscience that is prodded by ethico-
environmental considerations. The public has been exposed to large amounts of 
information, on the basis of which ethico-environmental considerations in lifestyle 
and consumption could be made. They have been urged to exert purchasing power to 
demand reforms in the practices of industry and other services which they consume 
and to act at the domestic level as well. In the past recycling was the catch word but 
now the call has gone out to 'reduce, re-use, then recycle'. 
The information and pressure has come from NGOs working at different levels - at 
the international level, groups such as Greenpeace, FoE, Survival International, 
Amnesty International, IFAW etc. have been hard at work, whilst at the national and 
local level, hundreds of groups in any given country are working towards 'a cleaner 
environment' and greater ethical consideration. There are 'ethical consumer guides', 
'animal-free shopping guides', 'guides to greener living' and considerable deliberation 
and work on 'eco-labelling' schemes for products. 
National and local authorities have moved with the times and now local authority 
recycling facilities are widely available, as are private and community/organisation 
deposit points - this in response to public demand as well as authority initiatives. 
Recycling has become a growth industry, the good economics of household 
environmental consideration in terms of energy efficiency and maintenance product 
choice has expanded, and increasingly people gravitate towards actions offering the 
environmental feel-good factor'. 
The UK DoE (1992b) publication 'UK Environment' details public attitudes towards 
the environment which are the collated results of a number of organisations 
(including MORI, Gallup, and the British Social Attitudes Survey). Though the 
degree of sympathy expressed, the actions claimed and observable realities may not 
directly suggest ethical consideration, it is nevertheless implied in the expression of 
environmental concerns. 
From the mass of statistics, some indicative ones will be extracted. Between 1986 and 
1989, the proportions of respondents who said that the environment/pollution was the 
most important issue the Government ought to be dealing with rose from 8% to 30%. 
Between 1971 and 1989 the proportion of respondents concerned with pollution of 
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the seashore and beaches, water pollution, and air pollution rose by 31% (to 77%), 
26% (to 76%), and 19% (to 55%) respectively. Two surveys in 1989 and 1993 
provide useful insight to the level of concern of the public for particular issues; it is 
interesting to note the issues where concern increased and diminished (see Table 6.3). 
Global issues such as the pollution of rivers and seas, ozone-layer depletion and 
global warming, etc., (with the exception of nuclear waste) became less of a concern, 
whilst issues closer to home such as factory fumes; road traffic; countryside 
encroachment; the decay of inner cities; vacant and derelict land/buildings; and noise 
increased in terms of public concern. This is likely to be related to the perceived 
'economic depression' of the early 1990's but there are other possible explanations -
such as environmental group publicity drives strategically tapping potential (and 
justified) local concerns rather than less tangible global issues (see below). 
A 1989 survey of England and Wales enquired into what people were either doing or 
willing to do to 'help the environment' (see Table 6.4). 
In a large number of areas people are doing (and more would consider doing) things 
to reduce their ecological impact - a move which, as already mentioned, implies a 
form of ethical consideration even if it is thought to be of benefit to the self as well. A 
1991 survey in Scotland found that 45% and 74% do buy and would buy 
(respectively) one product over another because it was "better for the environment'. If 
the above proportions of people were already doing things, and the considerable 
proportion of people would consider doing them, then something of a 'feel-good 
factor' may have resulted from environmental awareness. This might also help explain 
reduced interest in global issues, since as well as the issues being less tangible, 
personal actions in response to them offer less immediately tangible results. 
Another explanation could be 'issue fatigue' - where people grew bored of being 
concerned over intangible issues such as global warming and ozone layer depletion. 
Further, public concerns over issues often bring about 'political speak' of all that is 
being done to resolve problems, or 'business speak' that raises doubts about the 
justifications for the concerns. In this light, 'pressure group speak' can not be 
excluded. As the 1990's began, urban encroachment of the countryside and green-belt 
issues came into the media limelight through pressure group campaigning. Out of 
town supermarkets were springing up all over the country. This became a focus of 
lobbying for environmental groups. It meant that public awareness of a fresh issue 
expanded and concern followed. 
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(1) (2) 
ISSUE 1989 1993 TREND 
Pollution of rivers and seas 64% 63% -1% 
Sewage in seas/on beaches 59% 56% -3% 
Nuclear Waste 59% 60% +1% 
Ozone Layer depletion 56% 41% -16% 
Pesticide use 46% 36% -10% 
Global Warming 44% 35% -9% 
Drinking water quality 40% 38% -2% 
Acid rain 40% 31% -9% 
Factory fumes 34% 35% +1% 
Wildlife protection 45% - -
Road traffic 32% 35% +3% 
Countryside developments 27% 35% +8% 
(2) (2) 
Traffic/exhaust fumes 33% 40% 4-7% 
Decay of inner cities 22% 26% +4% 
Vacant/derelict land/buildings 16% 19% +3% 
Noise 13% 16% +3% 
1 - DoE 1992b 
2 - Government Statistical Service (GSS) 1995 
Table 6.3 
Public Concern Over Environmental Issues 
(adapted from DoE and Government Statistical Service). 
Doing Doins + Would Consider 
Use ozone friendly aerosols 61% 90% 
Pick up other peoples' litter 50% 72% 
Avoid using pesticides in the garden 42% 80% 
Take bottles to the bottle bank 34% 85% 
Cut down on electricity use 33% 83% 
Collect old newspapers 34% 80% 
Use alternative transport to the car 25% 58% 
Use recycled paper 25% 85% 
Make compost out of kitchen waste 25% 58% 
Use unleaded petrol 22% 73% 
Buy phosphate-free washing powder 10% 70% 
Table 6.4 
Public Actions/Willingness to 'help the environment' 
(adapted from DoE 1992b) 
That concern over ozone layer depletion declined 16% between 1989 and 1993 (Table 
6.3), and 90% are using/would be willing to use ozone-freindly aerosols might be 
indicative of the persuit of a clear conscience through the easiest route; and also that 
feelings and understandings are a 'hot-pot' - one small reaction to awareness seems to 
solve any concerns about an issue. 
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Common phraseology which the public uses, such as 'to help the environment' or Tor 
the environment', is misleading. What differential product choice actually means is 
not help for the environment, but 'reduce impact on the environment'. This is a part of 
the 'reformist' and 'conscience clearing' environmentalism which must be welcomed 
from the general public, but which is considered by many to be seriously inadequate 
in terms of actually redressing ethico-environmental problems. 
Whose knowledge and opinions count in decisions about 'progress', change, 
development and urgent issues? Purdue (1995) considers responses to public demands 
to play a greater role in these issues. Succinctly summing up the complex questions 
he asks: 
Who is consulted? Who participates? Who decides who is consulted and 
participates? Who decides what the issues are that people shall be consulted on? 
What counts as relevant knowledge and expertise? Is anyone obliged to pay attention 
to the consultation, or is the simple process of consultation considered sufficient? 
He opines that unless these questions are seriously considered, 'consultation' and 
'participation' are likely to be nothing more than: "...new ways of containing - or even 
silencing - popular environmental concerns" (Purdue 1995). 
A 1991 DoE survey found that about 25% of the public ('incorrectly') thought that the 
depletion of the ozone layer was the most important cause of global warming (DoE 
1992b). This suggests an awareness of issues, but an absence of understanding that 
causes some confusion. 
Some demographic characteristics of environmental concerns are interesting to note. 
Throughout the UK, women are more concerned about environmental issues than 
men. In England and Wales retired people are more concerned about local issues such 
as 'fouling by dogs', litter and noise (DoE 1992b), and they are backed up by 8-12 
year olds, who also consider litter a most important issue (GSS 1995). Children 
between 13 and 15 are more concerned about traffic fumes (ibid.). 
Another gauge of public feelings about environmental issues, and the desire to act in 
response is their membership of environmental organisations. Between 1981 and 
1993, the total membership of the 16 most prominent environment-related groups in 
the UK (including the National Trust, the RSPB, Greenpeace, WWF, FoE, the 
Ramblers Association, etc.) increased from 1.95 million to over 4.8 million (GSS 
1995). Particular growth figures that stand out are Greenpeace (whose membership 
grew from 30,000 to 410,000, and the National Trust which grew from 1.05 million to 
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over 2.18 million. This doubtless includes some cross-over/multiple membership, but 
shows a willingness to spend some money in order to either 'help the environment' or 
to publicise current issues. 
Between 1982 and 1988, there was a distinct increase in the belief that priority ought 
to be given to the environment over economic growth: those favouring environmental 
priority increased from 50% to 70%, whilst those favouring economic growth 
declined from 36% to 17% (ibid.). This is again clear evidence that environmental 
consideration, and by implication the degree of ethical consideration, is on the rise. 
An American Enterprise Institute survey in April 1995 found that 53% of Americans 
thought economic growth should be sacrificed for the environment, whilst 23% 
thought the reverse (Ravitz 1995). Obviously there are significant differences 
between countries but overall environmental awareness is increasing. Whether there 
is a serious determination to resolve the problems or whether people, on a more basic 
level, seek to clear their conscience, is much harder to gauge - if asked, they would 
surely say that they are genuinely concerned. The willingness to consider altering 
one's lifestyle significantly exceeds rates of actually doing so, partially because of 
information deficits and the difficulties of change in a society which has not been 
designed for environmental beninignity, but also through laziness. 
Lastly, some responses to questions about who should pay for increased 
environmental consideration, and who is responsible for it (these responses are from 
Scotland). Just 5% thought that nothing should be spent on environmental protection 
because it is not affordable, while 75% thought that environmental considerations 
should be presented to the public through product pricing (GSS 1995) - a 'vote' in 
favour of ecological tax reform and pricing, as described earlier in this chapter. A 
very important observation is that: 
People who were better informed about the environment supported in particular, 
controlling industry, paying more for environmentally-friendly products and paying 
higher taxes to protect the environment. 
(GSS 1995) 
This implies that environmental education is a crucial goal for the environment 
movement. WWF, for example, produce education packs such as their 'Kiss it better 
or kiss it good-bye: community action pack for environmental awareness'. Schools 
have started to include environmental studies as a regular part of the curriculum; 
school-based 'environmental awareness' projects are increasingly common. Ravitz 
(1995) observes that "environmental education, one of the key ... strategies of the 
environment movement, is a huge success" - a positive observation from (the US) one 
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of the most important countries in terms of its need for improvement in ethico-
environmental consideration. 
In the 1991 Scottish survey a considerable majority of 79% (13% strongly) thought 
that industry ought to be prevented from causing environmental damage even if it 
meant higher prices, while 54% (20% strongly) thought that companies which 
seriously damage the environment ought to be shut down (GSS 1995). The same 
survey revealed that about 85% (33% strongly) thought that it was up to individuals 
'to protect the environment' by changing their own behaviour; 80% (25% strongly) 
thought the government could do a lot more than they are now to protect the 
environment (ibid.). We are not informed of how many were not sure how much the 
government was doing, but it is likely that many would not be in possession of any 
details of current actions and legislative trends in environmental protection by 
authorities. 
It was described earlier in this chapter how 'greenspeak', 'greenwashing' and product 
package appearance have come to be used as marketing strategies and that 
'environmental/y aware' products/production is considered by many in business as a 
growing niche market. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that a 'partially informed' 
public is to a significant extent unable to distinguish between 'bluff greenness of 
products and actual ecological/ethical benignity. It is a fact that even with strict 
trading standards enforcement, customer deception and product 'misrepresentation' 
persists. For example, a product may state that it does not contain an environmentally 
damaging ingredient, even though it never has; an obnoxious garden chemical may be 
sold in a Spring green, proudly announced 'recycled cardboard' box. As a 1992 
Commission of the European Communities (CEC) states: "Good intentions will not 
produce the desired results unless alternatives exist" (CEC 1992). 
Some of the statistics available are of dubious provenance (these examples come from 
DoE 1992b) - what does it mean that 55% of people occasionally (35% often) avoid 
using pesticides in the garden? How is it that 36% of people occasionally (32% often) 
use unleaded petrol? What is the commitment level of 46% of people who 
occasionally (28% often) take bottles to the bottle bank, and 37% who occasionally 
(14% often) cut down on use of electricity/gas in the home? If these are occasional 
actions for a minority, and more frequent actions of a smaller minority, then what is 
the overall level of commitment to environmental/ethical consideration at the popular 
level? Perhaps more useful is that 18% occasionally (8% often) request information 
about green issues. Even this does not indicate accurately the level of commitment to 
environmental consideration, since the parameters of 'what is environmental' are 
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extremely wide - a 1993 Institute of Environmental Sciences 'Environmental Careers 
Handbook' considers jobs with large construction firms and chemical companies to be 
'jobs in the environment'. At the popular level the scope of 'environmental' is so wide 
as to demand careful scrutiny. The 1992 edition of 'Who's Who in the environment -
England' is, ironically, sponsored by the oil giant Esso. Lastly, Ravitz (1995) reports a 
paradoxical fact: an April 1995 survey by the American Enterprise Institute found that 
79% of Americans consider themselves to be environmentalists - yet the collective 
human society of the country is a model of unsustainability. 
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CHAPTER7 
APPROACHES TO THE FUTURE : 
ECOLOGISATION, PSYCHOLOGISING ECOPHILOSOPHY 
AND SOCIAL ECOLOGICAL RESURGENCE 
The last chapter considered environmental reformism, which is characterised by 
'shallow ecological' approaches. They were mainly referred to as 'reformist' since this 
is the most common terminology used to describe them. Ecologisation, the subject of 
this chapter, refers to deep ecophilosophical principles. The following frameworks 
will be considered: deep ecology; social ecology; education from the non-industrial; 
community organicisation; and transpersonal ecology. These outlooks involve a 
process that Fox (1995) refers to as "psychologizing ecophilosophy". La Chapelle 
(1986) clarifies what inevitably will be noted in this and other chapters of this thesis, 
that (occasionally cumbersome) new word formulations are sometimes favourable in 
discussions concerning 'Environmentalism', particularly when discussing more radical 
frameworks such as deep ecology: "to write about such a holistic subject as Deep 
Ecology it frequently is necessary to invent awkward new words...". 
Bookchin outlines clearly what he sees as the failings of shallow ecological 
approaches to socio-ecological restoration when he states that: 
Conventional reform efforts, at their best can only slow down but they cannot arrest 
the overwhelming momentum toward destruction within our society. At their worst, 
they lull people into a false sense of security. Our institutional social order plays 
games with us to foster this passivity. It grants long-delayed, piecemeal, and woefully 
inadequate reforms to deflect our energies and attention from larger acts of 
destruction. Such reforms hide the rotten core of the apple behind an appealing and 
reassuring artificially-dyed red skin. 
(Bookchin in Bookchin & Foreman 1991) 
Bookchin offers another observation regarding the reformist approach (which at a 
general level is accurate), that it focuses on single issues. This means that the 
resolution of complex and intricate problems will be deferred, or will never be 
achieved (Bookchin 1990). 
Foreman (1991 in Bookchin & Foreman) states that: 
...[reform approaches], by themselves, are simply not enough...Today the 
conservation movement's strategy is to bargain away huge portions of the wild world 
in order to protect a dwindling core of 'untouchable' wilderness areas. 
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Foreman is particularly concerned with the protection of the remaining 
wilderness/semi-wilds, but the same criticisms can usefully be extrapolated and 
applied to the 'shallow' environment movement. One of Foreman's current projects, 
which obviously is a huge and ambitious goal, is The Wildlands Project, which aims 
for the 're-wilding' of North America through a continent-wide network of large bio-
region based wilderness cores linked by broad habitat corridors. Devall and Sessions 
(1985) state that they see reformism as essentially attempting to: 
...address some of the environmental problems in this society without seriously 
challenging the main contradictions and assumptions of the prevailing world view. 
Reformist movements and organisations are also seen to have 'sold out' and become 
like any other large organisation with 'power goals'. Manes (1990) informs us of the 
magnitudes of (1985) salaries of the leaders of the large US environment 
organisations: the Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society (executive directors $70-
90,000), the Audubon Society (over $100,000 for the executive director), and the 
National Wildlife Federation (the leader was in receipt of $120,000 plus expenses, car 
and apartment). These high salaries to individuals working for causes which generally 
work on tight budgets derived from memberships, merchandise and legacies were 
defended, as Manes tells us, "...by saying they were necessary to attract the kind of 
leadership qualified to run what amounted to multi-million dollar corporations". Such 
ideas are compelling evidence that the larger environmental organisations or 
individuals within them have confused 'value' with 'material goals'. As Foreman 
(1991) observes from his US perspective: 
Many see their jobs with conservation groups as stepping stones to jobs with 
prominent politicians or to high positions in the next presidential administration. 
Too many take care not to ruffle feathers in order to preserve their opportunity to be 
considered later for Director of the National Park Service or Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture. 
Foreman (1991) lists ten characteristics of the composition, priorities, and 
motivations of conservation groups. These points, it should be stressed, are 
observations in the US context (though similar trends are observable in the UK as 
well). They are instrumental to the successful growth of 'environmentalism', and the 
subsequent professionalism in environmental organisations. 
\)Many of the people who work for environmental groups today are not 
conservationists but technicians. 
2) Until the mid-1970's, the route to a job with an environmental group was by 
proving oneself first as a volunteer activist. 
3) Conservation groups look for potential employees who will fit smoothly into their 
particular organisation.. 
4) Fewer and fewer staff members of conservation groups are outdoors persons. 
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5) Staff members of conservation groups today are often career-oriented. 
6) Many people working for environmental groups today have a higher loyalty to the 
political process than to conservation. 
7) The viability of the group itself has become more important than the conservation 
mission of the group. 
8) Efficient operation has become the main concern of environmental groups. 
9) Professional staff are frequently unfamiliar with the intellectual discussions going 
on in the movement. 
10) There is a growing divide between grassroots volunteer activists and 
professionals. 
Surely competent administrators are needed to run the operations of multi-million 
pound/dollar operations, but "they must be guided by the vision of Muir, Edge, 
Marshall and Leopold - not by the Harvard Business School" (Foreman, 1991). 
Foreman (1991 in Bookchin & Foreman) criticises reform environmentalism for its 
propensity to compromise and weaken its goals, jeopardising its potential impact in 
the process of change: 
Trying to fit in, to not seem too radical or extreme, to always seek to compromise 
obviously keeps you pretty damn manageable. It is no wonder that the mainstream 
conservation movement has been outmanoeuvred [by anti-ecological interest 
groups] over the last fifteen years because of its timid vision and tactics. 
At this point it is worth presenting briefly the essential distinctions between shallow 
and deep ecological outlooks. Fox (1995) made a comprehensive study of published 
and unpublished works and conferences on ecophilosophy, and noted eleven 
"typologies" which distinguish between shallow and deep eco-philosophies (see Table 
7.1). 
Perspective of: Shallow Eco-philosophy V's Deep Eco-philosophy 
Marx Conservation vs Ecological 
Worster Imperial vs Arcadian 
Roszak Expedient vs Sacramental 
Rifkind Engineering/technological vs Ecological/empathetic 
O'Riordan Technocentric vs Ecocentric 
Drengson Technocratic vs Person-planetary 
Meeker Homocentric vs Holistic 
Bookchin Environmentalism vs Social ecology 
Toumlin Anthropocentric vs Cosmological 
Grange Dividend vs Foundational 
Rodman Resource conservation vs Ecological sensibility 
Table 7.1 
Typologies of Shallow V's Deep Eco-Philosophy (adapted from Fox, 1995). 
It should be made clear that some who argue for a deep eco-philosophical future, and 
against 'thin environmentalism' do not subscribe to 'deep ecology' as a favourable 
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philosophical approach, though this and ecocentrism are the most dominant 
phraseologies in terms of breadth of adoption for both advocates and critics alike (Fox 
1995). Bookchin in particular has been critical of 'deep ecology', seeing it as 
biocentric and occasionally anti-human (Bookchin 1990), while for example Devall in 
the early 1980s stated that 'social ecology', the (deep) eco-philosophy Bookchin 
favours, was "just another 'old paradigm', leftist ideology that falls short of a 
genuinely ecological philosophy" (Chase 1991). Another description of the 
differences between ecology movement visions is 'wilderness' and 'garden' ecology -
the latter favour a more managed ecological picture, whilst the first opposes this 
interference. Chase (1991) observes that there is a 'garden ecology tendency' in the 
social ecology movement. 
But 'factional' dispute within the radical environment movement is not a priority 
debate even if, for example, Bookchin concludes that social and deep ecology are 
fundamentally antagonistic. The debate between Foreman and Bookchin which is the 
basis of their 1991 book clearly brings to the surface the fact that there is only a 
marginal conflict between social ecology and deep ecology, when set against 
reformist and particularly 'business as usual' advocations. Foreman states that 
"contradictions among [radical ecologists] are different from the contradictions 
between [themselves] and the guardians of the imperial status quo" (ibid.). One 
explanation for the fact that "few...would disagree that there are some significant 
differences between social and deep ecology" (Chase 1991), might be that the key 
writers on deep ecology generally come from naturalistic and/or philosophical 
backgrounds, while prominent social ecology writers such as Bookchin come from 
'labour movement' and left libertarian backgrounds. As a consequence their balance of 
emphasis gravitates more towards, or emanates from, ecological and social constructs 
respectively. Another might be what Foreman observes, that: 
...too often when you fight regularly with powerful and intransigent institutions you 
can't get out of that mode of interaction when you are among {actual and potential 
allies]. 
(ibid.). 
Bookchin observes unifying developments in the space between eco-gravitational and 
social-gravitational eco-philosophies, and so the complimentary futures of deep and 
social ecology in socio-ecological terms: 
We should never lose sight of the fact that the project of human liberation has now 
become an ecological project, just as, conversely, the project of defending the Earth 
has also become a social project. Social ecology as a form of eco-anarchism weaves 
a way of thinking that I call dialectical naturalism; second, by means of a mutualistic 
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social and ecological ethics that I call eco-communities. 
(Bookchin in Bookchin & Foreman 1991) 
Bookchin here makes clear the value of a diverse movement for change, and indeed 
the strength of such a movement, when complemented by co-operative inclinations, in 
that it can offer a collective projection that incorporates distinct but strongly linked 
changes to organisational and life-style systems. McLaughlin (1995) observes that 
deep ecology is a common ground for those beginning with interests weighted more 
towards either human-social or non-human interests. From this point on a more 
detailed description of deep ecology, social ecology, education from the non-
industrial, community organicisation, and transpersonal ecology will be attempted. 
7.1 Deep Ecology. 
In 1984, Sessions and Arne Naess drew up eight principles of deep ecology which 
have come to be recognised as embodying the core of an ecologically integrated 
future. Table 7.2 outlines these principles. 
1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have value in themselves 
(intrinsic/inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for 
human purposes, [this is essentially a rejection of anthropocentrism] 
2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realisation of these values and are also values 
in themselves, [essentially a rejection of the notion of 'superior' life forms] 
3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 
4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human 
population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease. 
5) Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly 
worsening. 
6) Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and 
ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present. 
7) The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent 
value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound 
awareness of the difference between big and great. 
8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to 
implement the necessary changes. 
Table 7.2 
Basic Principles of Deep Ecology (adapted from Devall & Sessions, 1985). 
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In point '3', 'vital need' is deliberately left vague since there will inevitably be 
differences in judgement - due to climatic and cultural factors which will effect 
biological and psycho-cultural needs. A part of the founding of point '4' is the notion, 
supported by the conclusions of a 1984 UN State of the World Population report, that 
human population growth rates are diminishing the quality of life "for many millions 
of people". With regard to point '5', the catchword 'non-interference' does not imply 
that humans should not modify some ecosystems but that the nature and extent of this 
interference is 'out of control'. 
They state that current industrial forms of economic growth are incompatible with 
points 1-5 (point 6), and that there is a considerable gap between 'ideal sustainable 
forms of economic growth' and the policy goals of modern industrial societies, for 
whom 'sustainability' still effectively means 'in relation to humans'. This is perhaps 
changing, slowly: since 1984 there have been some considerable developments in 
understandings of the meaning of 'sustainability' - since the Brundtland report, the 
1991 'Caring for the Earth' report (by IUCN, UNEP, and WWF) and the 1992 
UNCED conference, descriptions of and strategies to achieve a more comprehensive 
version of 'sustainability' have emerged. The 1991 New Zealand 'Resource 
Management Act', a very progressive piece of legislation, clearly defines 'intrinsic 
value' and demands respect for this as well as considerably expanded regard for the 
indigenous Mauri population and their interests/values. Finally for point '7', 
McLaughlin (1995) states that this is particularly relevant for "...industrial peoples 
enmeshed within an ultimately unsatisfying consumerism", while Devall and Sessions 
(1985) provide a clear summary of the explanation Sessions and Naess provided: 
Some economists criticise the term 'quality of life' because it is supposed to be vague. 
But on closer inspection, what they consider to be vague is actually the non-
quantitative nature of the term. One cannot quantify adequately what is important for 
the quality of life as discussed here, and there is no need to. 
This idea that "there is no need" to quantify important aspects of life quality was 
considered in chapter five in relation to the 'difficult to quantify' aspects of attempts to 
achieve indices or valuations in environmental economics. There it was suggested 
that it might degrade what one is trying to 'evaluate', and that it is perhaps better not 
to put a value onto something than to undervalue it. A good example of the absurd 
and indeed obscene results that can derive from evaluations is provided by Raghavan 
of the Third World Network (1995). He related some details of a report being 
prepared by the Third Working Group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, in which for the purposes of evaluating the likely damage to result from 
global warming, the 'value' of human life was to be estimated. Partly through the 
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influence of OECD economists, the 'value' of one human life in North America and 
the European Union was put at $1.5 million, and in other countries at $150,000. 
Exchange rates and price levels may explain this result, but at the same time it makes 
clear that economics of this form can be repugnantly discriminatory 
Devall and Sessions (1985) quote Arne Naess on the meaning of 'deep ecology' from 
an interview. Naess states that the essence of deep ecology is "to ask deeper 
questions". He believes that people do not generally question deeply enough, that 
their 'world view' is very much dictated by external framing. "Most people follow the 
trends and advertisements and become philosophical and ethical cripples". His 
'ecosophy' (a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium) advocates 
(presumably for the disproportionately resource-intensive industrialised communities) 
a drastically reduced material standard of living in conjunction with an enhanced of or 
maintained quality of life. He states that in deep ecology there is a basic intuition that 
"we have no right to destroy other living beings without sufficient reason"; that when 
humans reach a stage of maturity, they will experience joy and sadness when other 
creatures, landscapes and ecosystems flourish or are damaged respectively. At present 
our means of destruction are vast and there is "extremely little maturity in our 
feelings...Only a very narrow range of feelings have interested most human beings 
until now". 
It is interesting that although Naess is widely assumed to have coined the phrase 'deep 
ecology', and the one responsible for planting the seeds of current lines of deep 
ecology, Naess is himself in no doubt that the ideas existed long before he first used 
the term in the early 1970's, whilst Zakin (1993) suggests that "...the lineage of deep 
ecological thought ...has probably been around since the days of cavemen". Naess 
states that: 
Many of those who emphasise the breadth of ecology tend, simultaneously, to limit it 
somewhat. When concentrating on the relations between things, of course many 
aspects of their limited separateness are ignored. Ecologism is excessive 
universalisation or generalisation of ecological concepts and theories. The attempt 
to fully replace the theory of knowledge with certain ecological theories about 
behaviour and survival leads to very great difficulties ('labyrinthine epistemology') 
or, one encounters great inconsistency and paradox. 
(Naess 1989) 
Perhaps Naess here refers to the 'ecological survival of the fittest ' excuses for 
unscrupulous and socio-ecologically anti-social business activities. 
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Naess (1995) presents what he acknowledges to be only one of the possible 
"condensed codification's" of deep ecology (see Table 73). He states that contrary to 
the dominant trend in attempts by ecologists to influence decision makers, which is to 
present 'factually' (scientifically) based ecological threats - deep ecology 
accommodates normative preferences as well. That is to say that some wider norms 
and value characteristics can compete with scientifically based argument. He also 
notes that ecological movements are in fact ecophilosophical rather than purely 
ecological - ecology being "a limited science which makes use of scientific method". 
The seven points for a deep ecological outlook in Table 7.3 do not clash with, or 
reduce the importance of, the basic principles of deep ecology outlined in Table 7.2 -
they are one version of the core foci in the deep ecological framework which Naess 
believes may alter depending on climatic location and culture etc.. 
Naess (1986) presents a clear case for accommodating the 'normative experiential' 
(expressions of "spontaneous experience") in scientific presentation. He asserts that it 
is a useful product of our perceptive capacities; to not do so is to play into the hands 
of nihilism: 
Spontaneous experience is not limited to so-called pure sense experience. It has 
cognitive elements, but elements of acquaintance and insight rather than of 
abstract knowledge. These must not be left unexpressed in the name of science. 
There may of course be biologists who suspect that an expert who uses spontaneous 
language is incapable of scientific rigor. But we should not neglect our linguistic 
abilities from fear of such misunderstandings. When biologists refrain from using the 
rich and flavourful language of their own spontaneous experience of all life forms -
not only of the spectacularly beautiful but of the mundane and bizarre as well - they 
support the value nihilism which is implicit in outrageous environmental policies. 
This argument is a part of the 'deep ecological case', but is implicitly in conflict with 
dominant scientific, or authoritative, presentation approaches. It welcomes the literal 
vitality of our faculties as well as the "...grey and flat...language of scientists" (Naess, 
1986). Seymour (1989) reminds us of the 'left and right lobes of the brain' theory, that 
one is the thinking half of the brain and the other the feeling part. Modern scientific 
and industrial people are trained from birth to suppress the feeling half - the creative 
and intuitive half - and it is this which ought not to be excluded or suppressed as is 
demanded by a 'fact'-based scientific analysis paradigm. 
Bookchin (1991) (who as Fox (1995) notes has variously described deep ecology as 
"a vague, formless, often self-contradictory and invertebrate thing", "a goulash of 
notions and moods" and "a deluge of 'Eco-la-la'") criticises the deep ecology outlooks 
as being "quasi-religious, often misanthropic" ecological world views which are an 
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understandable response to "a grow or die capitalistic economy on the biosphere", but 
which will not be effective in arresting our negative impact on socio-ecological 
integrity. This sort of objection is a typical one. But it seems that the most common 
consensus is that 'spiritual awakening' is no less legitimate a means of thought 
development than reasoned/scientifically-based routes. It is also increasingly 
acknowledged that the suppression of emotion in relation to what are clearly emotive 
issues is not a pre-requisite to sound case and argument. Bookchin does, however, 
have reservations about spiritualism that is 'supernaturalist', but not when it is more 
'naturalist'. Bookchin maintains that 'social ecology' rather than 'ecology-centrism' is 
the way in which developmental ecologisation can occur, and that to ignore the social 
context of human society in attempts to resolve the stressed condition of human/rest -
of-nature relations is to set a poor foundation for the future. 
1) Rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of the 'relational total-field' image. 
2) 'Biospherical egalitarianism' in principle (the 'in principle' clause allows for the fact that "any 
realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression". To the ecologically aware 
individual, the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom). 
3) Principles of diversity and symbiosis. Diversity welcomes the enumerate 'products' of evolution, 
and the potentialities of equilibnate survival. Symbiotic principles of orientation favour interpretations 
of 'survival of the fittest' in terms of abilities to "coexist and co-operate in complex relationships, rather 
than the ability to kill, exploit and suppress". 
4) Anti-class posture. This opposes differences in the qualities and standards of living based on 
exploitation and/or suppression on the part of certain groups. Linked to ecological egalitarianism, 
discrimination and exploitation of other people is divisively anti-ecological. 
5) Fight against pollution and resource depletion. "This goal ought to be pursued within vigilant 
observance that the resolution of one problem ought not to cause or aggravate other problems - to 
reduce pollution in one area only to cause it to grow elsewhere [see chapter 2 for the maquiladora 
scenario, that tighter environmental regulations (amongst other factors) can simply shift a dirty practice 
over a national border], and the enhancement of class differences as pollution abatement pushes prices 
up are objectionable policy impacts which ought to be avoided". 
6) Complexity, not complication - "[humility in the face of] the profound human ignorance of 
biospherical relationships and therefore the effect of disturbance" of natural systems. Applied to 
humans, it favours division of labour, not fragmentation of labour - "...in integrated action in which the 
whole person is active, not mere reactions". The latter opposes de-humanising menial and repetitive 
un-skilled occupations such as are so much a part of industrial production line techniques. 
7) Local autonomy and decentralisation. "The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional 
to the weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has obtained an 
ecological equilibrium". This principle argues against the patterns that emerge through 'dependency 
theory' as described in chapter 3. It favours local self-governance (as is advocated by Bookchinian 
social ecology) and material and mental self-sufficiency. Local autonomy is enhanced the more 
"hierarchical chains of decision" are broken away, and the greater local independence of resource 
consumption, the greater is resource efficiency - this directly conflicts with conventional economic 
theory, which includes un-ecotogical anomalies such as comparative advantage theories. 
Table 7.3 
Summary of Naess' 1995 Seven Points for a Deep Ecological Outlook (adapted from 
Naess, 1995). 
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Fox (1995) quotes an unpublished (1982) paper ('Deepness of Questions') by Naess in 
which he suggests that: 
The difference between the shallow and deep movement is one of deepness of 
argumentation and of differences in conclusions. In the Shallow movement in favour 
of decreasing pollution and economy of resources, positions are tacitly assumed 
valid which are questioned by the deeper movement. But the differences in 
conclusion are largely due to certain questions, especially of value priorities, not 
being seriously discussed and answered in the shallower movement. 
And that 
...when the deeper issues are introduced in a debate, the conclusions lend towards 
those of the deeper movement, even among those who at the start of the discussion 
favoured shallow policies or who did not hold any definite view... 
It is observable that when more 'moderate environmentalists' discuss issues in a 
serious manner, i f defensive or 'political sensitivity' barriers do not emerge, they tend 
to verge towards more radical ideas, and to agree with what in a more abrupt public 
situation they may reject as 'unrealistic' or 'Utopian'. To consider an ideal 'utopia' and 
then to ignore it is to deflate potential. It is paradoxical then that moderates depend on 
the radicals they condemn in order to appear moderate and more acceptable, since 
without them, their own views would be the extremes. 
McLaughlin (1995) begins his paper concerning the 'role' of deep ecology by stating 
that it is one perspective that leads us to question expansionary industrialism, whether 
it be capitalist or socialist based. Both of these political shades "routinely require the 
destruction of species and ecosystems", and the transformation of industrialism 
towards a less destructive condition is a paramount necessity for human and non-
human interests. Though deep ecology may be idealistic, it is a necessary component 
of the 'environmental consideration spectrum'. Again, it should be remembered that as 
mentioned above, with more radical sections present in the environmental 
media/education picture, the moderate positions gain greater acceptability sooner, and 
so progress with the collective 'ecologisation project' is likely to be hastened. 
The deep ecological framework has learned from historically and currently less 
destructive cultural traits than industrialism. It is widely acknowledged amongst 
advocates of radical ecological frameworks for living that we of the more 
industrialised nations have much to re-learn from what are arrogantly sometimes 
referred to as 'primitive' cultures (Devall & sessions 1985, Naess 1989, Bookchin 
1990, Oelschlaeger 1991, and Fox 1995). La Chapelle (1995) observes a correlation 
between cultures incorporating ritual as an important part of living and less 
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destructive human societal impacts, and between ritual-free cultures and severely 
destructive human impacts. She refers to "native cultures". Thus: 
...they had an intimate, conscious relationship with their place; they were stable 
'sustainable' cultures, often lasting for thousands of years; and they had a rich 
ceremonial and ritual life. They saw these as intimately connected. 
We should remember though, that as with all analysis, blinkered adherence to any one 
form of approach can have a negative effect. Naess' acknowledgement of "nutritional" 
(read 'intellectual') deficient gravitation towards any one 'world view' (whether it be 
maths, physics, history, or even ecology (Naess 1989)) places him in agreement with 
Bookchin who, as mentioned earlier has heavily criticised 'deep ecology' as being too 
narrow a focus. Earlier it was mentioned that Naess described 'ecologism' is an 
unhelpfully narrow focus through 'ecology eyes'. He urges further wariness of this in 
a way that would ward off blind praise of ritualistic outlooks: "hundreds of wars 
which we now consider more or less crazy were glorified in the name of God..." 
(Naess 1995). Christianity has often been implicated as sanctioning and promoting 
destructive and disruptive acts, whilst at the same time urging forgiveness and 
celebration. 
La Chapelle describes various cultures including the Tukano Indians of the Northwest 
Amazon River basin, the !Kung people of the Kalahari Desert, the Tsembaga of New 
Guinea, the Hopi Village of Oraibi in the US, and the people of Santa Ana Pueblo in 
New Mexico State (US); how their evolved cultures had developed deliberately 
'minimal impact' conditions. Turner (1995) describes how the home territories of the 
North American Plains Indians were: 
...entirely mapped by song and story, myth and lore, filled with critical information 
about distance, water, animals, plants, weather, shelter - a string of ecological and 
economical connections between human being and place, an interdependence that 
resulted from necessity, the 'life and death lesson of subsistence economies'. 
And a rich non-destructive human society it was. Turner then lucidly describes the 
cultural condition which has most significantly replaced it in the US: 
Urban inhabitants, freed from producing their own food, clothing, warmth, and 
shelter, ignorant of where their water comes from and where their garbage goes, 
released from educating their children and deprived of community, are blinded to 
biological continuities and dependencies. At the same time, wild nature - forest fires, 
earthquakes, drought, disease - is seen as a malevolent intrusion on the human 
world. Our reaction is to seek more control, our way of measuring progress, 
regardless of the pernicious effect on the planet or even our own destruction. 
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This brings us to the crux of the deep ecological message: it challenges the dualistic 
'man - rest of nature' (Man - Nature-not-Man as Seymour (1995) refers to it) paradox, 
asserting that we are part of a natural system; that we are morally obliged to reverse 
the current trend towards destructive, disruptive and ultimately unsatisfying 
conditions of human culture. 
7.2 Social Ecology 
The most prominent 'social ecology' proponent is Murray Bookchin. It is not possible 
in this paper to review all of his extensive writings on society and its relationship with 
the rest of nature, but the essence of his argument will be outlined. What particularly 
drove his thoughts in the 1970s was his observation that the environmental movement 
was "rather narrow, pragmatic, [and] often socially neutral" (Bookchin 1991). That 
this condition maintains a 'pre-eminence' today remains a source of frustration. He 
considers that most environmental groups have focused on single issues, a charge 
levelled today at many groups by both environmentalists and anti-environmentalists 
alike. 
Bookchin believes that it is the societal and cultural dimensions of civilisation which 
are the cause of adverse impacts of some sections of the human species. It is 
particular sections of the human species which are causing the 'ecological 
haemorrhage'. Discourse of population levels not infrequently generalises 'humans', 
when it is a minority proportion of them who precipitate disharmonious actions 
disproportionately per capita. He surmises that: 
...fit is] our particular society, our particular civilization (western-style industrial 
society], with its hierarchical social relations which pit men against women, 
privileged whites against people of colour, elites against masses, employers against 
workers, the First World against the Third World, and, ultimately, a cancer-like 
'grow or die' industrial capitalist economic system against the natural world and 
other life forms. 
(Bookchin in Bookchin & Foreman 1991) 
Bookchins' emphasis on social relations as the source of our destructive and 
disruptive cultural paradigm explains why the ecophilosophy he adheres to is named 
'social ecology'. Chase (1991) reminds us of the strong influence of Peter Kropotkin 
on the development of social ecology insights and outlooks in his writings on: 
...eco-anarchisl ideas of communitarian democracy, de-urbanisation, industrial 
decentralisation, alternative technology, organic agriculture, limits to growth, and a 
renewed naturalist sensibility. 
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Bookchin (1990) closely echoes the subjects of Kropotkin when he states that human 
society needs to develop towards: 
...an ecological society based on non-hierarchical relationships, decentralised 
democratic communities, and eco-technologies like solar power, organic agriculture, 
and humanely scaled industries. 
Chay (1993) seems to be much in agreement with Bookchin regarding societal 
organisation. He describes the situation in Guatemala, where the Mayan people: 
...believe that any proposal aimed at finding a solution to the problems of the 
environment must recognise changes in land ownership patterns. The most important 
is to preserve and revitalise what remains of the indigenous communal ownership, 
which the state wants to do away with so that it can throw what little land remains 
onto the market. 
He makes clear the favourability of local community autonomy for the maintenance 
of the integrity of low (negative) impact rural society: 
There has to be a decentralisation to combat the constant centralisation of power, 
services and investment that runs counter to the interests of rural communities. 
Chase (1991) observes that deep ecologists have also built on Kropotkins thoughts. 
Perhaps the distinction between social and deep ecological adoption of these ideas is 
that social ecologists such as Bookchin are less suspicious of technology, believing 
that it might be able to serve the interests of radical societal ecologisation/re-
harmonisation (Bookchin 1991) - deep ecology ecophilosophy is more in favour of 
extensive abandonment of technological/industrial endeavours which have 
collectively proven to be negative impactors on socio-ecological integrity. 
Social ecology argues that there is a strong connection between the way people treat 
each other and the way they treat the rest of nature. Hence the aforementioned linkage 
of ecological problems being "...fundamentally social problems requiring fundamental 
social change" (Bookchin in Bookchin & Foreman, 1991). Bookchin (ibid.) believes 
that the source of the current human society structural problems go back a long way: 
Society is poisoned. It has been poisoned for thousands of years, from the Bronze 
Age. It has been warped by rule by elders, by patriarchy, by warriors, by hierarchies 
of all sorts which have led now to the current situation of a world threatened by 
competitive, nuclear-armed, nation-states and a phenomenally destructive corporate 
capitalist system in the West, and an equally destructive, though now crumbling, 
bureaucratic state capitalist system in the East. 
Regarding technology and genetic engineering, Bookchin (1991) considers human 
society to not be morally capable of dealing with bio-technology, and to be: 
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...so immoral that it can't be entrusted to invent anything until [it is J able to...decide, 
as a socially responsible, ecologically sensitive community, how [it is] going to 
design and use [its] technology. 
7.3 Non-Industrial Education. 
It was suggested earlier that industrial societies have much to re-learn from 
'indigenous' populations in order to re-harmonise human society. Appendix 4 contains 
extracts from papers written by representatives of tribal cultures which could act as a 
part of the 'cultural professorialship' from which we could proceed. The perspectives 
are those of representatives of communities and cultures that have suffered 
considerably as imperial and religious conquests have encroached on the integrity of 
very old, yet stable, 'permacultural' societies. Please take the time to read them. 
It is impossible to do justice to what we could learn from traditional societies - Soule 
(1986) explains this omission from his broad book on conservation biology, claiming 
that "it...deserves a book of its own". For this reason, in the context of this thesis only 
an insight will be provided. Doing so is subject to criticism: Piacentini (1993) states 
that "...both the diagnosis and the search for solutions are defined within the 
framework that also gave rise to the problem in the first place". As a Western student 
in a Western university, one can hardly expect to adequately present the words and 
wisdom of other cultures. For this reason, the bulk of this part of the chapter has been 
placed as an appendix of extracts as mentioned above. 
Piacentini (ibid.) believes that "taking the scientifically oriented approach ...more 
concern is given to rectifying the excesses and mistakes [in human societal 
developments] of the model rather than questioning the model itself". He observes 
that non-Western cultures: 
...have not had any noticeable influence on either the dominant development 
paradigm or on the deterioration of nature as a direct result of the application of 
that paradigm. On the contrary, traditional cultures view nature as sacred, and their 
value systems are light years distant from the consumerism that has dragged the 
environmental crisis along in it's wake. 
The Prime Minister of Norway (GH Brundtland) expands on this: 
1) Indigenous peoples are amongst those most affected by environmental 
degradation. 
2) Interaction with modern society has often left indigenous peoples out of the 
process of general economic development. 
3) Indigenous cultures have become victims of what could be described as 'cultural 
extinction'. 
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4) The eradication of poverty is a precondition for environmentally sound 
development, this will require some form of growth which must be a new kind not 
based on over-exploitation of natural resources - it should not mirror western 
growth ethics. 
5) The market alone can not promote environmentally sound behaviour, and socio-
environmntal concerns should be integrated into every level of economic planning, 
performance, and accounting. 
6) Protectionism in the North costs the less industrialised countries more than they 
receive in aid. 
7) Less industrialised countries are strongly influenced by international economic 
conditions, but they are unable [less able] to influence them. 
8) The marginalisation of traditional cultures is a symptom of a cycle of development 
that tends to neglect both human and environmental considerations - [ethical 
consideration in the management of environments for the purpose of development 
has been negligible, or at least it has had negligible impact on developments]. 
Although tribal and other long established cultures are increasingly believed to hold 
clues to sound human society organisation, industrial imperialists have for a long time 
shown wanton disregard for, and extreme forms of exploitation of and violence 
towards traditional societies. 
Seabrook (1993) observes that when the West talks of sustainability, it (most often) 
means sustaining its own patterns of living and privilege. He quotes Indian 
environmentalist Anil Agarwal who states that: 
Those who say the present system is unsustainable are talking nonsense. It is 
sustainable. The only question is, who will pay the price for the powerful to sustain 
their riches and their privilege? This is why questions of environment are also 
questions of social and distributive justice. But there is no objective reason why the 
present system can not go on dispossessing the poor, with more and more casualties 
of environment, more and more urbanisation, social dislocation and degradation in 
every sense. 
The limits of growth may well be a long way off, but things will get increasingly 
unpleasant as they near. It would be arrogant and narrow-minded to suggest that the 
adverse effects of Western style development on traditional cultures, and on other 
socio-ecological interest groups, are not a clear sign that this process is already in 
place. Those who deny that life in New York, Paris or Hong Kong does not effect 
overseas socio-ecological integrity are either blind to or ignorant of the 
internationalisation of trade and political manipulation. If those who are aware of the 
problems caused by these processes do not consider them important, then they are 
guilty of the same arrogant discriminative and selfish outlooks which accommodated 
slavery and imperialistic colonialism. 
Corrupt elite beneficiaries who have been complicit in the processes that have shaped 
disharmonious development bear equal responsibility with the MNCs, development 
bodies, and Western governments which have sought profit and power without 
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effective regard for the impacts of their endeavours. Though there have been some 
considerable benefits from Western development paradigms, much of what is 
transferred is nothing less than cultural pollution. It is not surprising then that, for 
example, certain North African, Middle Eastern, and Asian communities vigorously 
seek to exclude western cultural imperialism. 
'Riches and privilege' are a definitively mixed circumstance. As has been suggested 
elsewhere, and as Durning (1995) argues, consumerism (which offers the material 
'wealth' and 'privilege' of the powerful) is failing to deliver the contentment (the 
emotional and spiritual 'wealth' and 'privilege') it promised. By extending work time 
and stress, and by distracting people from social relationships, it often makes people 
less happy ('happy' is to mean 'good quality of life'). That the 'privilege' of 
consumerism is a negative impactor on the life quality of the consumer is all the more 
tragic since part of the uncounted costs of this are the extensive and considerable 
adverse impacts on the lives of the non-wealthy and the rest of nature. Even where the 
consumer culture does offer potential or actual benefits in terms of improved life 
quality, the marginal increment of 'life-quality-improvement' through greater levels of 
'resource' and product consumption diminishes rapidly. 
Perhaps the most important thing which can be re-learnt from traditional cultures is 
our place in nature and human society - both of which are due considerably greater 
regard in terms of ethical consideration and respect. 
7.4 Community organicisation and the eqoitablisation of culture. 
Visions of how human society could reorganise itself through community 
organicisation and social ecological resurgence will be considered. The ideas of social 
ecologists Bookchin and Morrison (1995) provide two directions which will be 
outlined, followed by Fox's (1995) step forward from deep ecology to a 'transpersonal 
ecology' (in 7.5), achieved through 'psychologising ecophilosophy'. All three aim 
towards ecological community resurgence - a process that would re-link humans, 
non-humans and place. 
A useful grounding for understanding Bookchin's (1991) outlook and cultural vision 
is his view that: 
No one has a right to own property on which the lives of others depend, - either 
morally, socially, or ecologically. Nor does anyone have the right to design, employ 
or impose privately-owned technological equipment on society that damages human 
health and the health of the planet. 
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Bookcbin believes that for example a widespread switch to organic gardening and 
agriculture would serve more than just the conventional stated aims (a superior 
inventory of nutrients, improved soil quality and an end to the adverse impacts of 
agro-chemicals). It would also enrich daily life, sharpen our appreciation of growth 
and decay, introduce us to 'ecological ballet', and "greatly improve upon the current 
fad for jogging on concrete and asphalt sidewalks" (ibid.). He suggests that other eco-
technologies, practices such as the use of wind and solar power, re-use/recycling, 
household composting, season-awareness, transport such as cycling, mixed farming 
permaculture etc., can work to redress the broken appreciation of linkages between 
'first and second (human) nature'. 
Bookchin observes that alongside mass production, mass cultural training has 
degraded our individual uniqueness and so personality. 
Loss of individuality and personal uniqueness, with its ultimate result in the 
'liquidation' of personality itself, begins with the loss of our ability to contrast a more 
human-scaled world that once was; another world, approximating complete 
totalitarianization, that now is; and finally a third one, human-scaled, ecological, 
and rational that should be. 
(Bookchin 1991) 
These points are part of the footing for Bookchins' 'ecological society' vision. The 
details of this and the 'ecological democracy' envisioned by Morrison (see below) are 
outside the scope of this thesis and so will be outlined only very briefly. More 
emphasis will be put on the psychological, outlook, and attitudinal sides of their ideas 
and observations since this answers the 'ethical consideration' question in terms of 
management of the environment. 
One theme that Bookchin emphasises again and again is that humans and their 
managed spaces are natural. The psychologically-internalised dualistic outlook 
which places people as separate from the rest of nature and views them as 
supernatural is a damaging fallacy. He also criticises the view that people are totally 
equal to all life forms and ecosystem complexes, or conversely 'a plague on the earth': 
he believes that we are distinct from other animals, that impact is inevitable and 
legitimate. The hierarchical frame of mind allows people to be perceived as superior 
to each other and the rest of nature and leads to disregard or lack of acknowledgement 
of the interests of other people and the rest of nature. It also leads to grandiose 
aspirations and egotistical material desire. 
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If such arrogance and hierarchy are rejected, responsibility is placed back in the hands 
of the individual; the individual is responsible for respecting the interests of other 
individuals and other parts of nature; and something of an ecological society emerges. 
This form of society favours: 
• re-empowerment in the fullest personal and public sense (not as a psychic experience in 
'psychological energetics'); 
• libertarian peopled institutions "...structured around direct, face-to-face, protoplasmic 
relationships, not around representative, anonymous, mechanical relationships" (Bookchin 
1991); 
• a direct democracy that is free of sexual, ethnic, and hierarchical biases; and 
• a breakdown of the distinction between policy formulation and administrative 
implementation. 
Active citizenship is ultimately "...the most advanced form of direct action" (ibid.). 
Direct action is often misconstrued as being a strategy when in fact it is "...the 
reclamation of the public sphere by the ego, its development towards self-
empowerment, and its culmination as an active participant in society" (ibid.). The 
media has done damage to the phrase 'direct action', associating it only with its more 
controversial side rather than including the (perhaps) more mundane components 
such as participation in community projects such as LETS schemes (see below), 
'green living' and union based worker protection. 
Bookchin states that: 
It is not a 'retribalisation' that an ecological society is likely to seek but rather 
recommunalisation with its wealth of creative libertarian traits. 
(ibid.) 
Other features of Bookchins vision of an ecological society include: Communes 
composed of many smaller communes; the larger Communes would be networked 
confederally through ecosystems, bioregions, and biomes and would be artistically 
tailored to their surroundings. Communities would be decentralised and scaled to 
human dimensions; work would become more craft-like than industrial and would be 
as readily rotated as positions of responsibility; "...the fetishisation of needs would 
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give way to the freedom to chose needs, quantity to quality, and mean-spirited 
egotism to generosity" (ibid.). 
These transformations would introduce ethical consideration into the psychological 
ball-park. It would bring with it ethical consideration in environmental management 
in the social, ecological and economic spheres. Bookchin believes that "humanity can 
never afford to lose its sense of ecological direction and the ethical meaning it gives 
to its projects" (ibid.). 
To introduce Morrison's (1995) vision of an 'ecological democracy', it will be useful 
to state his view of industrial civilisation: 
With astonishing arrogance, industrial civilisation reduces all the world's substance 
to 'resources' to feed the production machine, all the world's people to 'customers' 
and 'workers'. The attempt to continue forever the growth of production and 
consumption is deeply contemptuous oflife...The negative consequences of industrial 
practices are called 'externalities', as if the poisoner had not intended the death of 
the victim. 
As Morrison sees it, an ecological civilisation "...is based on diverse life ways 
sustaining linked natural and social ecologies" (ibid.). In such a civilisation, people 
are not at war with nature, they are knowingly a part of it. It would not develop 
through an act of government or by an authoritarian decree, it would rely on humans 
being willing to make new social choices. The economy would be community-centred 
and comprised of "small businesses, co-operatives, community-based non-profit 
groups, and local government organisations", (ibid.). Education, business and banking 
would be owned and controlled in the community. An internalised appreciation of 
'ecological commons' would mean that a sound balance would emerge between the 
right to use the commons and the responsibility not to degrade it. The social systems 
of commons use would be based on participation and agreement, "not on the notions 
of state monopoly of force and exclusivity of citizenship" (ibid.). 
Morrison notes how globalisation has weakened the nation state, inviting diverse 
community assertion (presumably in defence against cultural and heritage extinction -
through, say, the 'Americanisation' of culture). Like Bookchin, one of the 
cornerstones of his ecological society are 'associations', which are "the basic venue 
for moving power away from the state and corporate bureaucracies" (ibid.). 
Community autonomy is important: a reduction of state-based control is in order 
(responsibility of the individual and community is assumed and encouraged). Indeed 
Morrison likens 'association' to Bookchin's libertarian municipalism, where there is an 
expansion of local power and self-sufficiency. Multiple alliances between 
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associations (or confederations) further weaken the power of distant government, and 
enhance community autonomy. An ecological associative democracy aims to bring 
about a change from large firms and government bureaucracies to a "local, co-
operative, and responsive social and economic order" (ibid.). 
The importance of this explanation is that it erodes the hierarchical dominative 
paradigm and works towards a mutually assisting culture, away from competitive 
conflict. Morrison observes that ecological values can inform our actions and choices, 
but that "value finds meaning through action - the practice of association, co-
operation and confederation" (ibid.). Again in agreement with Bookchin, such a social 
condition (eroded hierarchical, top down, state authority), which would make space 
for mutual assistance, would at the same time open the collective mind to greater 
consideration - ethical consideration - towards the non-human world. 
Morrisons' plan for an ecological democracy is more an aim than a form of approach 
whereas Bookchins' social ecology is a frame of analysis leading towards an 
ecological society. He gives three core components of the task to reach the 
ecologisation goal which reveal a slightly awkward human-centred slant to an 
otherwise sound plan: 
1) To transform the existing market and planning system to one conditioned by 
ecological social choices; 
2) to nurture and co-ordinate the grand expansion of freedom and community 
stimulated by ecological transformation; and 
3) to develop durable means of communication and decision making to create and 
protect the ecological commons. 
What is awkward is the term 'ecological commons'. It places people at the centre of 
things and ignores wider interests - it is as if the area to which he refers belongs to 
people. 
The earth, like the sun, like the air, belongs to everyone [and everything] - and to no-
one [and nothing]. 
(Abbey 1970) 
It is the social contract between people which demands respect for the interests of 
others (and their 'possessions'), whilst moral rectitude demands respect for the 
interests of both human and non-human integrity. As Oelschlaeger (1991) describes 
the 'homo-sapiens distinct by culture' outlook: 
...natural or evolutionary process led to human nature, and human nature led to 
culture; but culture has paradoxically enabled behaviour that impairs the integrity of 
nature. 
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Great intellectual capacity is not inherently 'good' or 'special' - if it allows us to do 
that which degrades the integrity of Earth ecology and of human society, it is a 
handicap. 
The earth is not a mechanism but an organism, a being with its own life and its own 
reasons, where the support and sustenance of the human animal is incidental. If man 
in his new-found power and vanity persists in the attempt to remake the planet in his 
own image, he will succeed only in destroying himself- not the planet. The earth will 
survive our most ingenious folly. 
(Abbey 1970) 
Morrison (1995) also offers several 'elements and venues' for a more ecological 
approach. They are further detailed in Appendix 5 with adaptations from other related 
sources, and include the following: 
• democratising finance 
• building community economics 
• revaluation of the future 
• creating a social wage 
• pursuing disarmament and demilitarisation 
• developing an industrial ecology 
• developing a 'solar economy' 
7.5 Transpersonal Ecology. 
Fox (1995) provides another vision of the future of societal interactionary evolution. 
He argues for what he refers to as a 'transpersonal ecology', that is to say 'trans-' (as in 
beyond as opposed to across) '-personal' - extending the psychological functions of 
concern, respect and defence beyond "...the limits of one's egoic, biographical, or 
personal sense of self". He makes a distinction between 'transpersonal ecology' and 
'transpersonal psychology': the latter is limited to thought and sentiment which can 
consider the non-human (though not necessarily); the former also includes the 
interaction processes. Fox argues that transpersonal psychology is not inherently 
anthropocentric, but that to date it has had this tendency. Thus he calls for 
"'ecologizing' transpersonal psychology" - in other words a 'transpersonal ecology'. 
Foxs' approach is based around 'ecopsychology' (covered to depth in Roszak et. al. 
1995), geared more towards psychological change (that this may redress the negative-
impacting condition of industrial imperialistic outlooks), rather than the more clearly-
defined human social arrangements considered by Bookchin and Morrison. It rests on 
the assumption that what the mind reasons, the body will effect. 
181 
To 'psychologise' is to internalise psychologically. Thus 'psychologising 
ecophilosophy' is the process of psychologically internalising ecophilosophy. Fox 
believes that there is a great need to allow and encourage transpersonal ecology; that 
sound ecophilosophy may be more widely internalised, eroding or replacing the 
current dominance of anthropocentric instrumental ecophilosophy. It would open the 
doors to a more holistic ecophilosophy which accommodates intrinsic values in the 
equation of living. 
Fox (1995) describes nine arguments that underlie instrumental value theory: 
1) life support system argument 
Point 1 emphasises the physical nourishment value of the 'non-human world to 
humans' (NHWTH) - food, water and shelter. 
2) early warning system argument 
3) laboratory argument 
4) silo (genetic information storage) argument 
Points 2, 3, and 4 emphasise the informational value of the NHWTH - sources of 
knowledge etc. (observation, example, medicine sources, gene bank...) 
5) gymnasium argument 
6) art gallery argument 
7) cathedral argument 
Points 5, 6, and 7 emphasise the experiential value of the NHWTH - aesthetics and 
entertainment. 
8) monumental argument 
Point 8 emphasises the symbolic instructional value of the NHWTH - reminds people 
of the power and grandiosity of nature, and 'our place' in nature. It provides 'scales of 
grandiosity' to compete with. 
9) psychogenic argument 
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Point 9 emphasises the psychological nourishment value of the NHWTH - relates to 
the sum of points 1-8, the physical and intellectual nourishment that allows humans to 
be what they are. 
Table 7.4 shows the concept of the 'tripartite self (the whole person being comprised 
of a 'desiring-impulsive', a 'normative-judgmental,1 and a 'rationalising-deciding' self). 
I t relates the three selves to their psychological role, the ecophilosophical 
accommodations they allow - a Freudian analogy. In the Table the rationalising-
deciding self is paired with accommodating intrinsic values and theory. It should be 
noted that this is a potential accommodation, and that the rationalising part of the 
label is also the source of the many 'elaborate justifications' people have historically 
produced to justify their lack of moral concern for some sections of the human species 
and generally all non-humans (Fox 1995). 
WHICH SELF ROLE ECOPHILOSOPHICAL 
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Tripartite Self Conception & Ecophilosophy (adapted from Fox, 1995). 
The 'rationalising-deciding1 self specialises in explanations and justifications, acting 
like a conscience or 'contentment nerve centre' - when personal rationality seems not 
to be in charge of personal actions, it has to explain, excuse or justify the 
consequences of actions. As Fox states, it is the self that says " I don't know what 
came over me", "totally out of character", or "didn't really want to do it". It is the 
place where bravado lies to the conscience, conscience is suppressed to please or 
conform and knowingly exploitative actions are excused or rationalised. It is where 
honesty, consistency, and deep self-dissatisfaction and guilt sit. It is often suppressed 
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or hidden by those practising socio-ecologically damaging lifestyles who are aware of 
the nature of their actions - and the possible source of ecologisation instincts. 
Environmental education and ethical awareness need to sow themselves in this comer 
of the mind. 
In fact, the three selves of the mind seldom work in isolation. Inconsistent and 
'psychically uncomfortable' combinations of, for example, resource conservation and 
intrinsic value approaches may be more common than purely conservation or intrinsic 
value reasoning. 'Real world' pressures of time, budget, perceived scarcity, 
materialism, 'hotch-potch' belief complexes, legal and tradition intervention, career 
aspirations, fear of media and appearing 'unconventional' or 'radical', and many more, 
mean that compromise, inconsistency and 'hybrid' goals and guiding principles' are 
common. Fox (1995) states that: 
Objectivisl intrinsic value theory approaches—show that it is morally wrong to do 
some things to certain members or aspects of the non-human world and morally right 
[or acceptable] to do other things; that one's personal likes and dislikes -one's 
personal prejudices- are neither here nor there with respect to the validity of these 
judgements; and that, where conflict occurs between intrinsic value based concerns 
(i.e., moral concerns) and either appetitive, desiring-impulsive concerns or 
anthropocenlric, 'responsible management' concerns, it is the intrinsic value based 
concerns that should be given over-riding priority. 
This sort of moral consistency is rarely adhered to. More often it is the case that 
ignorance or confusion interfere with the possibility of moral rectitude and 
consistency. 
Above it was stated that the 'rationalising-deciding' corner of the mind was where 
environmental education and ethical awareness need to/can sow themselves. It is the 
individual, not external rules to which the individual adheres, which dictate that the 
person does not breach 'sound morality' in actions. 
Fox argues, congruent with the deep ecology thesis, that a psychologically 
internalised expansion the concept of 'self to a wider me, the environment, and its 
components 'Self is possible. It is from the narrower (self) conception that philosophy 
proceeds to moral demands. I f an individual psychologises a transpersonal 
ecophilosophy (ecologisation of the mind), then ethics "(conceived as being 
concerned with moral 'oughts') is rendered superfluous"(Fox 1995, emphasis added). 
Fox describes this mind ecologisation as extending the 'self to include "family and 
friends, other animals, physical objects, the region in which I live...". He quotes an 
unpublished lecture by Naess to explain how with a transpersonalised ecological 
outlook, morals and ethics become obsolete, since respecting and protecting the 'Self 
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includes respecting and protecting beyond the physical T, an 'I-and-my-internalised-
interests1: 
Care flows naturally if the 'self is widened and deepened so thai protection of free 
Nature is fell and conceived as protection of ourselves..Just as we need not morals 
to make us breathe...[so] if your 'self in the wide sense embraces another being, you 
need no moral exhorlion to show care...You care for yourself without feeling any 
moral pressure to do it - provided you have not succumbed to a neurosis of some 
kind, developing self-destructive tendencies, or haling yourself. 
(Naess, from an unpublished lecture, quoted in Fox 1995) 
Numerous sources (such as Manes 1990) describe the realisation by Australian 
environmentalist John Seed when protesting the logging of New South Wales rain 
forest, that he realised "...through all [the] chaos I realised that I was part of the forest 
- that I was the rain forest defending herself" (Manes 1990). This realisation is 
analogous to a Zenian 'transformation of personality' (Fox 1995). Naess' (1989) 
ecophilosophy has a core of "Self-realisation" - a condition in which benevolent 
actions are performed through inclination rather than duty (not inclination 
consequence of fear of reprisal by law or intimidation). Naess also believes that there 
is a need to be reminded of our ethical shortcomings but that i f people feel they 
sacrifice their interests in order to show respect for Nature: "this is probably in the 
long run a treacherous basis for conservation" (Naess, quoted in Fox 1990). 
Fox is not impractical: he asserts that in interpreting ideas such as the above 'Self, we 
should not: "get carried away in flights of imaginative fancy but rather...understand 
what is being said as far as possible in a down to earth, ordinary, everyday sense". It 
should be interpreted as appreciating a sense of 'similarity', or 'commonality' - not in a 
literal sense of " I am that tree over there" (which is plainly absurd to most people), 
but though interlinked interests; the moral obligation to respect intrinsic values is of 
paramount importance in morally sound living. Thus 'identification' with the interests 
of the non-human and their inherent value is where complicity with their interests can 
develop. Advocates of the expansion of self as the manifestation of ecologisation are 
in no doubt that this is "a difficult ridge to walk: to the left we have the ocean of 
organic and mystic views, to the right the abyss of atomic individualism" (Naess 
1989). It is perhaps worth recalling the view of Terena of Brazil (Appendix 4, Terena 
point 6), that the indigenous people consider themselves "citizens of the forest". This 
is very close to the transpersonal ecological advocation, since as citizens of the forest, 
the protection of all 'citizenry' interests is close to mandatory - here through 
internalised (widened) citizen companionship. 
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As a final paradox in the Self-realisation and transpersonal ecologisation line of 
thought, Fox notes another perspective of Naess' 'ridge treading': there is positive 
effect to be accrued from the transpersonal ecologisation approach but there is a fine 
conceptual line between this and the possible negative effects of "exclusive or 
primary reliance on this form of identification (ray self first, my family and friends 
next, and so on)" (Fox 1995). The latter "...underlie the egoisms, attachments, and 
exclusivities that find personal, corporate, national, and international expression in 
positiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and ecocide" (ibid.). So the vital symbiotic 
identification with Self-realisation, of the internalised appreciation and respect for 
non-instrumental value in the non-human, need to become established and prevail 




The level, nature and potential of ethical consideration in environmental management 
have been considered. Environmental management includes parameters of context 
that are not inadequately recognised, for example environmental racism is a historical 
and contemporary problem of considerable proportions. Legacies from the past can 
explain historical problems of this sort, but contemporary trade and political 
structures, and naive (though well meaning) responses to socio-environmental 
problems, have allowed new recipes to continue the infrastructure of discrimination, 
exploitation and abuse. 
Homo sapiens, the most intellectually gifted species, has developed technological 
capacity and ecological impact potential that far exceeds their understanding and 
control of the same. As societies move down the channels of western style 
industrialisation, so 'growth', 'consumption' and 'control' become culturally fetishised 
- there is a ratchet system in the psychological normalisation of socio-ecological 
impact growth. The capacity of technology is hardly under the restraint of moral 
reason, and attitudinal 'formulations' consequence of social environment conditioning 
and the ruthless pursuit of personal desires, promote socio-ecologically destructive 
and divisive traits. 
One of the most problematic products of social development is the hierarchical social 
order which stratifies ego fulfi l l ing 'status'. Historically white men have dominated 
the apex of these social divisions, and through the extension of this insidious 
psychology, non-human nature has been put at the base (though sometimes bigotry 
has placed some humans below animals). Human endeavours at managing and 
engineering the 'evolution'/direction of composition/structure of ecosystems and 
landscapes is a gamble with vital Life integrity. Our understanding of nature is 
rudimentary and partial: "Nature is not only more complex than we think, it is more 
complex than we can ever think" (Miller 1993). 
Excessive consumption (and thus by implication waste disposal) is of paramount 
significance and in part this problem derives from the break-up of the sources of 
socially structured community. The assertion of personalised space, the pursuit of 
personal profit and property, the expectation of rapid and distant travel/'escape', and 
the normalisation of geographically and seasonally exotic consumables and 
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experiences has catalysed a collective psychology which ignores, denies, and often 
does not even recognise the extensive and dramatic adverse socio-ecological impacts 
of these goals. 
Currently responses to realisation that 'throwing waste over the garden fence' is both 
socially and ecologically damaging in this age of mass consumption and waste, 
coupled with economic sanctions that have been introduced to deter irresponsible 
waste disposal (including inadvertent disposal/loss of 'resources'), and 
communications allowing awareness and vocalised opposition to more distant (out of 
sight) disposal of industrial society waste, are reactive rather than pre-emptive. 
There are cultural development explanations for current socio-ecologically disruptive 
and damaging conditions. But it is particularly 'the West' and more industrialised 
countries, and strivations to mimic western socio-industrial paradigms, that are most 
responsible for the erosion of bio-integrity and diversity. Parallel to the erosion of 
'community', scales of activity have grown. 'Resource' consumption has expanded 
dramatically towards 'high mass consumption' for a large proportion of people, and 
production, promotion, and distribution have gravitated towards impersonal and 
unnatural scales of operation. 
Streamlining production and distribution has brought with i t the standardisation of 
consumption patterns. This is paralleled by the spread of what is often referred to as 
'cultural pollution'. Just as US hegemony has dominated in other spheres of socio-
economic development, so "Californication" (Abbey 1977) has denuded cultural 
diversity and richness as well as the individual human, animal and ecosystem. 
At the global and national strategic level, the level of corporate and business interests, 
and also at the popular level, responses to an expanding awareness of the socio-
ecological costs of recent changes in community and lifestyle has been dominated by 
'reformist' discussion, proposals and action - that which seeks to modify current 
systems and orders to effect changes towards the highly acclaimed goal of 
'sustainability'. 
There is much heated debate about domestic environmental policy out of which come 
proposals, deliberations and more proposals for future research/monitoring of 
environmental change, and 'environmentalism' has perhaps reached a stage of 
'acceptance'. 
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The linkages between politics, commerce and research are so strong as to provoke 
serious questioning about wholwhat ends government seeks to serve. 
At the strategic level, it seems that international development bodies are struggling to 
apply reformed and embryonic commitments to social and environmental 
responsibility. 
Ecological tax reform/'green taxes' have potential, but there are numerous social, 
procedural, strategic, and logistical barriers in the path of their widespread 
application. 
The growing trend of 'directional migration' from corporate unaccountability (to 'the 
'polluter pays principle', then to the 'pollution prevention pays' principle) has a further 
step to take: production reduction pays socio-ecologically. 
With public interest and concern, as well as some 'carrot and stick' incentives from 
governments, the dependence of business on a satisfied customer has brought a will to 
satisfy demands for greater socio-ecological responsibility (so as to maintain sales). In 
practice i f the goal (reform) is achieved, then it does not matter whether this is 
through genuine corporate wil l , or to maintain sales. 
At the popular level there is a core of informed people pressing for and living more 
benign lifestyles, with ethical consideration either explicit or implicit in this assertion. 
The general public is also increasingly aware of environmental issues and expressing 
concern over collective human impact. Ethical consideration is implied in this 
concern. 
However there are two key sources of barriers to widespread lifestyle adjustment 
geared towards environmental consideration: 
a) the public is in possession of incomplete, often confused, and sometimes 
misdirected information about environmental issues; and 
b) human character traits that restrict the potential for lifestyle modifications, 
and shark away from anything that seems as though it might threaten 
individual liberty. 
Environmental education is a crucial goal for the environment movement. 
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Environmental economics and evaluation are some of the more prestigious reformist 
responses to environmental concerns, and implicit in the attempts to incorporate 
environmental criteria more effectively into decision making for development and 
management is ethical consideration. 
Methodologies for environmental valuation that seek to achieve stated 'preference' 
and 'environmental index' gauges have merits and demerits - both methodological and 
principle based. 
Some core flaws in the application of neo-classical economic theory to environmental 
issues are that: the environment is not a commodity traded and consumed by 
individuals in the same way as other goods and services are (though for example the 
private access to clear fell public forests, and the absorption of commons for private 
developments are relevant quirks to this theme); and private ownership of 
environmental phenomena is not the norm - exploitation of 'environmental commons' 
by some people affects the care that many more express towards these commons, and 
also the observable consideration people show towards components of the 
environment. 
Environmental economics has some potential to assist with reducing adverse impacts 
on socio-environmental integrity. But attempting to put a price on the priceless is 
questionable and homocentrically arrogant. It is arguable that it is better for a subject 
to remain im-priced than to be under-priced - categorical and unimpeachable 
standards of regard for some phenomena may well be justified, and strategically this 
may be the only way to ensure their protection. 
Another predicament in attempts to apply neo-classical economic theory to 
environmental concerns is that the latter must then 'compete' with profit motivated 
development interests in order to be protected. Environmental integrity is greatest 
when human impact and economistic application is minimal or non-existent, and so 
environmental interests (which benefit people as well - people are a part of the 
environment) can hardly be expected to compete with corporate/development 
interests whose expressed purpose often necessitates environmental damage, with 
profit as the motive. Equally, i t is insidious to attempt to impose capitalist systems on 
indigenous cultures. Costs can be written off against predicted earnings, and profits 
(benefits in the cost/benefit balance sheet) can be ratcheted up by attaching more 
development to proposals. 
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The prices attached to environmental components and complexes are only one small 
part of their value. Although people are 'the centre of the world' they personally 
experience, so too the Elk or Wolf are 'the centre of the world' that they experience. 
Humans are not the measure of all that is of value; their intellectual and technological 
capacities do not grant them a disproportionately special place in the natural world. 
Reformist approaches to environmental issues are generally motivated by ethical 
consideration as well as instrumental goals, but they are timid, compromising, often 
inconsistent, and avoid real depth in questioning. This is the distinction between them 
and more radical outlooks. 
Radical outlooks are defined by their deeper questioning and by their willingness to 
confront tough and sometimes uncomfortable questions. Reformist approaches are 
characterised by thought within the status quo which addresses some socio-
environmental problems, or rather symptoms of problems, without seriously 
challenging the contradictions and assumptions of the (impactually) dominant world 
view. Bookchin (1991) succinctly and accurately sums up the nature of reformist 
outlooks: 
Conventional reform efforts, at their best can only slow down but they cannot arrest 
the overwhelming momentum towards destruction within our society. At their worst, 
they lull people into a false sense of security. Our institutional social order plays 
games with us to foster this passivity. It grants long-delayed, piecemeal, and woefully 
inadequate reforms to defied our energies and attention from larger acts of 
destruction. 
Although there is some 'factional dispute' between sections of the radical environment 
movement, this pale to insignificance next to the gulf between them and the 
prevailing mechanistic and instrumental outlooks. These are most distinctly 
'prevailing' in terms of impact and the 'power' of those who hold them; but they also 
prevail in the quantity and breadth of the damage and divisiveness they wreak on 
socio-ecological integrity. 
Now more than ever, the relief of adverse impact on environmental integrity is bound 
up with the relief of the degradation of human social environment integrity. Equally, 
widespread awareness of the conflict of interests between short-term egoic-greed 
motivation in conjunction with the potency and impact of technology, and an ethically 
considerate human component of the Earth, defines a watershed of human society's 
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relationship with the rest of nature. People must chose whether to continue eroding 
the Earth's biosphere, or to begin redressing the damage. 
A majority of what people do that causes damage and division is optional; other 
choices can be made. When discussing issues to greater and informed depth, even the 
moderate and indifferent tend towards the conclusions of deeper ecophilosophy. 
Because people are optionally responsible for massive adverse distortions of Earth 
system, structure and composition integrity, they are morally obliged to reverse the 
trend towards these destructive, divisive, and ultimately dissatisfying conditions of 
human culture. 
More industrial societies can learn much from the less industrial - and particularly 
'indigenous' - cultures which are the antithesis of the consumer culture which has 
dragged the socio-environmental crisis condition in its wake. Deep questioning of 
culture is in order 'the market' can not resolve socio-ecological dislocation, although 
as a very short term transition stage, the potential of environmental economics might 
be one part of the process. Consumerism is failing to deliver the contentment it 
promised. 
The most important thing to be learnt from traditional cultures is the place of the 
individual in nature and human society. Mass consumer culture denudes personality 
and individuality. Human society was once 'human-scaled' by virtue of tradition, the 
level of 'technological know-how, and 'restrictions' consequence of the marriage of 
both of these; it now resembles almost complete totalitarianisation by state and the 
consumption/manipulation fetish, fuelled by media-exposure psychological 
'guidance'; and it is possible to choose a future that is once again human-scaled and 
also ecologically rational. 
Deep ecology, social ecology, and transpersonal ecology are three distinct but linked 
fields of reason which offer considerable and comprehensive suggestions of how 
human society could evolve henceforth, i f people had the courage to go against the 
grain of docile, rudderless, acceptance of the status-quo. Such changes would not 
happen through any form of authoritarian decree, for this is an unreliable basis for 
cultural change or maintenance: it would rely on people being willing to make new 
choices, to internalise an appreciation of a just balance between the 'right' to use the 
'Ecological Commons' (in the widest sense of all interest groups, both human and 
non-human), and the responsibility not to degrade them. 
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Human intellectual capacity is not inherently 'good' or 'special' i f it allows us to do 
that which degrades the integrity of Earth's biosphere - it then becomes a handicap. 
Human violation of the ecosystems ultimately degrades their own 'life style' (foul 
their own nest), as well as the condition of the rest of nature; the comfort and 
'services' afforded to people by the rest of nature can be drastically eroded, but people 
are a fragile and dispensable component of Nature from the perspective of the Gaian 
whole. 
Ignorance, confusion, tradition and a 'herd' mentality interfere with the possibility of 
moral rectitude and consistency. Physically, people are a part of the earth, and just 
like the destructive industrial machine, are ultimately destined to decompose back 
into the earth from where they came. However humans are vitally aware of living, as 
we must assume are other animals. In this respect people can appreciate the value of 
life for other species. 
The core of transpersonal ecology is the extension of the narrow appreciation of 'self 
to a wider appreciation of 'Self - an internalised, indeed psychologised appreciation 
of, and respect for, a broader contingent of interest groups. This Self-realisation and 
opening up to respect for non-instrumental value in the non-human would improve 
the quality of life for people at the same time as reducing the scale and total cost of 
personal consumption. 
I f people feel that they must sacrifice their interests in order to show respect for 
nature, then "this is probably in the long run a treacherous basis" (Naess in Fox 1990) 
for ecologisation - the rationalising-deciding component of personality must gravitate 
towards this end. It is therefor vital that environmental education and ethical 
awareness take root in this corner of the mind. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The European Community and North Sea Degradation. 
Adaptive summary of a June 3rd 1995 Guardian Report. 
While it seems likely that commercial extinction due to pollution and overfishing 
threatens the marine fishing industry, its global fleet receives $54 billion (£34 billion) 
in subsidies annually, encouraging it to fish for smaller fry and to go further to do so. 
Social conflict emerges as fishing grounds are fought for - up to 50 countries are in 
dispute over fishing stocks, creating disputes in every major fishing ground (for 
example in the Irish Sea between Spain and the UK and off Canada (between Canada 
and Spain)). 
In the North Sea (and others) pollution in the form of nutrient run-off from sewage, 
forestry and farming leads to the death of marine life through lack of oxygen caused 
by the decomposition of algae that flourishes in the nutrient rich conditions; 
sedimentation from mining, forestry and farming clogs fish gills, smooths and buries 
coastal ecosystems, and carries toxins and excess nutrients; pathogens from sewage 
and livestock contaminate seafood and coastal bathing areas, spreading diseases; 
persistant toxins from industrial discharge, and pesticides from farms, forests, and 
home use poisons marine life and contaminates sesa food; oil (46% from cars, heavy 
machinery, industry and other land based sources and 32% from ships and oil tanker 
workings) can, even at low level contamination, ki l l larvae and cause disease in 
marine life, while oil slicks kill marine life; plastics (from landfills, industry, beach 
litter, fishing nets, and agriculture - where disused plasti-culture ('glass-house') 
materials are abandoned extensively) litter the oceans; thermal pollution as cooling 
water from power plants and industrial sites kills off corals and other species sensitive 
to temperature; radioactive isotopes from discarded submarines and military wastes 
and from atmospheric fallout create hot spots of radioactivity and can enter food 
chains causing disease in marine life and polluted seafood. These are the striking facts 
of the seas. 
The same report describes how the then UK Environment Minister (John Gummer) 
"diluted" what had been strong words against overfishing after correspondence with 
the then Agriculture Minister (William waldegrave) who encouraged not to offend the 
EC as its support would be needed in another foreseen "Atlantic tuna war" with 
Spain. 
The European Union, with "the most sophisticated regulation of trade and waste", 
where theoretically catch size controls are in place, 'technical expertise' is abundant, 
less corruption is experienced [?], and there is a concentration of strong economies, is 
unable to construct and effectively implement environmental protection even within 
its own superficially united territory. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Environmental Damage Balance Sheet 
for the Federal Republic of Germany 
Damage category Damage costs (in billion DM per year) 
Air pollution about DM 48 billion 
Human health damage greater than 2.3-5.8 
Material damage greater than 2.3 
Damage to fauna greater than 0.1 
Damage to flora greater than 1.0 
Forest damage greater than 5.5-8.8 
Water pollution much greater than DM 17.6 billion 
Loss of earnings from fishing greater than 0.25 
Cost of drinking-water supply much greater than 9.0 
Decline in leisure and recreational value greater than 7.0 
Loss of aesthetic appeal/value greater than 1.0 
Other "calculable" damages (eg. injury to greater than 0.35 
water birds, oil spills by tankers) 
Soil contamination much greater than DM 5.2 billion 
Chernobyl and "Chernobyl avoidance costs" greater than 2.4 
Waste disposal greater than 1.7 
Biotope and species preservation costs greater than 1.0 
Other types of soil contamination much greater than 0.1 
("pro memoria" figures") 
Noise greater than DM 32.7 billion 
Decline in productivity greater than 3.0 
Noise compensation greater than0.4 
Decline in value of residences greater than29.3 
Total "calculable" damages much greater than DM 103.5 billion 
[Note: it appears that there was a printing error in the Air pollution section (in Barde and Pearce, 
1991). However the total of DM 48 billion is thought to be correct.] 
Adapted from Barde and Pearce, 1991. 
BARDE J-P. & PEARCE, D.W., (eds) 1991. Valuing the Environment. London, 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Gilbert Whites' letter of May 20th, 1777 (in Wall 1994) is a fine example of how 
'pests' and other components of ecosystems can be misunderstood and their 
contribution to stability not recognised. It is an amusing and lucid plea to the people 
of his day. 
Letter XXXV: Selbourne, 20th May, 1777 
Dear Sir, 
Lands that are subject to frequent inundations are always poor; and probably the 
reason may be because worms are drowned. The most insignificant insects and 
reptiles are of much more consequence, and have much more influence in the 
oeconomy of nature, than the incurious are aware of; and are mighty in their effect, 
from their minuteness, which renders them less an object of attention; and from their 
numbers and their fecundity. Earthworms, though in appearance a small and 
despicable link in the chain of nature, yet, i f lost, would make a lamentable chasm. 
For, to say nothing of half the birds, and some quadrupeds which are almost entirely 
supported by them, worms seem to be the great promoters of vegetation, which would 
proceed but lamely without them, by boring, perforating and loosening the soil, and 
rendering it pervious to rains and the fibres of plants, by drawing straws and stalks of 
leaves and twigs into it; and , most of all, by throwing up such infinite lumps of earth 
called worm-casts, which, being their excrement, is a fine manure for grain or grass. 
Worms probably provide new soil for hills and slopes where the rain washes the earth 
away; and they affect slopes, probably to avoid being flooded. Gardeners and farmers 
express their detestation of worms; the former because they render their walks 
unsightly and make them much work: and the latter because, as they think, worms eat 
their green corn. But these men would find that the earth without worms would soon 
become cold, hard-bound, and void of fermentation; and consequently sterile: and 
besides, in favour of worms, it should be hinted that green corn, plants and flowers, 
are not so much injured by them as by many species of coleoptera (scarabs), and 
tipuloe (long-legs), in their larva or grub state; and by unnoticed myriad's of small 
shell-less snails, called slugs, which silently and imperceptibly make amazing havoc 
in the field and garden. 
These hints we think proper to throw out in order to set the inquisitive and discerning 
to work. 
A good monography of worms would afford much entertainment and information at 
the same time, and would open a large and new field in natural history. Worms work 
most in the spring; but by no means lie torpid in the dead months; are out every mild 
night in the winter, as any person may be convinced that wi l l take the pains to 
examine his grass-plots with a candle, are hermaphrodites, and much addicted to 
venery, and consequently very prolific. 
In WALL, D., 1994. Green History: a reader in environmental literature, philosophy 
and politics. London, Routledge. 
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APPENDIX 4 
'Non-Westernised' Voices on Man and the Rest of Nature. 
Section 7.3 suggests that there is much to be gained from re-learning appreciation of 
our place in nature; to learn that we are a part of i t , not something outside of it, 
threatened by it; nor with a moral right (even less a fulfilled-survival need) to attempt 
to dominate and abuse it. This would represent a shift (in general terms) from a 
Western to an Eastern philosophical way of viewing the world. The many fragmented 
and on-defensive tribal cultures can teach us through their own voices, rather that 
through global anthropologists who historically - and often still - misrepresent 
cultural constructions. 
The insights presented here are extracts from the book 'Story Earth: Native Voices on 
the Environment', which is comprised of papers writen by representatives of 
indigenous peoples and edited by Pablo Piacentini on behalf of the Inter Press Service 
Third World News Agency. 
Bruchach (1993), an authority on his North American Indian heritage, provides some 
lucid insights into the psychology of pre-European-invasion life of one of the 
hundreds of different cultures there. He shares the following insights with us: 
• I f we see 'the earth' as the web of life that sustains us, then there is no 
question that the web is weakened, that the earth is sick. But i f we look at it 
from another side, from the view of the living earth itself [Gaian inference], 
then the sickness is not that of the planet, the sickness is embodied in human 
beings [Foreman's 'cancer' analogy], and, i f carried to it's logical conclusion, 
the sickness wil l not kill the earth, it wil l kil l us. 
• Human self-importance is a big part of the problem. It is because we human 
beings have one power that no other creatures have - the power to upset the 
natural balance - that we are so dangerous to ourselves. 
• The rattlesnake is deadly and dangerous, the grizzly and the polar bear have 
been known to hunt and ki l l human beings, but in native traditions those 
creatures are honored even as they are feared. 
• [As mentioned in chapter 2] ...for Europeans, wildness was something to be 
tamed. To the native people of North America, wilderness was home and it 
was not 'wild' until the Europeans made it so. 
• It is a simple fact that the native people of New England, for example, were 
better fed, better clothed, and healthier than the European colonists. They also 
had more fun. European chroniclers of the time often wrote of the way in 
which the Indians made even work seem like play. They turned their work, 
such as planting a field or harvesting, into a communal activity with laugh and 
song. 
• The lot of native women was drastically different from that of the colonial 
women. Native women had control over their own lives. 
• The whole idea of wildlife conservation and ecology, in fact, was common 
practice among the native peoples of this continent...There was not, therefore, 
the European idea of devastating your own backyard and then moving on to 
fresh ground - to a new frontier (the backyard of your weaker neighbour). 
• There was no clock time, but cyclical time. The seasons completed a circle, 
and so too did our human lives...The circle is the way to see. The circle is the 
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way to live, always keeping in mind the seven generations to come, always 
asking: how wi l l my deeds affect the lives of my children's children's 
children? 
• I f you see things in terms of circles and cycles,...you do not think in terms of 
a four-year presidency or a yearly national budget - artificial creations that 
mean nothing positive in terms of the health of the Earth and the people. 
Chay (1993), a member of the Quiche Mayan group, and a communal leader, 
provides insights to the psychology of Central American Guatemala Mayan 
'ecophilosophy': 
• The Mayan culture...has managed to survive five hundred years of 
colonization, a process that started with the conquistadores and continued at 
the hands of their descendants. Over all these years, we have been on the 
receiving end of a constant offensive against our forms of production and 
social organisation, our culture and our religion, in reality a cult of nature. 
• The Guatemala of today is a country torn by serious conflicts rooted in two 
very different forms of l ife, two cultures tied together by a bond of 
domination-subordination [recall Bookchin's concern about the effects of 
hierarchical culture]. The aim of the conquistadores was to introduce 
Christianity as a form of ideological control and justification for new forms of 
oppression and exploitation of both man and nature. 
• Mayas believe that all nature is life: each animal, stone, and river has its 
own nahual or 'divine personification' [intrinsic value as deep ecology 
recognises] 
• The earth and water are considered superior to all elements of nature 
because they are the orogins of life. 
• Man bends to the design of nature, which he does not consider alien to 
himself [counter to the dualistic people-in environment referred to elsewhere] 
and which he cannot exploit without mercy. The irrational use of the natural 
resources made available to man is a sin. 
• A Mayan year is divided into 260 days, further divided into thirteen months, 
representing the cycle of corn in the bowels of the earth and the gestation 
cycle of the human being in the womb....Corn is omnipresent in all human 
activity, as food, as decoration, and as religious symbol. Most meals are based 
on corn, which, with beans and chilli, makes up the basic diet. 
• ...the fundamental core of the religion consists of the cult of nature and 
respect for and subordination of man to nature (not the reverse, as happens 
with the culture imposed by the conquistadores). 
• The early 1870's saw the introduction of some industry and the exploitation 
of coffee in Guatemala, and with it the start of the process of capitalistic 
industrialisation that has since governed attitudes to nature....Coffee 
cultivation requires extensive surface area, and this inevitably led to the 
abolition of communal ownership of land. This in turn led to a strengthening 
of latifundios (large estates) where previously minifundios (smallholdings) 
had flourished. The best land ended up in the hands of a few and the 
indigenous people were forced to expand their agricultural frontiers using 
methods that ran counter to their cosmo-vision, such as the burning of forests 
and the use of mountains to replace the forests from which they had been 
expelled. Feudal-type agriculture and the defective process of industrialisation 
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constituted the base of an economy that privileged the search for maximum 
profit and was thus insensitive to nature. 
° There is a common denominator...: the worst affected are those whose view 
of nature and its resources are based on respect 
° As long as the Mayas are a demographic majority but a political minority, 
the longed-for development tied to environmental preservation wil l not be 
possible. 
Terena (1993) provides a valuable insight into the experience and visions of the 4% 
of the original indigenous populations of Brazil still alive. As the founder and 
president of the Union of Indigenous Nations of Brazil he offers harsh truths and facts 
on the impact of 'civilizing' Europeans over the last 500 years. 
• We take seriously current world concern over what we have always warned 
about [socio-ecological degradation]. 
• Indigenous man has been able to decipher the greatnesss of nature and set 
down a code of life 'civilized' man could never understand, whether in its 
materialist or spiritual aspect. 
• White man's civilization...forced our people to adopt comercial, economic 
and social values that we knew nothing about, like the difference between 
richness and poverty. Later, we discovered how deceitful and despicable these 
new ideas were, because the end result was social misery and degradation: the 
development forced on us benefited the few at the expense of the many. 
• Today the Parakana resist, but it is probable that as each sun goes down they 
are thinking about the distant lake that now stands in the place that was once 
the center of their history and traditions. There rises the huge hydroelectric 
plant of Tukirui, which has not only flooded the land of the indigenous people 
but has led to the loss of various biological and wood species of the region. 
The same happened to the Paratintins, thanks to the trans-Amazonian 
highway, and to the Nambiquaras, as a result of the BR-364 highway -
arrogant progress that generates a form of development that impoverishes and 
degrades the natural habitat of men, animals, and plants. 
• Five centuries have forced a harsh silence on us. Now is the moment to 
break that silence. We can no longer remain dumb. The big powers talk of 
industrial development and richness. But it is a richness that brings with i t 
poverty and hunger, increases social marginalisation, and division between 
brotherly ties. 
• We Indians consider ourselves citizens of the forests. That is why we have 
fought so hard to obtain a government decree that provides official recognition 
of our territory. 
• Despite all the massacres (physical, spiritual, and cultural), we resist. And 
we wi l l continue to keep alive the teachings of our fathers. Rational 
management of the environment and cohabitation with nature form part of the 
ancient wisdom of our people. That's why, in the past, we were rich. Thanks to 
our deep understanding of nature [consider Naess' call for deeper questioning], 
our forefathers were able to produce medicines with no side effects and no 
commercial value, healthy food and architectural and engineering forms 
adapted to the forests. We are reliving the dreams of our prophets and fimly 
believe that one day AIDS, cancer, and simple allergies will be cured using 
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plants that come from our land. [Cox and Balick (1994) however state that 
"many funders of drug research still perceive the ethnobotanical approach [to 
drug research] as archaic, unscientific and unworthy of attention" even though 
their own research of more than a decade, and also that of many others find "a 
striking precision [in] the knowledge posessed by many healers".] 
Next the harsh truths and inspirational possibilities for re-learning sound socio-
ecophilosophy come from Palomino (1993), who is a teacher of the Quechua 
language and Andean culture at the university of Lima, Peru. He is a coordinator of 
the Indian Council of South America. 
• In the Quechua language, the words 'religion' and 'god' do not exist, but we 
use them in Spanish to indicate our relationship with the divine beings that are 
the holy forces of nature. 
• We believe that the dual, horizontal, and complimentary relationships 
always generates collective and communitarian organisations. This is the 
concept that gives rise to the Indian institution that can be expressed in the 
words 'mutual harmony' [recall Kropotkinian reference to 'mutual aid' as 
opposed to Darwinian competitivism]...n>z&w [is] translatable as 'the dialectic 
of the complimentarity of opposites'...[it] is the primary law regulating the 
cosmos and endowing it with harmony...When applied to the organisation of 
peoples, the principles of tinku turn into social forms that can only be 
collective and communitarian [xecall social ecology's call for decentralised 
communitarian democracies]. 
• [We are informed that all land belonged to the community, that at marriage 
couples received lifelong access to a non-hereditary tapu of land (calculated to 
satisfy the needs of newly formed families), all including the chiefs and priests 
were expected to be primarily farmers (their other tasks being secondary 
specializations), the cultures knew of 1,080 types of potato and 800 varieties 
of corn (offering stability against partial crop decimation by natural causes): 
that terracing engineering up the slopes of the Andes, coupled with trenches 
also to prevent erosion, offered extensive stable cropping opportunities and 
water bodies offering fish and edible algae]. 
• The result of being a conquered people is that our socio-cultural universe 
has been buried under the theories and concepts of experts who have 
misinterpreted our value system [the aim of these extensive quotes is to avoid 
this failure, to allow the voices of cultures to speak for themselves], either 
through prejudice, or through a lack of understanding of that which is 
different, or as a means of imposing an 'inteligent decodification' of our 
culture in line with the demands of the oppressor's culture . 
• What is unquestionably real is the survival of both cultures, albeit in a 
relationship of inequality: the Western in a position of domination, the 
indigenous in the position of the dominated. This conflict is at its most visible 
in the forms of oppression that have always been our daily bread: yesterday 
the destruction of our temples, the persecution and slaughtering of priests, the 
banning of ancestrial rituals, the burning of sacred objects; today, much more 
subtle and deceptive measures [recall the change from colonial imperialism to 
more discreet economic and cultural colonialism]. For example, in almost all 
countries of America, only the Catholic religion [one which historically has 
'justified' imperialistic and domination actions] is recognised as an official 
religion, and it is prohibited to use substances we consider sacred, like coca 
and peyote, which have been declared 'narcotic substances'. 
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• Only Western religious thinking conceives an invisible world, populated by 
gods who are themselves invisible, that is over and above the cosmic reality. 
For us, it seems unthinkable that man - who as the 'beloved offspring', the 'son 
of God', is also divine - should be superior to other living beings and do as he 
pleases with the Earth, regarding Mother Nature as an object of consumption, 
to be conquered, suppressed, transformed, violated, poisoned to the point of 
destruction just to satisfy whims and not needs . 
• We believe that a conceptual pollution hangs over indigenous culture, 
history and ways of life that has caused us serious damage: it has attempted to 
make us forget our people's collective forms, to lead us toward individualism 
and a class structure, to distance us from communion with the holy Pacha 
Mama [Mother Earth], while at the same time it has incited us to become its 
enemies, in the image and likeness of Western behaviour. 
• [In terms of agricultural arrangements] With the estates [latifundios] came 
the introduction of extensive single-crop fanning geared toward the market, a 
system that started immediately to destroy our indigenous system of multicrop 
farming in favour of self-consumption...The abandonment of Andean 
technology (for the last five hundred years) has contributed to the opening up 
of rifts and deep gullies on the slopes of the hills...But the biggest threat...is 
the gradual loss of our natural seeds thanks to the invasion of imported seeds. 
• We don't agree with [the Western]...model of development because it is 
precisely this that has led to the current environmental crisis, in Peru and in 
the world at large. Either we change tack, or we are headed toward a 
holocaust, destroying Mother Earth and her offspring. 
• The wood dwellers have developed a system based on cohabitation with 
nature. Their system of agriculture uses seeds that blend in naturally with the 
forest-based plants. You can hardly even see their agriculture, hidden by the 
immense beauty of the forests [an age old version of permaculture]. 
PIACENTINI, P, (ed.) 1993. Story Earth: Native Voices on the Environment. 
SanFrancisco, Mercury House. 
BRUCHAC, J., 1993. The Circle is the Way to See. In PIACENTINI, P. as above. 
CHAY, R.Q., 1993. The Corn Men Have Not Forgotten Their Ancient Gods. In 
PIACENTINI, P. as above. 
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as above. 
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APPENDIX S 
Seven channels for a more ecological approach - based on Morrison (1995) and 
other related inputs. 
1) Democratising finance. 
This essentially aims to arrest the prerogatives of both the private and the public 
entities of "largely unaccountable industrial powers" which control the instruments of 
global finance. A particularly interesting process which tends towards equitable 
financial arrangements is the application of Islamic principles in the organisation of 
money. This for example excludes 'interest', proposing rather that the investor and 
borrower share the burden of loss or gain on investment in ethically guided and so 
permissible endeavours (LETS projects as in point '2' are interest free).The likes of 
insider share dealings, and divisive 'speculative investment' (gambling) are also 
problematic, as are the phenomenal dealings in electronic money and investment in 
indexes of 'real money' (investment in what doesn't exist). Democratising finance 
means the growth of co-operative commercial banking, community development 
corporations and banks, credit unions, and co-operative savings banks. The Co-
operative Bank in the UK is a step towards democratising finance, excluding from it's 
creditor portfolio many abusive, exploitative, or socio-ecologically disruptive 
operations, and indeed it offers a sort of 'proxy' democracy to non-human interests 
through 'environmentally considerate' conditions being attached to loans. 
2) Building community economics. 
Morrison describes with examples the way this can develop, based around co-
operatives, individual businesses, partnerships, and corporations etc.. But there are 
significant differences between this and the current condition. It involves an 
integrated market and planning system "informed by democratic and ecological 
values". "It strengthens grassroots social bonds and self-organisation through mutual 
aid and the growth of democratic associations in day-care, education, home building 
and repair, food growing, fire and police protection, recreation, elder care...". 
In community economics, exploitative wage labour is unacceptable, whilst corporate 
forms, and wage labour are not so much unacceptable as subject to transformation in 
terms of their nature, size and conduct. Neither the individual firm nor the community 
would be left 'adrift' in "the capitalist market sea". 
Morrison does not include in his community economics an increasingly significant 
and indeed important form of community economics. LETS projects (local exchange 
and trading projects) are a rapidly growing phenomena in the UK. They are not 
ideologically new (trade and exchange are ancient social processes and persist today 
in less money dependent areas), but as they grow now in the UK they are re-emerging 
from dormancy. They are a not-so-media-talked-about form of direct action, the 
reclamation of community autonomy in the face of often externally caused economic 
depression. As well as being interest free as mentioned in point T , once organised, 
scarcity is rarely an issue, and the benefits of any exchange stay local - defeating the 
within-nation capital f l ight and profit sapping as described in chapter 3 under 
'dependency theory'. LETSLINK UK state that between 1991 and 1994, the number 
of operating LETS projects increased from just a few to almost 300, with more than 
15,000 participants. They also report that similar systems were being organised in 15 
other European countries as well as in the US, Canada and Australia. Their 'Infopack' 
is a comprehensive and detailed study and 'how-to']. 
LETS projects are systems through which skills and abilities are exchanged amongst 
a pool of participants. They give autonomy from local or national economic 
depression (the 1930's saw a rise in LETS type trading) and are much more flexible 
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than 'real' money trading. Projects function with credit and debits of invented 
currencies. The pooled credit/debit exchange system means that A can do a job for B, 
who may pay for it by doing a job for C, who then uses the credit earned by having D 
do a job for her (C). Money and government are not required, just a community 
based, and collectively agreed terms of project, and an integrated, ecological, and 
local trading system is in place. 
3) Re-evaluation of the future. 
Redefine accounting, for example to make the GNP a real index of social, economic 
and environmental health. Another questionable tool of evaluation is the 'net present 
value', which for example when evaluating human life loss, devalues future lives. 
Morrison also asserts the need for 'ecological accounting'. [This is a vote in favour of 
the aims of environmental economics. See chapters 4 and 5]. 
4) Creating a social wage. 
Establish a liveable minimum wage 
5) Pursuing disarmament and demilitarisation. 
This is a self explanatory direction, but approaches to it are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
6) Developing an industrial ecology. 
Three particular components of this he suggests are: the elimination of products and 
production processes that are destructive, poisonous, and unsustainable, and the 
replacement of them with sustainable and beneficial processes and products; the 
ongoing pursuit of efficiency and the elimination of waste in resource and energy use; 
and the development of production and consumption patterns based on re-use and 
recycling, where 'waste' products are reclaimed and used as inputs for further 
productive processes. [This is clearly a reformist goal, though other components of 
his societal ecologisation are more radical.] 
7) Developing a 'solar economy'. 
This he describes as transforming society such that it depends on renewable energy 
sources. He also favours greater efficiency and reduced materialism in production 
goals. But Morrison warns against damaging manifestations of 'renewable energy' 
sources such as huge hydro-electric dams "and other mega-projects", and the scenario 
where for example solar water heaters and photo voltaic cells are mass produced in 
sweatshop factories - this would perpetuate the industrial social scenario that is so 
violent to integrity. 
LETSLINK U.K.. 1995. The Lets Info Pack (6th edition). Warminster, LETSLINK 
U.K.. 
MORRISON, R., 1995. Ecological Democracy. Boston MA, South End Press. 
